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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most puzzling aspects of executive compensation is
the pay gap that exists between American and foreign Chief Executive
Officers (CEOs).1 U.S. CEOs are paid vastly more than their foreign
counterparts: they have higher base salaries, they receive larger
bonuses, they get more stock options, and they are given bigger
chunks of company restricted stock. 2 Commentators 3 and the financial
1. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 842 (2002). For business scholars' descriptions
of the international pay gap for CEOs, see Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2495-97 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999)
(summarizing numerous studies); John M. Abowd & Michael L. Bognanno, International
Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation, in DIFFERENCES AND CHANGES IN WAGE
STRUCTURES 67 (Richard B. Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz eds., 1995).
2. Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization) of
Executive Pay, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS, at 156-57 (Columbia University
Press 2003).
3. Bebchuk et al., supra note 1; MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, Do
CEOS SET THEIR OWN PAY? THE ONES WITHOUT PRINCIPLES Do 6-7 (MIT Dept. of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 00-26, 2000) (comparing contracting and skimming views of executive pay
and concluding that pay at poorly governed firms is more accurately explained using skimming
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press 4 have been quick to claim that such differences can be explained
by "Board Capture," a theory that claims powerful American
executives take advantage of weak domestic boards of directors and
passive, dispersed shareholders to overpay themselves exorbitantly.
5
According to Board Capture theorists, American CEOs
orchestrate the appointments of their obedient subordinates as inside
directors and of friendly, passive outside directors. The net result is a
board comprised of compliant directors and a Compensation
Committee that lacks the aggressive hard-nosed negotiators needed to
keep executive pay in check. To make matters worse, the
Compensation Committee's advisors, usually paid consultants from a
handful of well-known firms, have conflicts of interest that preclude
them from giving truly disinterested advice. They tell directors to rely
upon industry surveys of pay levels that have the (un)intended
consequence of constantly ratcheting executive pay levels upward.6
view), http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=223736; see also BRADFORD CORNELL,
COMPENSATION AND RECRUITING: PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES VERSUS PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 12-15
(UCLA Working Paper No. 6-02, 2002) (arguing that the pay gap between American CEOs of
private corporations and presidents of private universities is evidence of CEO overpayment),
http://repositories.cdlib.org/anderson/fin/6-02/.
4. Paul Krugman, Editorial, The Outrage Constraint, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at A17
(praising board capture theory). But see Holman W. Jenkins, Editorial, Outrageous CEO Pay
Revisited, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2002, at A17 (criticizing the theory as "nothing more than a
restatement of the greed hypothesis" and pointing out other flaws in the argument).
5. This Article uses the term Board Capture to describe a well-established stylized fact in
corporate law that the board of directors of a company may be more aligned with the
management than with the shareholders. JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 9.3 (2002)
("Corporate directors are often in fact chosen by management, and they do not (perhaps they
cannot) effectively monitor management's conduct and the quality of its performance"). In the
executive compensation area, Professor Elson has most forcefully asserted this claim. Charles
M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 651
(1995) [hereinafter Elson, The Duty of Care]; see also Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation
and the Management-Captured Board-The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV.
127, 156-64 (1996) (describing the captured board syndrome). The board of directors becomes
beholden to management for nominating them to the board. Elson, The Duty of Care, supra, at
650-51. The result is that the board becomes unable to bargain effectively on behalf of the
shareholders when it comes to setting the compensation levels of the CEO and other executives.
Id. at 655 (stating that "[t]he resulting salary may be problematic where effective bargaining
does not take place because one party does not attempt to maximize its own self-interest," and
that, "[i]f the board is reluctant to bargain effectively with management because, despite its
fiduciary obligations, it finds itself more closely aligned with management than with
shareholders, then the product of such a 'bargain' may be no bargain at all to the corporation and
its owners").
This same theory recently has resurfaced under a different name, the "managerial power"
theory, in an influential article. Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 754 (describing this as the
managerial power view).
6. JOHN M. BIZJAK ET AL., HAS THE USE OF PEER GROUPS CONTRIBUTED TO HIGHER LEVELS
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2 (Working Paper, 2000) (finding that competitive benchmarking
in setting executive pay increases executive pay levels); see also RONALD C. ANDERSON & JOHN
BIzJAK, AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF THE CEO AND THE COMPENSATION
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American CEO pay levels have skyrocketed, they claim, as a result of
this process.
The international pay gap arises, the story goes, because
foreign CEOs do not have the same power over their boards.7 In most
foreign corporations, control shareholders act as strong checks on
executive pay. Control shareholders will recoup most of the firm's
rents and therefore have strong financial incentives to keep executive
pay abroad at more reasonable levels. Thus, by comparison to U.S.
CEOs, foreign CEOs are paid less.
In the wake of Enron, Global Crossing, and the host of other
financial scandals, and the anecdotal evidence surrounding the abuse
of corporate perks and compensation schemes that has surfaced in
their wake, Board Capture Theory has caught the public's attention.
Executive compensation has been painted as the symbol of out-of-
control greed in corporate America. People here and abroad want to
believe that American CEOs have been playing a one-sided game, and
have been winning without really having to work hard for their pay.
Board Capture Theory provides an argument supporting these claims.
This Article presents the first comprehensive theoretical
analysis of the international pay gap.8 It is critical of the Board
Capture explanation and offers several more plausible market-based
theories that explain this phenomenon. The problem with relying
solely on board capture as an explanation is that, while it may lead to
some inflation in U.S. CEO pay levels, it does not fully explain the
CEO pay gap. For example, Board Capture Theory does not tell us
why executive pay in the U.S. grew so rapidly after the early 1980s.9
There is no evidence that CEOs' power over their boards grew during
this time period; in fact, most evidence is to the contrary. 10 Nor does
COMMITTEE IN STRUCTURING EXECUTIVE PAY 3 (Working Paper, 2000) (finding that adding
independent directors to Compensation Committees does not reduce executive pay levels).
7. Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 844.
8. For the only other theoretical discussion of the issue in the legal literature, see Bebchuk
et al., supra note 1, at 842-45. Those authors, however, devote only three pages of their survey of
the executive compensation literature to an analysis of the international pay gap.
9. As one commentator pointed out, "If managerial power has been on the rise, why are so
many CEOs fired? Why has tenure fallen and turnover increased? And why did some of the
richest pay deals go to executives who hadn't been hired yet and therefore didn't have the hiring
boards under their thumbs?" Jenkins, supra note 4.
10. Boards of directors became more independent of management and more powerful during
this time period. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love
the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 882 (2002) ("[O]utside
directors are not mere lackeys of management. Several studies based on pre-1990 data
document, among other things, that outside directors make it more likely that poorly performing
CEOs are fired, that they enhance shareholder wealth during tender offers .... "). The reality is
that shareholders' concern about executive pay grew only when the stock market's performance
fell. Institutional investors were happy to vote in favor of huge stock option plans during the bull
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Board Capture Theory offer a persuasive explanation of why bigger
firms pay their executives more than smaller ones, or why the supply
of executives has not dramatically increased in response to the alleged
huge rents that CEOs have been receiving for the last twenty years.
Furthermore, Board Capture Theory does not explain why boards pay
incoming CEOs so well even though the CEOs have no prior
relationship with the directors. Finally, even if we accept Board
Capture Theory, we still will need a mechanism to set executive pay.
Market-driven forces seem necessary to accomplish this result.
This Article offers five alternative theories that justify higher
pay for American CEOs than for foreign top executives. It argues that
each one of these theories-Marginal Revenue Product Theory,
Tournament Theory, Opportunity Cost Theory, Bargaining Theory,
and Risk Adjustment Theory-present better explanations for the
international CEO pay gap than Board Capture Theory.
The Article starts with the Marginal Revenue Product Theory,
which rests on the economic concept that each factor of production,
including managerial labor, should be paid the amount of its
contribution to the value of the firm; that is, its marginal revenue
product. This theory claims that American CEOs should be paid more,
on average, than foreign CEOs because American CEOs contribute
more to their firms' value. It claims that American firms have greater
growth opportunities, have greater resources to be deployed because
they are bigger, and that American CEOs play a much larger role in
the decision-making process at their firms than CEOs at most foreign
firms.
The second theory, the Tournament Theory, explains the
international pay gap as a product of the workings of corporations'
internal labor markets. In these markets, top executives' pay is the
prize that is awarded to the winner of the internal labor market
tournament. The tournament to win these prized positions is
analogized to a single elimination tournament in sports like tennis,
where the winner is given by far the largest sum of prize money. The
bigger the tournament is, the bigger the prize. The tournament to
become the CEO is, under this theory, a much bigger one at American
firms because U.S. CEOs have so much more power than their foreign
counterparts.11  For instance, in the United States the CEO is
market stock price run-ups in the 1990s. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The
Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 47
(2000) (finding that shareholders overwhelmingly approved stock option plans during the 1990s).
11. The management structure of U.S. firms has flattened significantly in recent years so
that more managers report directly to the CEO. RAGHURAM G. RAAN & JULIE M. WULF, THE
FLATTENING FIRM: EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA ON THE CHANGING NATURE OF CORPORATE
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normally also the Chairman of the Board, whereas in foreign countries
this is rarely the case. American CEOs' power is further enhanced
compared to those of their biggest foreign rivals, Japan and Germany,
because boards of directors are smaller in the United States than in
Japan and have only one tier, instead of the two tier structure in
Germany. Finally, the "winner-take-all" culture in the United States
may condone larger top prizes in these tournaments than is socially
acceptable abroad.
The third theory is based on the economic concept of
opportunity costs. Opportunity costs in this context can be thought of
as the amount that would be paid to a CEO in her best alternative job.
The Opportunity Cost Theory recognizes that CEOs and other top
executives are able to jump ship from their own firms and move to
other companies, hoping to get better jobs and higher pay. In order to
keep managerial talent in place, firms must pay their best executives
an amount at least equal to their opportunity costs, or they will leave
and go elsewhere.
The international pay gap arises because U.S. CEOs have
better job options than foreign CEOs. The opening up of financial
markets since the early 1980s has given U.S. CEOs better access to
capital markets for financing their own businesses, raising the value
of their alternative opportunities. This occurred first through the use
of the leveraged buyout (LBOs and MBOs) as a method of financing a
new firm, then with the tremendous growth in venture capital
financing for start-ups, and later on (at least for a period of years)
when the technology boom made available massive amounts of capital
to finance "dot com" companies. Today, LBOs have returned to
popularity, and are once again fueling the demand for top executives. 12
Established American businesses that wish to compete for managerial
talent are forced to offer their executives larger pay packages to keep
them from being lured away by the newcomers.
By comparison, foreign CEOs have not had nearly the same
access to financial markets to launch their own businesses. Foreign
financial markets are more fragmented, more regulated, offer less
venture capital financing, and have fewer LBOs and MBOs. Only
recently has there been an expansion of executive job opportunities
with the deregulation of some capital markets, coupled with the
expansion of internal labor markets, and increased managerial
HIERARCHIES 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9633, 2003). The result is a
steeper pay differential at the top of the organization as the prize for winning the internal job
tournament increases.
12. Emily Thorton et al., Those Bulging Buyouts, Bus. WK., Feb. 9, 2004, at 74.
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migration. These changes have increased pressure on foreign
companies to pay their executives more like Americans.
The fourth explanation of the large pay gap between American
and foreign CEOs, which this Article calls the Bargaining Power
Theory, derives from two important forces: first, the shift in the 1980s
in the relative bargaining strength of American CEOs in vetoing
takeovers of their corporations; and second, the concurrent acceptance
of the idea of pay-for-performance by U.S. institutional investors.
13
Beginning in 1985, when the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the Rights Plan, or poison pill, and shortly thereafter, when
the U.S. Supreme Court refused to invalidate second generation state
anti-takeover statutes, there has been a shift in the legal entitlement
to approve hostile takeovers from a target company's shareholders to a
target firm's board of directors and management. This shift gave the
American CEO tremendous power to stop a hostile takeover if the
CEO did not perceive the sale of the firm to be in that executive's
personal best interests.
While others have argued over whether this shift in the legal
rule was efficient or inefficient, takeovers of firms have continued on a
friendly basis. 14 In other words, the parties have bargained around
the shift of the legal rule to reach an efficient result, just as the Coase
theorem would predict. The Coase theorem, however, also tells us that
the shift in a legal entitlement can have distributional implications.
Here, one of the distributional effects of giving managers more power
to turn down takeovers is that they can demand to be compensated
more by their firm as the price for agreeing to give up their jobs. Even
if the CEOs only get a tiny fraction of their firm's value as the price for
their agreement to be a willing target, this can still amount to a vast
sum of money.
Around the same time as the legal rule was shifting,
institutional shareholders were gaining greater strength as they
became increasingly active in corporate governance. As the more
activist funds observed the success of the LBO movement with its
strong emphasis on stock-based compensation for the executives of the
newly privatized firms, they lobbied, with help from academics and
others, to move executive pay schemes away from fixed salary plus
bonus structures toward pay-for-performance systems. This led to a
surge in the use of stock options and restricted stock until today they
are routine (and large) components of American CEO pay packages.
13. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 871 (presenting a similar argument explaining the
increase during the 1990s in the levels of American executive pay).
14. Id. at 879-81 (explaining that "by the late 1990s, both friendly and hostile bids were
regularly made by Fortune 500 companies").
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The increased acceptability and greater use of stock options made
them a convenient mechanism for helping to convince CEOs of target
companies to accept high priced takeover bids because the sale led to a
big increase in the value of the CEO's personal stock and option
holdings. 15
Top managers of foreign firms have not enjoyed the same
increase in bargaining power because, while hostile takeovers in most
foreign countries continue to be almost impossible to pull off, these
firms generally have control shareholder ownership structures. 16
Thus in foreign firms, control shareholders make the decision whether
or not to sell the company. There is no reason for the dominant
shareholder to offer the firm's CEO more money for agreeing to a sale,
unless the CEO happens to be the control shareholder himself.
Furthermore, there is little impetus for institutional shareholders to
lobby to increase this component of foreign CEO pay because there is
no need to bribe foreign CEOs.
The fifth theory, Risk Adjustment Theory, points out that
American CEOs receive more of their pay in the form of stock options,
and probably hold more of their wealth in company stock, than do
foreign CEOs. Holding large amounts of options to buy their firm's
stock and being forced to hold unbalanced personal investment
portfolios create large risks for American CEOs. Their lack of
diversification can be very costly to them, and they justifiably seek to
be compensated for these risks. In other words, companies are forced
to pay them more in order to get them to place all of their eggs in the
firm's basket.
Foreign CEOs do not face these constraints. If they are
professional managers at firms with control shareholders, they face
less pressure to hold company stock. Alternatively, they may be the
control shareholder themselves. In this situation, although they hold
undiversified portfolios, they can take money from the firm in other
ways without raising their compensation, such as big dividends or
conflict of interest transactions.
Nor is there much reason to give foreign CEOs large grants of
stock options. Options generally serve three functions in the typical
dispersed ownership American firm: they give executives incentives to
work harder; they help align the incentives of executives with those of
shareholders as a substitute for close shareholder monitoring; and
they provide compensation and help with retention of talented
15. See JOHN C. COATES IV & REINIER KRAAKMAN, VALUING STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION:
EXECUTIVE PAY AND MERGER ACTIVITY IN THE 1990s (Working Paper, 2002).
16. See infra notes 401-411 and accompanying text.
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executives. Historically, options have not provided these benefits at
foreign firms. For example, while some form of incentive pay may
stimulate these executives to work harder, foreign firms traditionally
use bonus payments tied to firm performance measures. Options have
not been needed for alignment purposes either, because the control
shareholder can monitor the CEO's efforts relatively easily. Options
are unnecessary for retention purposes when no other firms in the
same labor market are offering them to their executives. Options are
also a relatively expensive way of compensating managers, unless
they provide other benefits, because of the need to discount their value
for the additional risk borne by their often undiversified holders.
These costs are an additional reason why options have been
unattractive to many foreign firms. In short, foreign CEOs will bear
less firm-specific risk and therefore will not need to be compensated as
much for it.
From a policy perspective, what does each theory tell us about
the need for government intervention in the executive pay arena?
Under the theories offered in this paper, market forces dictate pay
levels, and policymakers should play a secondary, supporting role in
regulating executive pay levels. The Marginal Revenue Product
Theory predicts that the international pay gaps will disappear if the
underlying economic factors converge toward common levels. For
instance, if foreign firms grow, control more resources, and have better
opportunities to expand, then this theory predicts that foreign CEO
compensation levels will rise if the CEO contributes
disproportionately to these changes. 17 International convergence to
U.S. pay levels can occur but only in order to reflect an increase in the
value of foreign executives.
International pay gaps will shrink, according to the
Tournament Theory, if foreign CEOs' power grows. Pay levels will
converge if the position of CEO in a foreign company becomes as
pnwtrfii1 q.-, in thp Arnrircn firm- ,n thnt thp prize, tn f.hp. victor i.R
equally large.18 As with the first theory, higher American CEO pay
today seems economically justifiable, and government intervention
remains unnecessary.
Opportunity Cost Theory leads to the conclusion that foreign
firms will pay their executives at American pay levels only if these
17. Alternatively, institutional investors and corporate boards could exercise greater control
over American firms, thereby reducing the amount of freedom that U.S. CEOs have to make
decisions, and lowering their marginal revenue product. Thus, lower American CEO pay could
result, and the pay gap be eliminated in that manner.
18. As with the Marginal Revenue Product Theory, tighter controls over American CEOs by
corporate boards or institutional investors could reduce their power and narrow the pay gap.
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executives can earn that much in alternative executive positions. This
will occur where new productive opportunities are opening up in their
economies. Again, convergence to higher pay levels seems justifiable if
the economics are right, and government intervention has little role in
closing the pay gap.
Turning to the Bargaining Theory, convergence of international
pay will occur in most foreign countries only if foreign share
ownership becomes more dispersed and legal barriers to takeovers are
reduced. These shifts would make hostile takeovers possible and
increase foreign CEOs' power to decide whether to sell the company.
In the United Kingdom, and other countries with relatively weak
protections for target firm managers, convergence to American levels
is possible if British CEOs gain more power in takeover battles, which
could happen if the English react to the new European Union
takeovers directive by diluting their current law. 19 If the foreign
market for corporate control becomes more efficient, then the ensuing
benefits to shareholders may offset any increase in executive pay so
that the resulting outcome is at least wealth-neutral for shareholders
in foreign companies.
Risk Adjustment Theory predicts that international pay
convergence will only occur if stock and equity-based instruments
move toward comparable absolute and percentage amounts of foreign
and American CEOs' individual wealth. This is a difficult claim to test
empirically, as little data are available on CEO wealth levels and
stockholdings. At present, however, there seems little reason to think
that stock option usage, the most easily observed component of this
equation, will move to similar levels in the United States and abroad.
American CEOs are likely to have much higher levels of option
compensation and stock holdings for the foreseeable future.
Unlike the other theories, the Board Capture Theory claims
that higher American executive pay is economically inefficient and
policymakers should try to reduce it. Theorists of this persuasion look
19. The European Union recently adopted a weak takeovers directive. Report on the
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on Takeover Bids, EUR. PARL. DOC.
(COM 534) (2002). The directive is intended to increase standardization and transparency, but it
has been diluted substantially by a provision that makes many of its requirements optional. The
directive's most controversial provisions include a "board passivity" rule and a "breakthrough"
rule. The board passivity rule requires a target company's board to seek shareholder approval for
any defenses seeking to frustrate a bid. Id. Similarly, the breakthrough rule invalidates many
restrictions a target may place on the transfer of its securities while a takeover bid is pending.
Id. EC member states are not required to adopt these provisions provided companies within the
state are permitted to opt in to them on an individual basis. Id. Furthermore, states may exempt
companies from these rules if the company is the target of a takeover by a bidder that is not
subject to the rules. Id.
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to reduce American executive pay levels by increasing disclosure
levels.20 This Article argues that, based on past experience with the
adoption of increased disclosure policies, this prescription is
misguided.
Based on currently available research, the five market-based
theories offer better explanations of the international CEO pay gap
that shed more light on executive pay than the Board Capture Theory.
Although all of the theories may be right to some extent, so that
executive pay is determined both for economic reasons and by
American executives' power to obtain a disproportionate share of their
firm's rents, more research needs to be done to understand the
dynamics of this market before governments rush in and intervene.
Current economic conditions have slowed, and may stop, further
increases in executive pay levels.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part II
presents a survey of executive pay arrangements around the world,
and an overview of the basic facts that affect executive pay on which
each theory is based (at least partially). Part III lays out the board
capture explanation for the international CEO pay gap. Parts IV
through VIII explain five alternative hypotheses for this gap: the
Marginal Revenue Product Theory, Tournament Theory, Opportunity
Cost Theory, Bargaining Power Theory, and Risk Adjustment Theory.
Part IX discusses what policymakers should do about the pay gap, and
then present some brief conclusions.
II. THE CEO PAY GAP: THE BASIC FACTS
A. Executive Pay Arrangements Around the World
When it comes to compensation, American executives stand out
as exceptional on an international basis and U.S. chief executive
officers have particularly distinctive arrangements.-, The best publicly
available data on worldwide remuneration, compiled by Towers
Perrin, a global management consulting firm, illustrates this point.22
The Towers Perrin 2001 annual remuneration survey compares pay
packages for different level executives at industrial companies with
20. LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK ET AL., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN AMERICA: OPTIMAL
CONTRACTING OR EXTRACTION OF RENTS? (Working Paper, 2001) (on file with author). These
authors also advocate stronger action by institutional investors at the firm level to help bring
down executive pay levels at individual firms.
21. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 2, at 13, 24-25.
22. TOWERS PERRIN, WORLDWIDE TOTAL REMUNERATION 2001-2002, at 20-23 (2002).
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approximately $500 million in annual sales. Using this benchmark, it
shows that total annual remuneration for a U.S. CEO averaged
$1,933,000 in 2001.23 This total compensation was more than twice
the average pay for CEOs in all of the other 25 countries surveyed,
and was more than three times the average CEO pay in all but seven
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China/Hong Kong, Mexico,
Singapore and the United Kingdom).
By contrast, looking at lower level managers this pay gap
shrinks. In 2001, Towers Perrin reports that America's human
resource directors ranked first with total annual compensation of
$449,000 annually.24 While this was significantly more than in other
countries, the gap was not as large as with CEOs, and there are ten
countries where human resource directors were paid at least half as
much as their American counterparts.
A second important distinction between executive
compensation in the United States and abroad is the use of incentive
pay. American chief executives have more variable, or performance-
based, compensation, where they benefit only if their company meets
or exceeds prescribed targets. The 2001 Towers Perrin survey on
worldwide remuneration shows that U.S. CEOs' annual bonuses are
56 percent of their salaries. 25 In addition, long term incentive-based
compensation (e.g. stock options and bonus plans with multi-year
targets) averaged about 161 percent of American CEOs' average
salary levels.
26
Outside of the U.S., incentive-oriented pay is considerably less
important to CEOs. For instance, there are only two jurisdictions
(Australia and Venezuela) where the ratio of annual bonus to salary
was higher than the 56 percent figure in the U.S.27 More importantly,
in long-term incentive pay comparisons American CEOs stand alone:
Canada's 90 percent ratio of this form of compensation to salary was
23. Id. at 20. Towers Perrin defines total annual remuneration as the sum of basic
compensation ("annual base salary... plus non-performance-related bonus and cash profit
sharing"), variable bonus ("payment[s] related to individual performance"), long term incentives
("[a]nnual expected value of long-term incentive awards (e.g., stock options, stock grants, and
other awards)"), perquisites ("[a] nnual cash value of company cars, club memberships," and other
typical perquisites), and company contributions (both compulsory and noncompulsory
contributions for benefits, etc.). Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 21.




the closest to the U.S. figure of 161 percent.28 The United Kingdom,
the highest European country, was far behind at 44 percent. 29
Long-term incentive schemes explain a great deal of why
American CEOs are better paid than their counterparts elsewhere.
Towers Perrin 2001 survey shows that an average U.S. chief executive
officer was awarded approximately $900,000 annually in long-term
incentive compensation.3 0 By comparison, in only two of the other
twenty-five countries surveyed did aggregate annual CEO
compensation come close to matching to this figure (Argentina at
$879,000 and Mexico at $867,000). 3
1
For lower level executives, Americans receive more incentive-
oriented pay than their foreign counterparts, but the pay gap is not as
substantial as it is for chief executives. Towers Perrin's 2001 survey
found that U.S. human resource directors get long term incentive pay
amounting to 66 percent of their base salary. 32 As with CEOs, this
percentage was higher than in any other country; however, there were
two jurisdictions (Malaysia and Singapore) with relatively close
figures.3 3 The Towers Perrin data also show that as recently as 2000,
the long-term incentive/base salary ratio was actually higher in these
two countries than it was in America.3 4
Finally, it may be important, as we shall see later, to compare
pay levels in countries that have similar levels of minority shareholder
protection. For our purposes, the United Kingdom provides the most
comparable set of data to the United States. Turning to these data, we
see a similar pattern: U.S. CEOs make far more. These differences
were documented in a comparative study of executive compensation
between the United States and the United Kingdom by Conyon and
Murphy.3 5 They surveyed pay arrangements in over 1600 publicly
quoted U.S. corporations and found that, as of 1997, U.S. CEOs were
paid on average £3,565,000 in total compensation, whereas English
CEOs received only £589,000 in total pay.3 6 American CEOs received
amiirh QrnnlPr pareant.qr- of their nay in fixed compensation with an
average of 29 percent (£1,033,850) of their pay in the form of base
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 20.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 27.
33. Id.
34. TOWERS PERRIN, WORLDWIDE TOTAL REMUNERATION 2000, at 25 (2000).
35. Martin J. Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the
United States and the United Kingdom, 110 ECON. J. F640, F643 (2000) (documenting
"differences in CEO pay and incentives in the United States and the United Kingdom for 1997").
36. Id. at F646.
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salaries. 37 By contrast, U.K. CEOs earned 59 percent (Y347,510) of
their total compensation in the form of salaries, although this
amounted to significantly less than the average dollar amount earned
by the Americans. 38 This same study shows that, while annual
bonuses constituted about the same percentage of total compensation
in the two countries, and the percentage of CEOs receiving bonuses
was roughly the same in the two countries, 39 the bonus payments in
the United States were, on average, triple the size of those granted in
Britain.
40
Stock options play a huge role in the overall compensation
package for American CEOs and executives. For example, in 1997, the
average American CEO received 42 percent (£1,497,300) of her total
pay in the form of option grants, as against the 29 percent
(£1,033,850) in the form of salaries. 41 By comparison, compensating
executives with stock options has been a uniquely American practice.
42
The United Kingdom was a frontrunner for Europe, yet stock option
plans were largely unknown there until the mid-1980s, when the
introduction of favorable tax treatment prompted large numbers of
companies to introduce executive plans.43 In more recent years in the
United Kingdom, income from stock-based plans has been increasing
dramatically. 44 The Conyon and Murphy study shows, however, that
37. Id. at F646-47. The authors converted all dollar figures to English pounds using the
average exchange rate during the fiscal year. Id. at F646 tbl. 1.
38. Id. at F646.
39. Id. at F646 tbl. 1, F647 (showing 81 percent in Britain and 83 percent in the United
States). The survey, in addition to covering nearly 1700 U.S. corporations, encompassed the
United Kingdom's largest 510 companies ("ranked by market capitalization"). Id. at F643.
40. Id. at F647-48. American CEOs' average annual bonuses totalled £606,050, whereas
average bonuses totalled £106,020 for English CEOs. Id. at F646.
41. Id. at F646-47.
42. Shirley Fung, How Should We Pay Them?, ACROSS THE BOARD, June 1999, at 37-38
("Up to now, compensating executives via stock options has been primarily an American
phenomenon and one widely used here."); Luisa Kroll, Catching Up, FORBES, May 19, 1997, at
162. Stock option plans have been popular in the United States since at least the 1950s. Clifford
W. Smith, Jr. & Ross L. Watts, Incentive and Tax Effects of Executive Compensation Plans, 7
AUSTL. J. MGMT. 139 (1982), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF ACCOUNTING POLICY CHOICE 347,
359 (Rau Ball & Clifford W. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) ("By 1968 the qualified option was the sole
long-term performance plan for 86 of the 100 largest companies in the U.S.").
43. Executive Pay; Perky, ECONOMIST (U.K. edition), Oct. 8, 1988, at 48 (referring to share
options as "the newest executive game"); Helen Kay, Have We Killed the Share Option?,
DIRECTOR, Oct. 1995, at 66 (including a timeline, 'The Life and Times of the Share Option");
Laura Mazur, Europay, ACROSS THE BOARD, Jan. 1995, at 40 (noting that "[t]he tax regimes in
each country are the key to the varying levels [of pay]... British participation [in stock options]
has increased remarkably during the 1980s, boosted by tax-friendly legislation in 1984").
44. Patrick Jenkins, Bosses Share Their Options, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2000, at 15 (quoting
a consultant expert as saying, "share schemes.., are really the growth trend"). For a discussion
of the trend in the 1990s and early 1980s, see Andy Cosh & Alan Hughes, The Changing
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in 1997 U.K. executives received only 10 percent (Y58,900) of their
total compensation in the form of stock options. 45
In sum, these data show that a large pay gap exists between
American CEOs and those in equivalent positions at foreign firms.
B. Background Facts Concerning Executive Pay
With the different compensation patterns in mind, this section
turns next to the important factual differences between American
corporations and foreign corporations that could affect comparative
pay differentials. While later sections of this Article elaborate on how
these facts support each of the different theories, a concise discussion
of them at this point in the paper will aid the reader in deciding how
well each of these theories explains reality.
First, American corporations have more dispersed share
ownership structures than most foreign companies. 46 Corporate
governance in continental Europe and in the market-oriented
economies of East Asia is organized around control shareholder
structures. For instance, in Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Italy, and the
Netherlands, more than 75 percent of public companies have a control
shareholder. 47  Publicly traded companies do not play nearly as
important a role in these economies, 48 for only a relatively small
number of European companies are public and, of these, "only a small
proportion" are listed companies. 49 Even at publicly traded firms,
control shareholders are prevalent and generally exercise considerable
Anatomy of Corporate Control and the Market for Executives in the United Kingdom, 24 J.L. &
SOC'Y 104, 118 (1997). The number of companies using stock option schemes declined, however,
during the mid-1990s as the popularity of other types of long-term incentive plans grew. Cf.
CONFERENCE BD., 10P EXEUu11vTI CuMPENSATION. CANADA, F"ANCE, THE UNITED TITDO-, AMnT
THE UNITED STATES 22 (1999); Conyon & Murphy, supra note 35, at F649-50, F666 (noting that
"there has been some movement away from the traditional stock option by larger companies" in
the United Kingdom).
45. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 35, at F646.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 180-207 for further discussion.
47. VAN DER ELST, THE EQUITY MARKETS, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES AND CONTROL:
TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL HARMONISATION? 13 (Fin. Law Inst., Universiteit Gent, Working
Paper No. 2000-04, 2000) (summarizing results of earlier studies).
48. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1137-38
(1997) (finding that the average ratio of outsider held stock market to GNP of countries with
French civil law is 21 percent as compared to 60 percent for common law countries).
49. VAN DER ELST, supra note 47, at 4. From 1990 to 1999, the number of listed companies
in France, Germany, and Spain grew significantly, indicating that financing by public issuance of
equity is becoming more important in these countries. Id. at 5-6 tbl. 3.
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influence over management. The prevailing approach to corporate
governance therefore is "insider/control-oriented."
50
This point has several implications for executive pay both in
the United States and abroad. For American firms, the dispersed
ownership structure means that the interests of managers and
shareholders may diverge in important ways. Shareholders want to
find alignment mechanisms that keep these interests directed toward
the same goals. Stock option compensation can serve this function and
is therefore likely to be much greater at American firms than at
foreign firms, where alignment of interests is less of a problem.51 The
absence of a controlling shareholder in American firms also gives U.S.
CEOs more power to decide many things, including whether or not
they wish to sell their firm.
For foreign CEO pay, one important fact is that these
companies are much more likely to have controlling shareholders that
either manage the firm themselves, or at least have substantial
control over the professionals that run the company. 52  These
controlling shareholders will not generally want to give up control of
their firms involuntarily and will therefore resist giving large
amounts of equity to professional managers, 53 and will try to defeat
hostile takeovers of their firms.
54
Many foreign corporations are controlled by majority
shareholders that appoint themselves, or their relatives, to top
management positions.55 Weak minority shareholder protections in
almost all foreign countries permit these CEOs to take large amounts
of money out of their firms in conflict-of-interest transactions. 56 In
some countries, the absence of corporate disclosure rules may permit
50. Erik Berglf, A Note on the Typology of Financial Systems, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS 151, 159-64 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997)
(" 'Insider control' is commonly used to denote a situation with strong control by management
.... "); Hans J. Blommestein, The New Financial Landscape and Its Impact on Corporate
Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND GLOBAL CONVERGENCE 41,
56-59 (Morten Balling et al. eds., 1998) (explaining that the "'insider model'.., relies heavily on
the accountability of board members to the stakeholders they represent").
51. See infra notes 185-191.
52. See infra notes 107-110.
53. See infra text accompanying note 105.
54. See infra notes 393-404.
55. See MARA FACCIO & LARRY H.P. LANG, THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL:
AN ANALYSIS OF ULTIMATE OWNERSHIP IN WESTERN EUROPEAN CORPORATIONS 2 (Working
Paper, 2001); STIJN CLAESSENS ET AL., ULTIMATE CONTROLLING OWNERS OF EAST ASIAN
CORPORATIONS AND EXPROPRIATION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 17 (World Bank Brookings
Institution, Working Paper, 1998) (providing data that supports this proposition).
56. CLAESSENS ET AL., supra note 55, at 3. See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 758-61 (1997).
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control shareholders to hide these dealings from the public's view.57
Thus, for firms where the controlling shareholders are also the
managers, available compensation data may grossly understate actual
payments to their CEOs, and render comparisons of reported
compensation values misleading. 58 To properly compare international
CEOs' total "take home" pay, it would be helpful to adjust for these
other forms of compensation, so as to measure all cash flows from the
firm to its top executive. 59 Lacking data to correct for these cash
flows, we should recognize that these foreign firms' CEOs' total
remuneration could be substantially greater than the figures reported
at other foreign corporations.6 0
On an aggregate level, national averages will be distorted in
countries where firms with control shareholders acting as chief
executive officers are dominant. 61 Within any national labor market,
the prevailing compensation rates for foreign CEOs will reflect the
effects of (legal) self-dealing transactions by dominant shareholders.
Thus, if CEOs at Italian firms with dominant shareholders expect to
receive both direct compensation and other side payments from
conflict-of-interest transactions, and these firms set compensation
57. For a general discussion of the differences in executive pay disclosure regimes, see
Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 2, at 166-168.18. Where disclosure rules for executive
compensation are stronger than those for self-dealing transactions, this may cause the control
shareholder to prefer to take money out of the company through those transactions rather than
in direct compensation payments.
58. At these firms, the observed compensation gap disappears for other executives because
lower level foreign managers may not have the same opportunities to engage in self-enrichment
as the CEOs at their firms.
59. The private benefits of control are documented in ALEXANDER DYCK & LUIGI ZINGALES,
PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 5-7 (Working Paper, 2002) and
Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country Analysis,
68 J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2003). Dyck and Zingales examined 393 control transactions in 39
countries between 1990 and 2000. DYCK & ZINGALES, supra, at 3. They found that the average
premium for corporate control was 14 percent (ranging from -4 percent to 65 percent) and that,
"the premium paid for control is higher when the buyer comes from a country that protects
investors less (and thus is more willing or able to extract private benefits)." Id. at 2.
60. Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 844-45. One question this point raises is why would
dominant shareholders not pay themselves huge salaries as well as take the private benefits of
control? Although Board Capture theorists have not offered an answer to this question, one
possible response is that control shareholders do pay themselves more, but since they don't need
compensation consultants to justify their pay, they don't report any information about
compensation, including to private sources, and therefore these figures are not factored into any
comparisons.
61. If there are weak minority investor protections, shareholder returns will suffer at firms
with dominant shareholders even if they employ professional managers, although for a
somewhat different reason. At these firms, the monitoring efforts by the dominant shareholder
may constrain the firm's CEO from engaging in conflict-of-interest transactions; the dominant
shareholder, however, will not be so deterred. Thus, minority shareholders may trade lower
executive compensation for higher returns to the dominant shareholder. In both cases, they lose.
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levels within the Italian economy, then executives at all firms may
find their total pay reduced to a market level that reflects these
effects. In other words, even firms that forgo such side payments will
offer their executives lower compensation because that is the market
rate for compensating these executives.
Second, there are other important differences between
American firms and foreign firms. For example, American firms are
much bigger than foreign companies. 62 American CEOs therefore
control more resources, and may have more opportunities to create
wealth for their shareholders. 63 Furthermore, U.S. CEOs may be
more powerful than their foreign counterparts with greater authority
to initiate crucial decisions, such as selling the company, 64 because
there is no controlling shareholder.
Third, pay inequalities are a bigger social issue abroad than in
the U.S. This difference surfaces both in popular discussion of income
inequalities and in the internal corporate cultures of corporations.
65
This increased societal focus may create strong pressures on executive
pay practices, although their strength can shift over time. Each of the
theories explored in the remainder of the paper relies upon some of
these background facts, often providing different explanations of their
significance. 66 Part III begins with a discussion of the Board Capture
Theory.
III. THE BOARD CAPTURE THEORY
A. The American Story
Board capture critics of American executive compensation
practices have claimed that the board of directors of most American
public corporations has been "captured" by the company's CEO. 67 This
theory starts with the hypothesis that directors of public companies
62. See infra notes 155-158.
63. See infra notes 139-152.
64. See infra notes 159-170.
65. See infra notes 212-250.
66. Thus, repetition of some of this information is inevitable. I have tried to minimize
repetition in the paper.
67. See supra note 5. Even critics of the Board Capture Theory agree that in the area of
executive compensation, directors tend to err in favor of awarding managers higher pay and that
"judgment calls tend systematically to favor the CEO." Murphy, supra note 1, at 2518 (rejecting
the "cynical scenario of entrenched compensation committees rubber-stamping increasingly
lucrative pay programs with a wink and a nod").
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are frequently nominated to the board by the company's executives
68
and receive large fees and benefits (in amounts determined largely by
those same executives) for their services. 69 Board capture leads to
high executive pay since these directors, many of whom are current or
retired executives themselves, 70  are predisposed to award the
company's executives attractive pay packages because of the manner
in which they are selected (or, once selected, kept on the board),71 the
amount they are paid, and their background. Both board dynamics
and social dynamics discourage directors from contesting executive
pay levels. 72 Directors that do raise objections can expect little gain
and potential sanctions for their efforts.73 This raises the spectre that
executive pay levels are not the product of effective arms'-length
bargaining by directors on behalf of the shareholders.
To assess the strength of board capture as an explanation of
allegedly excessive American CEO pay, we must first understand how
boards set executive pay at publicly traded American companies.
Typically, the board of directors delegates the job of investigating and
determining the appropriate levels of executive pay to its
Compensation Committee. 74 This committee negotiates with the CEO
to decide what to pay her.75 Ideally, this negotiation should look
something like the following:
68. James D. Cox, The ALI, Institutionalization, and Disclosure: The Quest for the Outside
Director's Spine, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1233, 1243 (1993) ("[T]he prevalent ethos of nominating
committees [is] to submit names believed acceptable to the CEO .... "); Bebchuk et al., supra
note 1, at 766-67 ('Traditionally, the CEO has dominated the director nomination process.").
69. Because the CEO sets directors' pay and outside directors set the CEO's pay, an "almost
incestuous" relationship exists between them, and their pay levels are positively correlated.
Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1867, 1873 (1992) (reviewing GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE
OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES (1991)).
70. Cox, supra note 68, at 1235 n.8 (citing studies).
71. Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 767 ('The CEO can use his power and influence to
encourage the appointment and reappointment o independent directors who are not iikely to
challenge his compensation.").
72. Id. at 767-69 (discussing the "support or fire" ethos of many boards, the need for groups
to placate members at the expense of interests not directly represented, and the presence of
other CEOs on the Compensation Committee as contributing to higher levels of executive pay).
73. Id. at 769-71 (explaining that directors receive little monetary benefit from reducing
executive pay and risk being thrown off the board or having their reputations as directors
tarnished).
74. GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN
EXECUTIVES 214 (1991); Murphy, supra note 1, at 2517; Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 765.
75. Professor Murphy has a somewhat different view of the role of the Compensation
Committee. He claims that the Compensation Committee should not try to set pay levels and
programs, but rather "define and enforce the company's compensation strategy, and to monitor
the process while being mindful that executives (like other individuals) prefer more to less."
Murphy, supra note 1, at 2518.
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From an economic standpoint, a CEO is the seller of his own services, the compensation
committee is the buyer of his services, and whatever the executive receives in the way of
pay is the price of his services. Under classic economic theory, a reasonable price is
obtained through arm's-length negotiations between an informed seller and an informed
buyer.
7 6
Unfortunately, critics claim, hard-nosed negotiations hardly
ever occur. On the one side of the table, there is the CEO as seller.
CEOs have been involved with fixing their own and other employees'
compensation packages for years, they have professional
compensation staff that work for them, and they hire professional
compensation consultants.77 In short, top management is a well-
informed seller with ample incentive to negotiate aggressively to
protect its interests.
The Compensation Committee, sitting across the room, is
claimed to be in a much weaker position. This committee would
normally be comprised exclusively of non-employee directors
handpicked by the CEO, 78 many of whom would be current or retired
executives from other public companies, and none of whom would
spend much time on this work. 79 Compensation Committee members
have limited time, lack information, and operate in the reactive mode
in which boards function.
80
To assist it in performing its tasks, the Compensation
Committee will usually retain the services of an expert compensation
consultant.81 The CEO may recommend that the committee choose a
76. CRYSTAL, supra note 74, at 215; Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 764 (attributing this
view to financial economists and the "optimal contracting" theorists).
77. CRYSTAL, supra note 74, at 43, 215.
78. JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS L. HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 11.05 (2d ed. 2003)
("[C]ompensation decisions are routinely submitted to the outside directors for their separate
approval.").
79. CRYSTAL, supra note 74, at 214. "A board's compensation committee typically consists
of about five outside directors-directors who are not employees of the company and who, at least
theoretically, have no economic ties to the company. The committee meets several times a year,
sometimes every time there is a board meeting." Id.
80. Murphy, supra note 1, at 2518 ("Compensation committees, which typically meet only
six to eight times a year, lack both the time and expertise to be involved in the minutia of pay
design."); Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 772-73 ("[D]irectors will rely heavily, if not almost
exclusively, on the information and proposal provided by the compensation consultant."); Cox,
supra note 68, at 1237 & nn.18-20 (citing studies and arguing that "[o]utside directors spend
most of their time reacting to management's strategic planning and reviewing other corporate
policies and practices, to an extent that allows only infrequent explicit and formal review of
management's performance" (citations omitted)).
81. Crystal states that companies routinely hire compensation consultants to advise the
company about top executives' pay. CRYSTAL, supra note 74, at 42-50. Murphy claims that
Compensation Committees "rarely" retain their own compensation consultant, but rather rely on
the company's human resource department for initial recommendations for pay levels and new
incentive plans. Murphy, supra note 1, at 2517.
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particular expert.8 2 Most of these experts come from a handful of well-
known consulting firms specializing in executive compensation
matters, many of which provide a wide variety of other consulting
services to the company.8 3 The Compensation Committee's consultant,
however, is supposed to scrutinize the company's executives' pay.
Critics of this process argue that, in fact, these consultants know that
they have actually been hired by the CEO to ensure that she receives
a substantial pay increase.8 4
The Compensation Committee asks the compensation expert to
compile information about the pay scales of executives at other
comparable companies.8 5  Using this information, the consultant
prepares a report to the committee comparing the compensation of
executives at comparable companies with that of the company's
executives.86 The compensation consultant uses this information to
advise the committee where the company's executives fall within the
remuneration spectrum.
8 7
The Compensation Committee, as the buyer of executive
services, is rarely well informed. These part-time directors spend only
a few days a year focusing on company business and are invariably
less knowledgeable than the executives with whom they are
negotiating. They rely on the compensation consultant to inform them
82. CRYSTAL, supra note 74, at 218 ("Ostensibly, compensation consultants were hired by
the CEO to perform an objective analysis of the company's executive pay package and to make
whatever recommendations the consultant felt were appropriate. In reality, if those
recommendations did not cause the CEO to earn more money than he was earning before the
compensation consultant appeared on the scene, the latter was rapidly shown the door.").
83. Id. at 218-20.
Most executive compensation consultants are employed by firms that do more than
executive compensation consulting.. .. Indeed, in many cases, the revenues derived
from a given client for such work as actuarial consulting dwarf by several orders of
magnitude the revenues for executive compensation consulting. So, bucking a CEO
and telling him that he ought to cut his bloated pay package can potentially cost a
consulting firm not only the loss of executive compensation revenues but the loss of
Id. at 219.
84. Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 790 ("[T]he process through which pay consultants are
retained-and some evidence regarding their use-suggest that managers use compensation
consultants primarily to justify executive pay, rather than to optimize it.").
85. CRYSTAL, supra note 74, at 220 ("Companies are solicited to complete often voluminous
questionnaires on the types of compensation plans they use, how the plans work, and how much
executives earn from them. These data are then analyzed statistically, and reports are sent back
to participating companies."); Murphy, supra note 1, at 9 (surveys are universally used in setting
executive compensation).
86. CRYSTAL, supra note 74, at 45.
87. By definition, some of the executives in the comparable group of companies will receive
above average compensation, and others will receive below average compensation. For example,
if 100 corporations are included in the comparable group, then the executives of at least 50 of
them must be receiving below average compensation. Id. at 220-21.
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about the possible ramifications of executive pay plans.88 Oftentimes
the consultant provides only a limited number of rosy scenarios that
leave the directors uninformed about the potential problems with pay
packages.
8 9
Even when they have adequate information, corporate boards
are unwilling to pay top executives below the average level of
executive compensation. As the leading critic of executive
compensation practices in this country has said:
Companies have a sort of institutional pride, and consciously paying a CEO below the
average constitutes a blow to that institutional pride. Talk to a member of the board
about this issue, and he'll likely tell you that "our company is as good as anyone else's,
and therefore we're not going to be cheap and pay below the average."
90
Compensation consultants supply the justifications needed to
rationalize this attitude. 91 If the company is performing well, an
increase can be justified to reflect the executives' contribution to this
strong performance 92 This increase may be coupled with the adoption
of a policy requiring premium pay for executives. 93 If the company is
performing poorly, compensation increases are said to be needed to
stop the loss of top officers or to create incentives for improved
performance. 94
This leads to a "ratchet" effect: as executives that are being
paid less than the average level demand and receive the additional
88. Id. at 224.
89. Id. at 50 ("The committee [does not know] that other performance scenarios-scenarios
that are at once more likely to occur and more gloomy than the one the consultant presented-
will produce horrifyingly large payouts."). Honest consultants discuss both the advantages and
the disadvantages of the pay package, including how it will affect the company's costs and the
various scenarios that could affect executive pay. Id. at 49. Less forthcoming consultants will
only present the case where things work out best for the company. Id. at 50. Crystal is
particularly critical of some consultants' failure to inform the Compensation Committee about
the lack of performance risk in executive pay arrangements. See id. at 225 ('This failure to
present the compensation committee with the results of scenarios is particularly onerous given
that so many CEOs are engaged in trying to squeeze every bit of risk out of their pay packages.").
90. Id. at 221.
91. Yablon, supra note 69, at 1878-79.
92. CRYSTAL, supra note 74, at 221. Crystal claims that only those performance measures
which support an increase in pay will be presented to the directors. See id. ("[T]he comparisons
that 'come out right'-i.e., show that the company is indeed an above-average performer-will be
trotted in front of the compensation committee to justify the above-average pay."). This may
require restructuring the data base so that some companies are taken out and others added in.
Id. at 222.
93. Id. at 223. Crystal claims that his surveys have shown that more than one-third of the
companies he examined had policies of paying their executives in the top 25 percent of all
comparable companies, and the other two-thirds of the sample had policies of paying their
executives at the average level. Id. None of the companies studied by Crystal aimed to pay their
executives less than the average level. Id.
94. Yablon, supra note 69, at 1878.
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compensation necessary to bring their pay levels up to the desired
amount and executives who are performing well receive increases,
then the average itself rises. 95 The greater the increases granted, the
faster the average will increase for all executives at comparable
companies, and the greater will be their demands at the next year's
negotiation.96 Empirical research on this effect has been mixed, with
some studies finding a statistically significant positive effect on
executive pay.
97
Nor are Compensation Committees aggressive bargainers.
98
Even if they are independent directors, without any direct
employment relationship with the CEO, the directors are unlikely to
want to ruffle the top executive's feathers. All of the directors on the
board will have been selected to be on the board by the company's
95. Murphy, supra note 1, at 2498; Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 790 ("It is widely
understood that the methodology of compensation consultants and boards in devising
compensation plans results in a "ratcheting up" of salaries."). A rising stock market may also
contribute to the upward ratcheting of the size of stock option grants in recent years. As
Professor Murphy explains:
The mechanical explanation for the explosion in stock options is rooted in institutional
details on granting practices and exacerbated by the recent bull market. According to
a 1997 Towers Perrin survey, 40 percent of large companies grant options on a "fixed
value" basis, 40 percent on a "fixed share" basis, and the remaining 20 percent use a
variety of other methods. Under fixed-value grants, the number of options granted is
determined by dividing a dollar-value target award (typically determined using
compensation surveys that express grant targets as a multiple of base salary) by the
Black-Scholes option value. Under fixed-share grants, the number of shares is
determined at one date (using the same surveys), and fixed for several years. Thus, in
periods of escalating stock prices, the Black-Scholes value of shares granted under
fixed-share programs will also escalate. Moreover, since the companies with fixed-
share programs participate in compensation surveys, the survey multiples will
increase, which in turn will increase grants in companies with fixed-value programs.
The net result is a ratcheting of option grants that corresponds to an escalating stock
market.
Murphy, supra note 1, at 2515-16.
96. Numerous justifications can be provided for executive pay increases. For a hard-
working executive who is committed to doing her best for the company, she has good reason to
believe that she should receive better than average compensation. F-urthermore, as one ieading
critic of executive compensation has noted, "most CEOs consider the fact that their compensation
is below average to be a grave threat to the future well-being and competitiveness of the
company." Yablon, supra note 69, at 1878 (discussing Professor Crystal's views on
compensation). If every CEO believes that she ought to be paid in the top quarter of the scale of
comparable companies, strong pressure will be placed on the Compensation Committee to
accommodate those demands. Id.
97. One study has found that executives who are paid less than the median level for their
peer group receive abnormally large pay increases, even when their firms experience worse
accounting and stock price performance than their peers. BIZJAK ET AL., supra note 6, at 3. This
result would strongly suggest that political and institutional aspects of the executive pay process
contribute to higher pay levels. Other studies have found conflicting results. See, e.g., Murphy,
supra note 1 (summarizing other studies).
98. CRYSTAL, supra note 74, at 226-27. The one exception is when the board has already
decided to remove the CEO from office. Id. at 227.
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CEO. 99 Many of them are executives from other companies, who are
frequently better paid than the management of the company on whose
board they sit.100 The CEO will also determine the directors'
compensation for their work for the company, and director pay levels
have risen in step with executive pay in recent years. 101 As Professor
Crystal noted:
[The board of directors determines the pay of the CEO, and for all practical purposes,
the CEO determines the pay of the board of directors. Is it any accident, then, that there
is a statistical relationship between how highly the CEO is paid and how highly his
outside directors are paid?
10 2
After completing its work, the Compensation Committee will prepare
a report and recommendation to the board for routine approval.
10 3
Shareholders have no direct input in this process.10 4 They can
voice their feeling to the board of directors in a variety of ways after
the package is approved by the board, but this only indirectly affects
how the process is conducted. Furthermore, while shareholders must
approve certain types of stock options that are often part of executive
pay packages, they do not otherwise vote on compensation matters.
10 5
Shareholders' ability to collectively monitor executive compensation
levels in the United States is doubtful.
10 6
Board Capture theorists conclude that U.S. CEOs are grossly
overpaid. But this is only part of the puzzle. We must still ask why
foreign CEOs are paid so much less than their American counterparts.
99. Board members are obligated to the CEO even where the board has a nominating
committee of independent directors because a nomination will not proceed without the CEO's
approval. Id. at 226.
100. Id. at 227.
101. Id. at 228-29.
102. Id. at 230.
103. Murphy, supra note 1, at 2518.
104. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1071 (1999).
105. Id. at 1038.
106. See id. at 1071-72 ("Even assuming shareholders could reach consensus on what
reforms might be appropriate, investors would have difficulty launching a broad enough
campaign to implement them everywhere."). But see Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 786-91
(arguing that the main constraint on executive pay levels is shareholder and societal "outrage"
over excessive pay and that some compensation devices are designed to "camouflage" high pay
from shareholders and the public to avoid this outrage).
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B. The International Explanation
Board Capture theorists claim that the CEO pay gap is the
result of international differences in CEO power. 10 7 In the United
States, shareholder ownership patterns are dispersed and no large
shareholders act as balances to the considerable powers of the CEO.
American CEOs have limited ability to extract rents from their firms
through self-dealing arrangements, and thus they concentrate their
efforts at self-enrichment on increasing their compensation levels.108
Internationally, CEOs face a different type of negotiator across
the table from them: controlling shareholders.10 9 In most foreign
countries, stock ownership is much more concentrated than in the
United States, and many firms are controlled by majority
shareholders. These large blockholders have incentives to set firm
limits on managerial pay. Consider, for instance, companies with a
concentrated ownership structure where the CEO is not part of the
controlling group or family. In these circumstances, those with a
controlling interest should be motivated to prevent excessive
compensation because any surplus in the firm reverts to the
shareholders, including those in the dominant position.110
"Professional CEOs hired by companies with more concentrated
ownership and companies controlled by a large shareholder will
therefore extract less rents than the CEOs of U.S. firms, whose
shareholders are more likely to be dispersed and therefore less able to
closely monitor the CEOs." 1 '
This story, however, holds little water at firms where the top
executives are also the control shareholders. These managers have
strong incentives to divert funds into their own pockets when there
are weak protections of minority shareholders. Minority shareholder
protections and disclosure rules are much weaker in almost all foreign
107. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 842-43 (providing explanations for the U.S./
international CEO pay gap).
108. Id. at 844.
109. Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1, 9 (2000) ("The corporate directors in these countries.., tend to have a stake in closer
monitoring-they represent significant shareholders ....").
110. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 844 ("When share ownership is more concentrated,
the CEO will have less power (unless, in firms with a controlling shareholder, the CEO is related
to the controlling shareholder)."); see also Kannan Ramaswamy et al., A Study of the
Determinants of CEO Compensation in India, 40 MGMT INT'L REV. 167, 182 (2000) (finding that
family owned firms in India pay lower executive compensation than firms with dispersed
ownership). For an example of this process in action, see S. Karene Witcher, Executive Pay
Growth in Asia Is Stalling, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 2, 1998, at 6.
111. Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 844.
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countries than in the United States, creating opportunities for
managerial abuses. 112
Weak legal protections for minority shareholders have
important implications for international executive pay comparisons
because CEOs of foreign firms can take money out of their firms and
pay themselves large amounts without shareholders being able to
object effectively. 113 Weak corporate disclosure rules reinforce this
effect because they permit these transactions to be hidden from
shareholders' view. 114 Surveys of compensation levels will therefore
understate the amounts that executives are paid in this situation. 1 5
For that reason we can only make meaningful comparisons of
compensation data in countries with similar levels of minority
shareholder protection, such as the United Kingdom Yet as we saw in
Part II.A, even when we compare the United States to the United
Kingdom, we find a substantial pay gap for CEOs.
The Board Capture Theory again claims that American CEOs'
power provides the only explanation for these pay differentials. 1 6
Share ownership is more concentrated in the United Kingdom than in
the United States, allowing shareholders to coordinate their actions
more easily, and act as better monitors of management. The more
concentrated share ownership patterns in the United Kingdom leads
112. See id. (discussing the types of abuses by a controlling group or family, such as self-
dealing and the taking of business opportunities); Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 2, at 164, 167
(lax disclosure rules outside of the U.S.).
113. DYCK & ZINGALES, supra note 59, at 41 (examining average premium in international
change of control transactions and finding that it is higher when the buyer comes from a country
with weak protections for minority investors).
114. A secondary impact of weak disclosure rules is that foreign firms' shareholders may be
provided minimal information about executive compensation, making it difficult to determine
compensation levels at foreign firms.
115. This understatement could result even if compensation consultants report information
about otherwise private average compensation levels, such as the information contained in the
Towers Perrin study discussed above. These controlling shareholders could choose to get cash
out of their firms in other ways, such as engaging in self-dealing transactions, and not call such
payments compensation. I would expect that executive pay levels will adjust to a level that
reflects the effects of various corporate law, securities law, stock exchange listing requirements,
and tax rates of the foreign firms' countries of origin. Controlling shareholders may choose to
keep compensation levels low for tax reasons, or disclosure regimes may require them to advise
shareholders of these payments and take their monies out of the firm in readily available
alternative forms. Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 845 ("By paying himself a reasonable
compensation, the controlling shareholder might be able to create the impression that he is being
loyal to minority shareholders.").
116. See id. at 844 (discussing U.S. and international CEOs' power to extract rents through
their executive compensation).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
to CEOs having less power. 117 Less CEO power (and more shareholder
power) leads to lower compensation.1 18
Finally, Board Capture Theory also purports to explain the
smaller international pay comparisons for lower-level managers. 119
Here, the argument is that the power difference at American firms is
concentrated with CEOs or the top two or three executives. Excess
compensation will therefore be paid only to these top managers, and
the compensation gap will be only at, or near, the top level of
management.120 International comparisons of human resource
directors, such as those given in the Towers Perrin data, will therefore
show little difference in pay levels because these lower level executives
have little power to extract rents.
C. Board Capture Theory's Weaknesses
While there are several attractive features to Board Capture
Theory, there are also fundamental problems with the claim that it is
the best explanation of American executive pay levels and the
international pay gap. First, Board Capture Theory does not offer an
explanation for why there has been such a big increase in American
executive pay and the growth in the use of stock options in the 1980s
and onward.1 21 All available evidence seems to show independent
directors getting stronger and more numerous, CEO tenure declining,
and CEO turnover increasing during the same time period.1 22 These
results are the opposite of what the theory would predict.
Second, Board Capture Theory does not correct for the larger
size of American firms. Bigger firms are more complex, have more
resources, and pay more. This needs to be taken into account when
comparing compensation levels. Nor does Board Capture Theory offer
an explanation for why allegedly excessive executive pay has not led to
an increase in the supply of executives. In other words, if there are
117. Id.
118. Executive pay in the U.K., however, has been rising steadily even as institutional
investor activism has been on the upswing. See BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY,
STRUCTURE, AND OPERATION 64 (1997) (discussing institutional investor activism).
119. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 845 ("[It is not surprising that ... lower-level
executives who do not have a significant share of corporate power do not enjoy higher
compensation than their non-U.S. peers.").
120. Id.
121. Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1869, 1886 (2001).
122. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 1, at 773-74 (summarizing studies showing decline in
CEO tenure and increase in terminations, but arguing that such changes have no effect on CEO
pay packages).
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huge rents available to American CEOs over the past twenty years,
why don't we see a supply side reaction? Most importantly from our
international perspective, why don't we see large movements of skilled
foreign executives into the U.S. market, instead of the relatively small
migrations that are occurring? By contrast, there seem to be fairly
extensive migrations of skilled technical workers to substantial wage
disparities (and outmigrations too).1 23
Furthermore, why aren't there more home grown executives
becoming available with the requisite skills? What are the barriers to
entry to domestic competitors in the labor market for CEOs? While
other domestic labor markets seem to respond to perceived rents by
increasing the supply of workers, why don't executive labor markets?
Barriers to entry may exist, but Board Capture Theory offers no
explanation for them.
The presence of long term contracts does not seem to be a
satisfactory explanation. First, about one-third of CEOs lack
employment contracts. 124 Second, the term of a CEO employment
contract is usually three or five years. So, even CEOs with contracts
do not have life tenure.125 Finally, almost all of these contracts permit
termination with or without cause.1 26 If there are no barriers to entry,
but just a small supply of very talented, qualified people, then the
high returns to CEOs are justifiable as payments to scarce factors of
production.
Third, if Board Capture Theory is the explanation for high
CEO pay, why do we see boards paying huge sums to attract outside
candidates as CEOs? There must be market forces at work here when
the existing board has no prior relationship with the incoming CEO.
So we cannot fully ignore markets as an explanation of CEO pay.
Finally, if we are to claim that executives are overpaid, we
need to have a way of determining what the appropriate level of their
pay should be. In other words, if the market for executives in the U.S.
is distorted by collusion among executives and their boards of
directors, how can we determine what the right pay level is?
Presumably we would need to fall back on economic theories to make
123. See infra notes 311-331 and accompanying text.
124. STEWART J. SCHWAB & RANDALL S. THOMAS, WHAT Do CEOs BARGAIN FOR?: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF KEY LEGAL COMPONENTS OF CEO CONTRACTS 14 (Working Paper, 2004).
125. Murphy's survey article summarizes evidence from several studies on turnover rates for
American CEOs. These surveys show that there is significant variation in the annual departure
rates, but that the range over the period 1970 to 1995 is from a low of 7.7 percent to a high of
22.5 percent. Murphy, supra note 1, at 2544-45.
126. SCHWAB & THOMAS, supra note 124, at 11.
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such a determination, perhaps by calculating the executives' marginal
revenue product or opportunity costs of employment.
Who will make decisions about the appropriate level of pay if
not the board? If we are relying on institutional investors as our
monitors, then they as outsiders to the firm will need to be able to
make these calculations on the basis of public information, which
seems like a daunting task. It is hard to see why these corporate
outsiders are better positioned to set executive pay and monitor it in
the future than boards of directors. As a practical matter, institutions
are not interested in doing micro-level management, but only in
setting broad parameters.
While Board Capture Theory provides one possible solution to
the puzzle of why the international CEO pay gap exists, the next five
sections provide alternative theories that focus more on the
underlying international economic forces at work. In particular,
economic theory and the experience outside of the U.S. are more
closely examined to provide a more sophisticated understanding of
executive pay arrangements.
IV. MARGINAL REVENUE PRODUCT THEORY
In neo-classical economic analysis, well-functioning labor
markets have informed active buyers and sellers. In this world, arms'-
length negotiations between an informed buyer, the board of directors
or its Compensation Committee, and an informed seller, the CEO, lead
to a competitive price prevailing in the market. 127 The firm hires
additional labor up to the point that the cost of an additional worker,
the wage rate, equals the additional revenue that the worker brings
into the firm, that worker's marginal revenue product. 128 Thus, this
model predicts that the firm's CEO should be paid her marginal
revenue product in a competitive labor market. If an executive
contributes more to the firm, then the executive should be more highly
compensated.
127. In a perfectly competitive market, there are a large number of sellers of a uniform
product, a large number of consumers, of the product, low barriers to entry and perfect
information about market conditions. HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 55 (1978).
When these conditions prevail, a profit-maximizing firm will set the price of its goods equal to its
marginal revenue, which also equals its marginal cost. Id.
128. DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: How EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND
HOW IT AFFECTS AMERICA 14-15 (1993); PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS,
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 327 (1992).
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A. CEOs that Have a Bigger Impact on Firm Value Should Be Paid
More
CEOs, or more generally good management, can create a lot of
value for shareholders. One recent survey of empirical research claims
that 10-20 percent of firm performance can be attributed to the
economic climate, while an additional 30-45 percent of performance
depends on the state of the firm's industry. 129 The residual amount, or
35-60 percent of firm value, could be attributed to management.
130
Individual managers' approaches make a big difference in determining
dividend policy, acquisition and diversification strategy, cost-cutting
policies, and a host of other corporate activities, which in turn affect
firm performance.
1 31
In short, good management can have quite an impact on firm
value. Existing empirical evidence shows that firms pay good
managers exceptionally well. 132 We would expect then that if top
management's contribution to firm value is lower in foreign countries
than in the U.S., then foreign top executives will be paid less than
American CEOs.
If executives are to be compensated based on their contribution
to firm value, then we can generate several predictions about
executive compensation. First, we would expect that firms with more
growth opportunities will compensate their managers more highly, as
their executives can, ex ante, contribute more to firm value by
choosing the best growth opportunities. 133 In other words, CEOs of
companies with more of their firm's value tied up in future growth
opportunities should be paid more.
A second prediction is that executives at larger firms that have
greater resources to be deployed by their managers will be able to add
more value. 134 As Professor Rosen noted, "[a]ctivities of top
129. Rakesh Khurana, The Curse of the Superstar CEO, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept. 2002, at 60,
63.
130. The Curse of Charisma, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2002, at 58.
131. MARIANNE BETRAND & ANTOINETTE SCHOAR, MANAGING WITH STYLE: THE EFFECT OF
MANAGERS ON FIRM POLICIES (Working Paper, 2002).
132. Id. at 24 ("Firms ... pay a premium for managers that are associated with higher rates
of return on assets.").
133. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Ross L. Watts, The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate
Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 263, 264, 274 (1992). We
would also expect them to receive more of their compensation in the form of stock options. Id. at
275; see also Jennifer J. Gaver & Kenneth M. Gaver, Additional Evidence on the Association
Between the Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation
Policies, 16 J. ACCT. & ECON. 125, 157 (1993).
134. Smith & Watts, supra note 133, at 274 ("In general, the larger the firm, the larger the
stock of real resources that can be affected by a given managerial decision. Managers of larger
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management are magnified geometrically because they affect
recursively the productivity of those who work below them in the
organization." 135 Large firm's executives will have a greater "scale of
operations" impact on value that will lead these firms to offer their
executives higher compensation. Larger firms may also employ better-
qualified, more talented, and therefore better-paid, executives. 136
Furthermore, mergers that create larger firms will increase executive
compensation. If firms engage in mergers that increase the pool of
assets controlled by their managers, higher executive pay will result.
Finally, the bigger firms' CEOs will handle more complex
organizations and therefore deserve higher pay. The positive
correlation between executive pay and firm size is widely observed at
American firms.1
37
Third, different economic systems may give CEOs different
organizational powers. Economies where the CEO makes all of the
most crucial decisions should pay their executives more, on average,
because of CEOs' greater impact on firm value. By contrast, in
economies in which the CEOs' powers are comparatively small, we
would expect that executive pay would be systematically lower.
Each of these factors will mean that, within the U.S.
managerial labor market, we would expect to see high growth firms,
larger firms, and, most generally, firms where CEOs exercise
substantial decision-making powers, to receive higher compensation.
Assuming that the supply of talented managers is relatively fixed in
the short run, the demand for good executives will drive industry-wide
(and possibly national) compensation levels for all good managers
upward to this level.' 38
B. Do U.S. CEOs Create More Firm Value and Therefore Deserve
Higher Pay?
What are the implications of this model for international pay
systems? First, if firms in some countries have, on average, greater
growth opportunities than firms in other countries, we would expect
firms thus have a higher value added, so we expect higher compensation for executives of larger
firms.").
135. Sherwin Rosen, Contracts and the Market for Executives, in 1 THE ECONOMICS OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 300, 302 (Kevin F. Hallock & Kevin J. Murphy eds., 1999).
136. Murphy, supra note 1, at 2493.
137. Smith & Watts, supra note 133, at 280 ("We expect firms with more growth options to
have higher compensation .. "); cf. Murphy, supra note 1, at 2493-95 ('Recent data suggest that
the relation between CEO pay and company size has weakened over time.").
138. This process may be facilitated by the use of pay surveys within industries and across
firms.
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them to pay greater levels of executive pay. Second, if firms in one
country are generally larger than firms in another country, we would
expect the firms in the first country to pay their executives more, on
average, than those in the second country. Third, if some economic
systems give executives more decision-making functions within the
firm, we would expect their CEOs to get paid more. The remainder of
this section develops the argument that, on the whole, American firms
are larger, have better growth opportunities, and have more powerful
CEOs, and thus we expect that executive compensation in the U.S.
would be higher than it is elsewhere.
1. Do American Firms Have Greater Growth Opportunities?
If U.S. firms, on average, have higher growth opportunities
that offer their managers more opportunities to contribute to firm
value, 139 then American CEOs would have higher marginal revenue
products than their foreign counterparts and should be paid more.
One possible basis for such a claim is that the U.S. economy is the
leader in the area of intangible (intellectual) property, and that such
property is the main engine of future economic growth.
Intangibles are the engine of future economic growth.' 40 As one
well-known commentator has stated:
Wealth and growth in today's economy are driven primarily by intangible (intellectual)
assets. Physical and financial assets are rapidly becoming commodities, yielding at best
an average return on investment. Abnormal profits, dominant competitive positions,
and sometimes even temporary monopolies are achieved by the sound deployment of
intangibles, along with other types of assets. 
14 1
Intangible assets have been defined as "a claim to future benefits that
does not have a physical or financial (a stock or a bond)
embodiment."'142  Intangible assets fall into three categories: 143 1)
139. See Smith & Watts, supra note 133, at 264, 274 (discussing firms' opportunity sets and
hypothesizing that "the larger the proportion of firm value represented by growth options, the
greater the manager's compensation").
140. "The ability to create, distribute and exploit knowledge is increasingly central to
competitive advantage, wealth creation and better standards of living." ORGANISATION FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY
SCOREBOARD: TOWARDS A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 7 (2001) [hereinafter OECD
SCOREBOARD].
141. BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES: MANAGEMENT, MEASUREMENT, AND REPORTING 1 (2001).
142. Id. at 5. Lev treats the terms intangibles (primarily used by accountants), knowledge
assets (economists), and intellectual capital (management and legal scholars) interchangeably.
Id. "When the claim is legally secured .... the asset is generally referred to as intellectual
property." Id. (emphasis added).
143. "[A]lthough it is convenient to classify intangibles by their major generator-discovery,
organizational design, or human resource practices-the assets are often created by a
combination of these sources." Id. at 7.
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discovery, 2) organizational structure, and 3) human resources.
Discovery consists of innovation; research and development (R&D)' 44
is the primary example of discovery. 145 Organizational design is the
set of unique practices and structures within a company that give it a
competitive edge and can be measured using data on information and
communication technology. 146 Human resource intangibles are the
most difficult to measure, but the most "pronounced in successful
corporations."'
47
In each of the three categories, the United States is at, or near,
the top in virtually all measures. On a prorated basis, U.S. R&D falls
behind some smaller European nations and perhaps Japan. 48 The
United States seems to be the most productive nation in terms of
144. R&D can be measured directly as the investment in or expenditure on R&D, although
the relationship between these investments and the end-benefits (often sales) can be too
attenuated to provide certainty about the effects of R&D on performance. Id. at 57. Lev specifies
the difficulties as the long "time lag between the investment in R&D and the realization of
benefits [and] ... biases and distortions in reported profits-arising from firms' attempt to
'manage' investors' perceptions... [which] might cloud the intrinsic relationship between R&D
and its subsequent benefits." Id. Alternative "output indicators" for R&D include the capital
market values of corporations and patents. Id.
145. Lev offers Merck & Co.'s "massive and highly successful innovation effort partially
reflected by R&D expenditures" as an example. Id. at 6.
146. See id. (discussing Dell's and Cisco's unique organizational designs, based on
information and communication technology). If computers (and, more broadly, Information and
Communication Technology, or ICT) are a "proxy" for organizational capital, as Lev suggests,
then the U.S.'s intensive investment in ICT is evidence of a strong base of organizational capital
(and knowledge capital in general). 'The development and diffusion of ICT, has simplified and
reduced the cost of codifying and diffusing knowledge. ICT has facilitated greater co-operation
among researchers and research organisations, increasing the effectiveness of research work.
ICT has also reduced barriers to entry in some R&D activities." ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY OUTLOOK: DRIVERS OF GROWTH:
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 58 (2001).
147. See LEV, supra note 141, at 14. While Lev classifies the knowledge embedded in a firm's
human resources as an intangible asset, Stephen Gates comments that, "[t]he... (GAAP) of the
United States require that to record anything as an asset a company must demonstrate that it
has effective control of it This condition makes it exceedingly difficult to consider a company's
employees as its assets." Id. at 181. The difference might be important for Lev's goal of greater
accounting disclosure of intangibles, but is really semantic at heart, as Gates continues,
"[nievertheless, many a company's value chain depends critically on teams of key employees."
Id. at 182.
148. The US ranks fourth in Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) at 2.64 percent of
GDP. OECD SCOREBOARD, supra note 140, at 147. Unless otherwise indicated, these OECD
statistics are for 1999. Sweden (3.80 percent) is first while Japan (3.04 percent) and Germany
(2.44 percent) are in the same neighborhood as the United States. Id. In absolute terms,
however, the United States dwarfs other nations in GERD, with $226,428.2 million, 43.6 percent
of the OECD total; the EU (28.4 percent, of which Germany's 8.7 percent is the largest) and
Japan (17.3 percent) combined barely exceed the U.S. total. Id. at 148 (using 1995 purchasing
power parities dollars).
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patents, 149  and possesses the most advanced venture capital
infrastructure, which provides for turning invention into business
success. 150 The U.S.'s advantages in organizational capital are even
clearer, as it dominates the OECD's Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) measures. 151 Finally, the United States boasts the
most educated and best-trained work force in the world, an indication
that its level of human capital is second to none.
152
If intangibles are the biggest engine of future economic growth,
and the United States is the world leader in creating and using
intangibles, then it would seem to follow that the greatest
opportunities for economic growth are at American firms. If firms with
greater growth opportunities should pay their managers more because
they can create more wealth, then American CEOs would be entitled
to higher pay than their foreign counterparts.
Of course this focus on intangibles, innovation, and human
resources may have just been a passing fad in the 1990s and one that
should not command much attention in the future. After all, Enron
was supposedly strong in each of these areas, and that was of little
comfort to shareholders when its credit lines dried up and it plunged
into bankruptcy. Hence, even if investors believed in the "new
economy" in the 1990s, and were thus willing to reward executives
149. The OECD provides information about patents, the "intermediate" stage of discovery,
from the European Patent Office (EPO). The United States received far more patents from the
EPO than any other single nation (28.54 percent to runner-up Germany's 20.37 percent and
Japan's 16.53 percent), but is far outdone by the EU collectively (46.98 percent). Id. at 175. Data
from the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) may broaden the picture. 47.2 percent of
United States-issued patents were to U.S. nongovernment organizations ("mostly corporations"),
compared to 31.2 percent for their counterparts from other nations. B.H. HALL ET AL., THE
NBER PATENT CITATIONS DATA FILE: LESSONS, INSIGHTS AND METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS 12
(Working Paper No. 8498, 2001). Of those patents that were assigned, 60.9 percent went to a
U.S. grantee organization (including the government) or individual; the United States thus has a
greater share of its own patent office's grants than does the EU (roughly 61 percent to 47
percent). OECD SCORECARD, supra note 140, at 11.
150. Venture capital is an indicator of research intensity and innovation because it "is a
major source of funding for new technology-based firms and plays a crucial role in promoting the
radical innovations often carried out by these firms." OECD SCOREBOARD, supra note 140, at 44.
151. The United States invests 8.0 percent of its GDP in ICT to Japan's 7.5 percent; Europe
is less than 6 percent ("with some exceptions, such as Sweden, which invests over 8 per cent").
DANIELE ARCHIBUGI & ALBERTO Coco, THE TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE OF EUROPE IN A
GLOBAL SETTING 1 (Working Paper, 2001), http://www.econ.uniurb.it/zanfei/convegno/papers/
archibugi-coco.pdf. Moreover, the United States boasts the highest rate of ICT investment as a
percentage of non-residential gross fixed capital formation among major economies, between 30-
40 percent. OECD SCOREBOARD, supra note 140, at 65.
152. The United States performs well in the methods used by the OECD to measure the role
of human resources in the knowledge-based economy. Among those aged 25-64, 27 percent of
Americans had a university-level degree. OECD SCOREBOARD, supra note 140, at 171. Only
Norway and the Netherlands also exceed 20 percent with Japan at 18 percent and Germany at
13 percent. Id.
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richly who could deliver in that environment, it may be irrelevant in
the new millennium. As documented below, however, even if we
totally disregard these factors, there remain strong arguments that
American CEOs have greater marginal revenue products than foreign
CEOs.
2. Are American Firms Larger?
One of the most strongly established empirical results in the
executive compensation area is that bigger firms pay their managers
more. 153 As noted above, 154 the theory is that larger firms have more
resources affected by managerial decisions, and therefore managers
can create greater value added. Hence we expect to see big firms
paying their executives more and they do.
American firms are the biggest firms in the world. If we look at
the Wall Street Journal's 2001 list of the 100 largest companies in the
world, the top six firms (General Electric, Microsoft, Wal-Mart Stores,
Exxon Mobil, Pfizer, and Johnson & Johnson) are all American. 155 If
we look more deeply into the list, we find that 14 out of the top 20 and
33 out of the top 50 are American. By comparison, the next largest
competitor is the United Kingdom, which has 8 companies in the top
50, including two that list their headquarters as both in the
Netherlands and the U.K. (Royal Dutch/Shell and Unilever). 156
Why are American firms larger? One important factor is that
the U.S. domestic market for goods and services is the largest in the
world. American firms have been able to expand internally to a larger
size than is possible in most other countries without having to
overcome external trade barriers and higher transportation costs.
Although these barriers have been reduced in recent years in some
sectors, many U.S. firms still have the first mover advantage of having
been established in the domestic market earlier. Furthermore, in
many sectors the size of the domestic market continues to be
important as trade and other barriers to internaLiua l riworate
growth have only been lowered, not eliminated.
These differences in firm size, however, are not a complete
explanation for the international pay gap. For example, the Towers
Perrin data cited in Part II.A is for firms of similar size. Furthermore,
Conyon and Murphy157 and another study by Core158 find that U.S.
153. See, e.g., Smith & Watts, supra note 133, at 274.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 134-136.
155. The Global Giants, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2002, at R10.
156. Id.
157. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 35, at F668.
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CEOs get paid more even after controlling for firm size. Thus, we must
continue to search for a fuller explanation of the international pay
gap.
3. American CEOs Have a Bigger Role Within the Firm
Different economic systems allocate power within the
corporation differently. For my purposes, this leads to the question:
are there systematic differences in the CEOs' contribution to the
success of a company across companies? In the U.S., where the
shareholder base of most major corporations is widely dispersed, the
chief executive plays a pivotal leadership role and has tremendous
discretion in decision making. While her actions are subject to the
approval of the company's board of directors, this approval is broadly
delegated for all but the most extraordinary transactions.
The CEO is usually the true leader in U.S. companies. For
example, at most American firms the top manager holds both the
position of chairman of the board and that of CEO. American CEOs
thus have an enormous power to make decisions that affect firm value,
and therefore a high ex ante marginal revenue product. 159 In these
circumstances, the fact that U.S. companies pay their chief executives
more recognizes their high impact on the firm's future performance.
In many foreign economies, where the norm is concentrated
shareholder ownership, the role of the CEO is fundamentally smaller.
In these countries most large corporations have a control shareholder
or controlling shareholder group. The foreign CEO, while still the
most important manager in the firm, does not have as much discretion
as the American CEO to take unbridled actions. The controlling
shareholder(s) will make critical decisions about the future of the
firm. 160
In fact, the CEO may be more accurately thought of as merely
a first among equals who carries out a bureaucratic set of tasks that
could be performed capably enough by various others. In other
countries, the "first among equals" view is held by many. Certainly in
158. John E. Core, The Directors'and Officers'Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of
the Quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449 (2000).
159. C.K. Prahalad & Yves Doz, The CEO: A Visible Hand in Wealth Creation?, J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Fall 2000, at 20, 20-21, 34 (arguing that CEOs have become more critical in wealth
creation in recent years).
160. See supra Part I.B.
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Japan the CEO does not have the same sort of "leader" status that he
has in the United States.
161
Moreover, even in the United Kingdom, where shareholder
dispersion is more widespread than elsewhere in Europe (although not
as dispersed as in the United States), CEOs' powers are more
circumscribed than in America. 162 Institutional ownership in the
United Kingdom increased significantly during the 1990s. 16 3. During
that time period, under pressure from institutional investors, U.K.
companies split the roles of chairman of the board and CEO, thereby
weakening the CEO's position within the company. 164 This suggests
that the marginal revenue product of American CEOs may be greater
than that of foreign CEOs, which would provide a justification for
paying U.S. top executives more.
Continental European CEOs may have less discretion in
running their companies than American CEOs for a second reason:
they cannot adjust their labor inputs of production and corresponding
capital-labor input ratios as readily as American CEOs. 165  For
example, if the labor force levels are set at inefficiently high levels at a
European corporation, current legal restrictions and corporate
governance arrangements in these countries limit worker layoffs.
166
Workers have more rights to resist job cuts. Thus, while foreign CEOs
can adjust their firms' capital structure to more efficient levels, 167 they
161. See, e.g., Pearl Meyer, Corporations Must Police Executive Salaries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1992, at A22 (stating that Japanese CEOs are lower paid than American CEOs because, among
other things, they are the "first among equals").
162. Institutional shareholders, however, are more powerful in the U.K. than in the U.S.
Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under
Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2002 (1994). They can therefore provide a stronger
check on the CEOs' powers than U.S. institutions do on American CEOs.
163. CHEFFINS, supra note 118, at 64.
164. Note, however, that CEO pay has grown dramatically in Britain since the early 1990s,
when the CEOiChairman split first became standard prauic~e. Bian 1I. ChieiTn & ,L,,a- &,.
Thomas, Should Shareholders Have a Greater Say over Executive Pay?: Learning From The US
Experience, 1 J. CORP. L. STUDIES 277, 280-81 (2001). However, the level of increases in the
United Kingdom have not been close to those in the United States.
165. For a thorough discussion of the European countries' tradeoffs between employment
levels and social welfare policies, see CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, UNEMPLOYMENT
POLICY: GOVERNMENT OPTIONS FOR THE LABOUR MARKET (Dennis J. Snower & Guillermo de la
Dehesa eds., 1997).
166. Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control,
53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 551-52 (2000) [hereinafter Roe, Political Preconditions]; see also MARK J.
ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE
IMPACT 36-37 (2003).
167. Roe argues that managers may be reluctant to restructure the firm quickly even when
in shareholders' best interests, but rather will prefer to move slowly to avoid "social opprobrium."
Roe, Political Preconditions, supra note 166, at 553.
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are limited in their ability to shift capital-labor ratios to more efficient
levels.
By comparison, the U.S. manager can move labor around more
easily. 168 Worker layoffs, while unpopular, are relatively common at
American firms, particularly in economic downturns. As U.S. CEOs
have the same access (or better) to capital markets as their European
counterparts, they can adjust their firms' capital-labor ratios more
quickly to new, more efficient levels when needed. For our purposes,
this means that American CEOs can have more impact on firm value
than European chief executives, and provides another justification for
their higher pay. More generally, if regulation levels in the United
States are lower than abroad, this allows U.S. CEOs more flexibility to
adjust firm output and to increase the potential value that they can
create.
The stakeholder orientation of some corporate governance
systems may reinforce this notion. Stakeholder systems constrain
executives' discretion by subjecting executives to many competing
demands from different constituencies. Corporate executives in
continental Europe and the market-oriented economies in Asia often
act to pursue a range of "social" objectives, rather than simply seeking
to maximize profits for shareholders. 169 This orientation could impact
manager's marginal revenue product compensation by reducing their
ability to create shareholder value.1 70 Furthermore, to the extent that
diverting corporate resources to achieve social goals results in lower
value creation for the firm, we could anticipate that manager's
marginal revenue product would be lower in stakeholder-oriented
firms than in shareholder-oriented firms.
V. TOURNAMENT THEORY
A second and related theory that offers a potential explanation
of international executive pay differentials is that U.S. CEOs are paid
168. ROE, supra note 166, at46
169. See, e.g., Ronald Dore, The Asian Form of Capitalism, in THE CORPORATE TRIANGLE:
THE STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF CORPORATE SYSTEMS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 35, 42-43, 47
(1997); Amanda Bennett, Managers'Incomes Aren't Worlds Apart, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1992, at
BI; Herbert A. Henzler, The New Era of Eurocapitalism, HARV. BUS. REV., 57, 60-61, July-Aug.
1992.
170. This orientation also could impact the composition of pay packages by discouraging the
use of pay for performance incentive pay, most heavily used in American compensation packages.
Other stakeholders likely are wary of pay schemes that focus solely on furthering the interests of
the shareholder class. Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany Inc. ": The Case of
Executive Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 513-16 (2002) (discussing hostility to new executive pay
initiatives).
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more because they are the victors in the "biggest" tournaments. This
tournament theory of executive pay claims that internal firm labor
markets are like single elimination tournaments: as the winners
advance, the prize of moving on to the next round of the competition
gets disproportionately larger. The winner of the whole tournament
becomes the CEO, getting the most power within the firm and the
largest pay packet.
The greater the power that the CEO exercises, the more fierce
the competition to win. If American firms give their CEOs more power
than foreign firms do, then we would expect that obtaining the chief
executive position at one of these corporations would offer the biggest
prizes. In short, U.S. executive pay should be greater than in foreign
firms if internal tournaments are bigger events at American firms.
A. The Bigger the Prize, the Bigger the Payoff
Academics at both business schools and law schools often
analogize promotions within an internal labor market to tournaments:
the best performers in the workplace are promoted to the next level of
jobs. 171 At each level of the organizational job ladder, workers are
competing with other workers for a fixed number of spots in
elimination tournaments. 172 The winner of the tournament receives
171. The analogy is to single elimination sports tournaments, such as tennis tournaments.
EDWARD LAZEAR, PERSONNEL ECONOMICS FOR MANAGERS 225 (1997). The best player wins the
match and receives the prize associated with being the winner. In this context, relative
performance is the key.
Firm internal labor markets are claimed to be like these sports tournaments in several ways.
Id. First, the participants in most internal labor markets are restricted to persons already
working for the firm in the position just below the one with an opening. Id. at 227. Second,
workers are promoted because they are relatively better than the other workers in their current
position. Id. Third, workers allegedly try harder to obtain the promotion based on the spread
between their current compensation and the compensation for workers at the next level; that is,
the spread in pay. Id. However, if there are uiier fat utu tatb affe...t ... .. c
promotion, such as luck or variables outside of their control, it will reduce workers' incentives to
work harder and require larger wage gaps between positions to induce the same level of
increased worker effort. Id. at 235. For an extensive discussion of tournament theory as an
explanation for corporate pay scales, see id. at 223-52.
Tournament theory has been applied in models of law firm promotion of associate lawyers.
See, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991). For a recent critique of this application, see generally David B.
Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and
Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998).
172. Tournaments have several advantages as a method of allocating promotions: first, they
require only ordinal information about the relative capabilities of the contestants for the jobs,
which is generally reasonably available at a relatively low cost; second, looking at relative
performance eliminates the common elements of uncertainty that may affect the performance of
all of the applicants; and third, they reduce the incentives that employers may have to act
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the immediate prize of a better job with higher pay and benefits, plus
the valuable chance to compete for a job at the next level. 173 The value
of this "option" to compete later for higher positions gives additional
incentives to the players in the lower rounds. 174
As the winners progress up the job ladder, there are fewer
higher levels to attain. For each winner, this reduces the value of their
option to compete for future jobs. In order to maintain the incentives
to compete, an employer must therefore increase the direct financial
gains from obtaining a promotion as individuals rise in the
hierarchy. 75 In other words, the amount of the increase in pay
associated with a promotion must increase as an individual reaches
the higher managerial levels. This is especially true for the pay gap
between the CEO and the level of executives directly below that
position, because there are no further competitions for the CEO to
win.176 In fact, empirical studies have demonstrated that pay
differentials increase between ranks as workers climb corporate job
ladders, with the promotion to CEO resulting in an extraordinary
jump in pay.
177
Tournament theory offers an explanation for large disparities
between the payments corporations make to middle managers and
workers on the one hand and CEOs on the other.178 Competitors are
incentivized by the high spread in their potential payoffs to seek the
higher positions. This incentive is claimed to lead to greater
productivity and a more efficient organization. 179 It also explains why
bigger firms pay their CEOs more than smaller ones: bigger firms
have more resources, their CEOs have more power, and thus the prize
for winning the tournament is larger.
opportunistically in reneging on performance payments. LAZEAR, supra note 171, at 243-45;
MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 128, at 367-69.
Some other fundamental characteristics of economic tournament theory include difficulty
monitoring the quality of the work performed by the workers and that firms nevertheless succeed
in providing incentives that stimulate employees to work hard. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 171,
at 1584; see also CHARLES A. O'REILLY ET AL., OVERPAID CEOS AND UNDERPAID MANAGERS:
EQUITY AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6 (Working Paper, 1996).
173. LAZEAR, supra note 171, at 240; MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 128, at 376; O'REILLY
ET AL., supra note 172, at 6.
174. LAZEAR, supra note 171, at 240. Some players may choose not to compete. To the extent
that numerous workers elect this option, the validity of this assumption of tournament theory
must be called into question. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 171, at 1606-08.
175. LAZEAR, supra note 171, at 240; MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 128, at 376.
176. LAZEAR, supra note 171, at 240.
177. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 128, at 376. But see HAROLD DEMSETZ, Management
Compensation and Tournament Theory, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN
CRITICAL COMMENTARIES 110, 133-34 (1995).
178. O'REILLY ETAL., supra note 172, at 3.
179. Id. at 6.
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Tournament theory may also explain why the gap between
lower and upper level employees has increased so rapidly in recent
years. The restructuring of American business that began in the late
1980s resulted in the downsizing of many levels of middle managers
and a flattening of the management structure of American
corporations. 8 0  Tournament theory predicts that reducing the
number of levels of potential promotions will lower the incentives that
workers have to strive for advancement unless there are offsetting
increases in the pay associated with higher level jobs.' 8 ' Raising CEO
pay increases the ultimate prize that a manager can win through
promotions and thus offsets the disincentives of having fewer
intermediate advancement steps. 8 2 Although tournament theory is
not without its critics, it does offer a coherent explanation of internal
corporate pay differentials.
18 3
Internationally, CEOs have less power in the control-
shareholder-dominated companies that are most prevalent abroad.
Less power equates with smaller prizes for winning the tournament.
Foreign CEO pay should therefore be lower than CEO pay in the
United States. Equally importantly, foreign firms' control
180. RAJAN & WULF, supra note 11, at 1, 35.
181. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 128, at 428.
182. Tournament theory also suggests an explanation for why incentive pay is the largest
component of CEO compensation. Once workers reach the top of the pyramid, there is nowhere
else to advance. Any financial incentives, therefore, must come from payment for performance.
Thus, as is observed, explicit performance pay should become most important to those at the top
of the organization. Id.
183. Tournament theorists have been criticized for ignoring the negative effects on those that
do not advance and obtain the prizes. O'REILLY ET AL., supra note 172, at 7. In settings where
cooperation is more valuable than competition, such as may frequently be the case within teams,
tournaments can create ill will and mistrust that will hurt productivity. "In this sense,
tournament theory is based on the assumption that competition encourages increased effort but
ignores the effects of competition when performance results from cooperation among
interdependent participants." Id.; Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 171, at 1614 ("A firm structured
entirely as a tournament would not be an environment that fostered cooperation simply because
one's success in the standard tournament is a direct function of others not performing as well.").
In other words, firms holding tournaments wind up full of "losers" in the management ranks
below the CEO.
A related concern is that managers may be able to increase their chances of advancing to
higher positions through political manoeuvres and acts of sabotage rather than because of their
merits. This conduct undermines the efficiency arguments in favor of a tournament style pay
structure and supports a more compressed wage structure in the upper levels of organizations.
O'REILLY ET AL., supra note 172, at 7; see also Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 171, at 1614-16
(noting potential for sabotage in competitive setting; also pointing out that those determining
who advances in the firm may not judge candidates solely on their merits but also on whether
they perceive them to be threats).
A third problem is that at least one prominent economist has found that tournament theory
is not empirically supported as an explanation of variations in CEO compensation. Demsetz,
supra note 177, at 121.
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shareholders are likely to want to retain their power within their
family. Children and relatives of the controlling shareholder therefore
have an excellent chance of being promoted to the top job. As outsiders
are destined never to arise above the middle level management ranks,
the internal tournaments for jobs at these firms will offer much lower
prizes to outsiders.
B. Do Dispersed Ownership and the Winner-Take-All Culture Increase
Executive Pay Levels?
If the American CEO has powers significantly greater than
those of CEOs in other countries, then tournament theory would
predict that the prize for winning the competition at the American
firm would be far greater than that at foreign firms. Why might this
be the case? I have already suggested some reasons that might
explain these differences in the preceding section: American CEOs
may have greater decision-making powers, they may run larger firms,
and they may have more impact on firm value. In this section, I
develop two more complementary hypotheses: first, that the dispersed
ownership structures at U.S. firms give their CEOs more power than
foreign CEOs and increase the need for stock option compensation;
and, second, that the American winner-take-all culture condones
super payoffs to the victors which are culturally unacceptable abroad.
1. Dispersed Shareholder Ownership Increases the Tournament Prize
and the Use of Stock Options
The stereotypical large American publicly traded company has
a widely dispersed shareholder base. This has two important effects on
executive pay: it gives CEOs more power because shareholders are
ineffective checks on their actions; and it increases the need for stock
options, which can lead to enormous pay increases in bull stock
markets. While the first of these points has been previously
discussed,18 4 the second requires some additional elaboration.
Agency costs in American corporations are an important
problem because there is no one shareholder, or group of shareholders,
with sufficient equity ownership to monitor managers as closely as in
many foreign systems where similar sized firms will have a controlling
shareholder. Instead, shareholders of U.S. firms rely more upon
alternative corporate governance techniques to insure that managers
act in the shareholders' best interests, including alignment devices
184. See supra notes 51-111 and accompanying text.
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such as incentive pay systems. 8 5 If managers' pay is based on the
return that shareholders receive, executives will have a financial
incentive to act in a manner that serves the interests of those who own
equity.186
For executives, though, substituting stock options for other
forms of compensation increases the riskiness of their pay package. As
several scholars have shown, executives discount the value of stock
option awards to reflect this risk.18 7 As a result, in order to maintain
the value of the tournament prize, companies must offer the winner
more options and greater upside potential to compensate for the
higher risks of no returns if the options fail to pay off. In other words,
the potential prize for CEOs is increased so as to compensate them for
the additional risk element added to their compensation packages for
alignment purposes.
This analysis of the role of stock options makes sense in
dispersed ownership systems, such as the United States and Britain.
Not surprisingly, investors in the U.S. and the U.K. have, at least
until very recently, strongly advocated the use of pay for performance
in executive compensation.18 8  Moreover, shareholders in both
countries have generally been content to see executive pay rise
substantially so long as the increase has been incentive oriented.
8 9
Pay packages that carried large components of stock options yielded
enormous returns in the booming stock markets of the 1990s.
185. For a more detailed outline of the points made here, see Brian R. Cheffins, Current
Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via Toronto, 10 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 5, 14-15, 17 (1999).
186. On this philosophy, see, for example, ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 221-22 (2d ed. 2001); Albie Brooks et al., Issues Associated with Chief Executive
Officer Remuneration: Shareholders'Perspectives, 17 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 360, 363 (1999); John
E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, ECON. POLY REV., Apr.
2003, at 27, zg-30; Charies M. Yabiun, Bu, L. ... ..... f. ; h, Frn f
Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 279-80 (1999).
187. See, e.g., BRIAN HALL & KEVIN J. MURPHY, STOCK OPTIONS FOR UNDIVERSIFIED
EXECUTIVES 2-3 (USC Marshall Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 01-16, 2001); Lisa K.
Muelbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of
Awarding Executive Stock Options, FIN. MGMT., Summer 2001, at 5.
188. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 164, at 308. On the United States, see also Daisy
Maxey & Richard C. ten Wolde, Fund Managers Watch CEO Pay When Shopping, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., May 27, 1998, at 19; Stuart L. Gillian, Has Pay for Performance Gone Awry? Views from a
Corporate Governance Forum, RES. DIALOGUE, July 2001, at 1, 3. On the U.K., see also Mary
Fagan, How Not to Skin a Fat Cat, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, July 18, 1999, at 21.
189. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 164, at 294, 312 (noting, though, that British
shareholders might be more prepared to take a stand against lucrative pay arrangements than
American investors). On the U.K., see also David Robertson, Fat Cats To Be Collared, SCOT. ON
SUNDAY, Apr. 4, 1999, at B5.
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In a country with concentrated shareholder ownership,
corporate governance systems operate differently. Control
shareholder(s) have strong financial incentives to monitor, to
discipline, and, if necessary, to remove disloyal or ineffective
managers. 190 As control shareholders can effectively constrain self-
serving managerial conduct, the agency cost rationale for incentive-
oriented pay falls away to a large extent.191 Monitoring, in other
words, will function as a substitute for performance-related
compensation.
Performance-oriented pay is less useful for other reasons as
well. First, control shareholders may be concerned about granting
large option awards to top managers for fear of diluting their control
of the firm. 192 Second, foreign executives may attach less value to
restricted stock, or stock options, if their companies are privately
held.193 Even for publicly traded firms, they may have a small free
float of their stock because of their concentrated ownership structure,
thereby reducing the value of their stock price as a gauge of
managerial performance. 194 In short, concentrated ownership systems
have to some degree suppressed adoption of the performance-oriented
compensation model associated with American executive pay.
190. Brian R. Cheffins, Minority Shareholders and Corporate Governance, 21 COMPANY L.
41, 42 (2000).
191. Todd T. Milbourn, Financial Systems and Corporate Governance, 154 J. INSTITUTIONAL
& THEORETICAL ECON. 170, 172 (1998); Ramaswamy, supra note 110, at 71; Giorgio Brunello et
al., Executive Compensation and Firm Performance in Italy, 19 INT'L J. INDUST. ORG. 133, 139-40
(2001); YUN W. PARK ET AL., CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER AND EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE
STRUCTURE: CANADIAN EVIDENCE 1-2 (Working Paper, 2000). Note, though, that tournament
theory predicts that incentive-based compensation may be used more extensively for lower-
ranking executives in companies with concentrated ownership structures. THOMAS BATES ET AL.,
PROMOTION INCENTIVES AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN FAMILY FIRMS 16 (Working Paper,
2000).
192. BATES ET AL., supra note 191, at 17.
193. John M. Abowd & David S. Kaplan, Executive Compensation: Six Questions that Need
Answering, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1999, at 145, 156 (1999); Andrea Melis, Corporate Governance
in Italy, in 8 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 347, 353 (2000); Mazur,
supra note 43; Tara Parker-Pope, So Far Away, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1996, at R12; see also Yun
M. Park, Executive Pay Practices in Family Controlled Firms in Canada: A Preliminary Study, in
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN WESTERN CANADA: FROM FAMILY BUSINESSES TO
MULTINATIONALS 321 (James J. Chrisman et al. ed., 2002) (saying that fear of self-dealing by
controlling shareholders will deter executives from seeking stock-based incentives).
194. A smaller size float results in more noise in stock price movements, that is, changes that
are unrelated to prospective future earnings. See, e.g., Throw Out the Rule-Book, ECONOMIST,
May 26, 2001, at 112; Maurizio Dallocchio, Why Do Italian Stocks Read Like Opinion Polls?,
WALL ST. J. EUR., June 11, 2001, at 7.
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Empirical evidence from Canada, India, and Italy confirms this
hypothesis. 195
In recent years, some scholars have argued that empirical
evidence reveals that Continental European countries are moving
toward more dispersed ownership structures at larger companies.
Markets for equity securities have become more developed throughout
the world. 196 Outside of the United States, data compiled by the
Conference Board show a measurable decline in the stakes held in the
25 largest corporations by banks and non-financial companies in
Germany, France, and Japan. 197 These holders were the traditional
allies of the founding families and managements that ran the largest
European and Japanese corporations.
At the same time, more activist shareholders are accumulating
larger positions in these firms. For example, U.S. and U.K.
institutional shareholders' stakes in the forty largest companies on the
Paris bourse have now increased to roughly 35 percent. 198 More
generally, U.S. institutional shareholders have dramatically increased
their investments in foreign equities. Thus, the largest twenty-five
U.S. pension funds held $110.8 billion in foreign equities in 1996, but
by September 1999, this figure had grown to $265.5 billion. 199
Assuming for the moment that a movement toward more
dispersed ownership is occurring, or will occur, this could have
significant implications for international executive pay trends. For
example, if the movement toward increased portfolio investment by
pension funds, mutual funds, and other financial institutions from the
U.S. and the U.K. continues,20 0 then when companies from continental
195. Brunello et al., supra note 191, at 141, 155; Park, supra note 193, at 321; Ramaswamy
et al., supra note 110; PARK ET AL., supra note 189, at 8, 10.
196. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 452 n.21 (2001) (discussing development of equity markets in Latin America).
197. JOHN COFFEE, JR., THE RISE OF DISPERSED OWNERSHIP: THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE
SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 14-15 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ.
Studies, Working Paper No. 182, 2001); see Brancato, Corporations Outside U.S. Become More
Subject to Investor Demands, CORPOR. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, July/Aug. 2000, at 1. The data
cited are for a one year period between September 30, 1998 and September 30, 1999. For France,
they show a drop from 33.5 percent to 30.2 percent, in Germany, 24.2 percent to 17.8 percent,
and in Japan, 21.2 percent to 14 percent. COFFEE, supra, at 14-15. For such a short time period,
this represents a very substantial unwinding of these traditional shareholders positions,
although this study did not document where the shares sold came to rest.
198. COFFEE, supra note 197, at 15 n.22; see John Tagliabue, Resisting Those Ugly
Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000, § 3, at 1, 10.
199. COFFEE, supra note 197, at 15.
200. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the
Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213,
234 (1999); Robert Graham, A Punctured Reputation, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1999, at 24; Lean,
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Europe, Asia, and Latin America raise funds on international capital
markets, they may be more responsive to the preferences of these
institutions.201 American and British institutional shareholders have
historically been more favorably disposed towards incentive-oriented
managerial remuneration. 20 2 Thus, a shift toward less concentrated
stock ownership could cause executive pay at these firms to shift
toward awarding more options and incentive-based pay.20 3 If stock
markets regain their upward momentum, this would lead to pay
increases abroad.
More comprehensive data compiled by Van der Elst, although
showing some shifts toward more dispersed ownership, still illustrate
the continued importance of control shareholder ownership structures.
Van der Elst finds, consistent with the evidence cited above, the
strength of the nonfinancial sector is decreasing in most European
countries, while foreign and institutional investors' holdings are
increasing. 20 4 In Germany, for example, from 1990 to 1999, data on
500 nonfinancial companies show that the percentage of widely held
companies increased from less than 15 percent to more than 25
percent.20 5 A similar shift can be seen in Belgium, although not in
France and Italy.206
However, it does not appear that control shareholders are
disappearing in the Continental European companies. One indication
of this continued presence is that the size of the average voting block
of the largest shareholder in all Continental European country firms
Mean European, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2000, at 5; Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance and
Globalization, 570 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 153, 167 (2000).
201. Thomas Kamm, Continental Drift: Europe Marks a Year of Serious Flirtation with the
Free Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1999, at Al; The Pull of the Markets, LATIN FIN., Mar. 1, 2001,
at 14; Sara Calian, Foreigners Make European Firms More Shareholder Friendly, WALL ST. J.
(Interactive Edition), July 26, 2001; see also Patrick J. Lyons, A Global Vote for U.S. Style of
Corporate Openness, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1999 (saying that the priorities of German and
Japanese institutional investors were similar to those of their Anglo-American counterparts),
1999 WL 9884074.
Some commentators are skeptical that these investors will have much influence over
managerial decisions. The Chaebol Spurn Change, ECONOMIST, July 22, 2000, at 59-60; Craig
Karmin, Corporate-Governance Issues Hamper Emerging Markets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2000, at
Cl; Peter Martin, Anglo-Saxon Angst, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 2/3, 2000, at 18; Phillip Webster, Italy's
Grand Families Back in the Frame, SUNDAY BuS., Aug. 5, 2001, at 14. Thus, it cannot be taken
for granted that the preferences which U.S. and U.K. investors have concerning executive pay
arrangements will have more than a marginal influence for the foreseeable future.
202. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
203. See France's Boardroom Revolution, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1995, at A20; Tom Leander,
The Global Shakeup in Executive Compensation, GLOBAL FIN., Aug. 1998, at 12-14; David
Woodruff, Europe, A Latecomer, Embraces Options, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2001, at A18.
204. VAN DER ELST, supra note 47, at 22, 27.
205. Id. at 28-29.
206. Id. at 30-33.
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remains more than twice as large as that of U.S. and U.K. firms.20 7
Similarly, control shareholder ownership stakes remain very high at
newly listed companies in continental Europe 208 and at other listed
companies. 20 9  If this pattern continues, controlling shareholders
presumably will still play a dominant role even if the current move to
the public stock market remains on track. 210 Finally, the number of
companies with control shareholders is much greater in continental
European countries than in the United States and United Kingdom,
and shows little sign of changing.
21'
This Article concludes that if the Continental European
countries are moving toward more dispersed ownership structures,
which remains a debatable point, the move appears to be very
gradual. If shareholder dispersion is in fact not emerging in
Continental Europe, this will slow any shifts towards the use of stock
options. On the other hand, if such dispersion is increasing, then the
move toward bigger tournaments for foreign CEOs may be underway,
with higher executive pay checks not far behind.
2. Does the Winner-Take-All Culture Affect Executive Pay?
Even if Tournament Theory would lead us to conclude that
foreign CEOs should be getting paychecks more along American lines,
there may be cultural reasons why big differences in pay may be less
acceptable abroad. In other words, cultural factors may prevent
companies outside of the United States from conducting tournaments
207. Id. at 35. The median value for the average voting block of the largest shareholder of
American and British firms is around 15 percent, whereas in continental Europe, the values
range from a low of 36.6 percent in Spain to 41.7 percent in Belgium, 46.1 percent in Germany,
48.1 percent in Italy, and 52 percent in France. Id. Furthermore, in some countries, only
nonvoting stock is traded on the stock market. Id.
208. Id. at 37 (showing that the average voting block of the largest shareholder at newly
public firms is more than 50 percent in .Italy and France, almost 50 percent in Belgium, and
more than 40 percent in Spain and Germany); see MARC GOERGEN, CUIR'UICNI' GOVERNANCE
AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF GERMAN AND U.K. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 51-56,
78-83 (1998) (examining the U.K. and Germany); Wayne H. Mikkelson et al., Ownership and
Operating Performance of Companies that Go Public, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 281, 286-89 (1997)
(examining the U.S.); Marco Pagano et al., Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical
Analysis, 53 J. FIN. 27, 56-60 (1998) (examining Italy); MARTIN HOLMPN & PETER HOGFELDT, A
LAW AND FINANCE ANALYSIS OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 20-21, 24 (Working Paper, 2003)
(examining Sweden).
209. VAN DER ELST, supra note 47, at 37-38 (stating that the concentration of voting rights is
even greater at other stock exchange listed companies than with newly listed companies).
210. Cheffins, supra note 185, at 36 (discussing the situation in Italy).
211. VAN DER ELST, supra note 47, at 39-41 (providing data showing that in the United
States and the United Kingdom slightly more than 10 percent of firms surveyed were majority
controlled, with much higher numbers in Continental European countries like Italy (62 percent),
France (57.5 percent), and Germany (48.5 percent)).
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that offer such highly lucrative prizes. 212 If this is true, it could help
explain the lower levels of executive pay abroad.
Legal academics are just beginning to appreciate the
importance of culture as an explanatory variable for differences in
corporate governance systems.213 One problem has been the difficulty
of defining culture precisely, 214 as many things ascribed to it boil down
to particular legal and financial arrangements. 215 Still, culture may
be pivotally important in the area of comparative corporate
governance and is frequently cited as an explanation for why
executive pay arrangements differ considerably on a country-by-
country basis.216 This section will therefore examine culture as a
factor in determining executive pay and define it as a society's shared
values, understandings, and assumptions.
217
When culture is invoked to analyze executive pay, a common
refrain is that the milieu is different in the United States than it is
elsewhere. The United States is said to be highly "tolerant of income
inequality, especially if the inequality is driven by differences in effort,
talent or entrepreneurial risk taking."218 Certainly, if we look at the
Gini coefficients for income distribution, the U.S. income distribution
is more unequal than in Japan or the continental European
countries. 21 9  The "winner-take-all" orientation of Americans
220
212. Legal arrangements could constrain the size of the prize awarded in the tournament.
For example, Australia and Germany have legal rules that require executive pay at public
companies to be reasonable. CHEFFINS & THOMAS, supra note 2. In practice, however, the impact
of these regulations is minimal. Id. The United States also imposes a reasonableness
requirement for executive compensation but only for closely held companies. Randall S. Thomas
& Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH.
U. L.Q. 569, 600-01 (2001). Courts apply this standard to discourage close corporations from
paying their executives disguised dividends to reduce their tax burden. Id.
213. Amir N. Licht, The Mother ofAll Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of
Corporate Governance System, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147, 152-57 (2001) [hereinafter Licht, The
Mother of All Path Dependencies]; AMIR N. LICHT ET AL., CULTURE, LAW, AND FINANCE:
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAWS 3-4 (Working Paper, 2001).
214. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies, supra note 213, at 166.
215. Back on Top?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 16, 1995, at 15.
216. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 35, at F667-68; Steven E. Gross & Per L. Wingerup,
Global Pay? Maybe Not Yet!, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 25; Sydney R.
Robertson, Establishing Global Compensation Strategies, in THE COMPENSATION HANDBOOK: A
STATE-OF-THE-ART GUIDE TO COMPENSATION STRATEGY AND DESIGN 606-07 (Lance A. Berger &
Dorothy R. Berger ed., 4th ed. 2000); Jill Elswick, Relative Values, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS,
June 15, 2001, 2001 WL 7984504.
217. See HELEN DERESKY, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT: MANAGING ACROSS BORDERS AND
CULTURES 105 (3d ed. 2000).
218. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 35, at F667.
219. DWIGHT H. PERKINS ET AL., ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 121 (5th ed. 2001).
220. ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY (1995) (coining
this term).
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provides a hospitable platform for lucrative performance-oriented
executive pay. 221 This influential theory claims that American society
is built around the principle that the winner of any competition,
including that to become a corporate CEO, is entitled to capture
enormous benefits.
222
In contrast, in Japan and Europe, many commentators have
claimed that there are strong egalitarian impulses against large pay
differentials 223 or conspicuous displays of wealth. 224 Such feelings
were quite evident in the recent national uproar in Sweden over the
severance pay package awarded by Swiss industrial giant ABB to
Percy Barnevik. The uproar ultimately led that company's board of
directors to demand the return of much of these monies, and badly
tarnished Barnevik's image as a corporate governance reformer.225
Culture therefore frequently is offered as a reason why executive pay
is much lower outside the United States.226
Culture may constrain executive pay levels even in the English
Commonwealth countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada and
Australia, which have many similarities in corporate governance
structures to the American system. 227 For instance, "[t]he British [are
claimed to] have always been suspicious of wealth, particularly of the
rich who made their money in the marketplace."228  This bias may
partly explain why U.K. executive pay arrangements have historically
not been as lucrative or performance-oriented as those in the United
221. James Cox, U.S. Success Draws Envy, Protests, USA TODAY, Aug. 3, 2000, at BI;
Michael Crawford, Peanuts for Elephants, CANADIAN Bus., July 1994, at 16-17; Richard Morais
et al., The Global Boss' Pay: Where (and How) The Money Is, FORBES, June 7, 1993, at 90; Maria
Slade, NZ Executives Paid Third World Salaries, INDEP. Bus. WKLY., Sept. 26, 1997, at 23. For
anecdotal evidence consistent with this view, see David Leonhardt, Executive Pay Drops Off the
Political Radar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, 2000 WL 21240320.
222. This theory also may explain why U.S. non-CEO executives are not paid much better
than their counterparts elsewhere: the focus in America is on winning the tournament. The
losers will receive much smaller rewards.
223. Shirley Fung, How Should We Fay T hemy, ACRuSs iME Bulv, June 1999, at 39; s~e
also Gross & Wingerup, supra note 216; Tara Parker-Pope, supra note 193, at R12.
224. See, e.g., Shawn Tully, American Bosses Are Overpaid... Or Their Counterparts in
Europe Are Underpaid, FORTUNE, Nov. 7, 1988, at 124. Hence, the adage in Japan: "When in
public, wear cotton. If you must wear silk, wear it at home." Michael Berger, A Look at Salaries
in Japan, S.F. CHRON., May 9, 1988, at B8.
225. Charles Goldsmith, Barnevik Saga Could Hold Sweden Back, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21,
2002, at A14.
226. Deborah Orr, Damn Yankees, FORBES, May 17, 1999, at 206-07; see also Herbert A.
Henzler, The New Era of Eurocapitalism, HARv. Bus. REV., Jul.-Aug. 1992, at 60; David Cay
Johnston, American-Style Pay Moves Abroad: Importance of Stock Options Expands in Global
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1998, at C1.
227. On business culture typologies, see DERESKY, supra note 217, at 117-18.
228. William Rees-Mogg, The Fat Cat is the Pensioner's Friend, TIMES, June 3, 1996, at 20;
see also Parker-Pope, supra note 193, at R12.
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States.229 Similarly, executive pay differentials between the United
States and Canada may come from fundamental cultural
differences, 230 such as Canada's "stubborn egalitarian streak."231 In
Australia, managerial compensation experts make the same claims to
account for lower executive pay there.
232
For our purposes, the cultural explanation for executive pay
differentials has two important aspects. The first arises out of internal
corporate checks: executives are said to find the large American pay
packages distasteful. 23 3 To the extent that internal corporate cultures
firmly embody such self-restraint, it will act as something of a brake
on a move towards U.S.-style executive compensation.
Culture could have a second effect on executive pay through a
broader societal resistance to higher executive pay.234 When executive
pay packages become sufficiently lucrative, they may violate equity
norms within society and cause a backlash.235 Societal outrage over
high corporate pay could stimulate corporate self-discipline,
236
producing various social and reputation costs for the directors who set
executive compensation and for the managers who are paid under
generous service contracts. 237 Directors will be reluctant to approve,
and executives will be hesitant to seek, compensation arrangements
that might be viewed by observers as outrageous. 2
38
Even if corporate self-discipline turns out to be weak, societal
outrage may act as a catalyst for government reform. For example, in
229. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 35, at F667-68; Martin Van der Weyer, Too Much Cream,
INDEP., Aug. 16, 1998, at 16.
230. Crawford, supra note 221, at 17.
231. Deirdre McMurdy, Taking Stock of Options, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 28, 1997, at 49; see also
Paul Waldie, Canadian CEOs in Middle of Pay Pack, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 26, 1999, at B6.
232. Slade, supra note 221, at 23; see also Florence Chong, Salary Secrets: What Companies
Have to Fear, BUS. REV. WKLY, June 5, 1987, at 50; Margaret Lyons, Australia's Top Executives:
Are They Paid Too Much?, Bus. REV. WKLY., Nov. 16, 1990, at 52; Julie McBeth, Who Pays the
Top Salaries, Bus. REV. WKLY, Nov. 25, 1988, at 60.
233. John Burgess, Big Bucks For Executives Finds Some Favor Abroad, WASH. POST, Oct.
20, 1991, at Hi; Gross & Wingerup, supra note 216, at 27; Johnston, supra note 226, at Cl;
Joann S. Lublin, The American Advantage,, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1991, at R4; Orr, supra note
226, at 207; Tully, supra note 224, at 124.
234. BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 20, at 33.
235. Duncan Brown, The Third Way: The Future of Pay and Rewards Strategies in Europe,
ACA J., 2d Q., 2000 at 15; Romesh Ratnesar, The Get Rich Quick Option, TIME EUR., Mar. 13,
2000, http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/2000/313/stock.html; Those Egalitarian
Swedes, ECONOMIST, June 3, 2000, at 51.
236. CHEFFINS, supra note 163.
237. BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 20, at 33; see also Alex Brummer, Failing Brakes on
Boardroom Pay, GUARDIAN, Jun. 1, 1996, at 38.
238. BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 20, at 24. For an example of this process, see Parker-Pope,
supra note 193, at R12.
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1993, President Clinton fulfilled a campaign pledge to halt "excessive
executive pay" by spurring changes to tax law that meant a
corporation which paid an executive more than $1 million annually
could only treat the expenditure as deductible for tax purposes if the
additional pay was "performance-based. '239 While ultimately this
provision of the tax code did little to rein in pay increases,
240 it
illustrates how popular opinion can pressure governments to take
direct action to reduce executive pay levels.
A second example of how public opinion can lead to reform of
executive practices is the United Kingdom's Confederation of Business
Industry decision to set up the Greenbury Committee. At the time,
disquiet over executive pay levels had motivated the British
government to contemplate introducing tougher statutory
regulation.241 Instead, the Greenbury Committee was created, and the
government let it consider the matter. The Committee Report
contained recommendations that prompted remuneration-oriented
changes to the London Stock Exchange's listing rules.242 While the
work done by the Greenbury Committee did not fully satisfy the critics
of executive pay, 243 it does indicate that public upset can lead to
reform intended to address controversial remuneration practices.
Even if culture is a barrier to higher executive pay in foreign
countries, however, the U.K. experience reveals that the values in
question can change. During the 1970s, British executives were paid
less than their counterparts in all other major industrial countries.
244
The British managerial culture was said to be similar to West
Germany's, and U.K. companies were claimed to have highly
egalitarian reward structures.
245
Things changed dramatically in the next decade. During the
1980s, the British government was controlled by a Conservative
239. Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV.
713, 714, ' (3 (19VO).
240. BRIAN HALL & JEFFREY LIEBMAN, THE TAXATION OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6-7
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7596, 2000) (finding that this rule had only
a minor effect on the composition of pay packages and none on the level of total compensation).
241. CHEFFINS, supra note 118, at 655-57.
242. Id. at 375-76.
243. See, e.g., Graef Crystal, Need a Good Laugh? Look at Caps on Executive Pay, L.A. TIMES,
May 21, 1995, at D2; How Greenbury Has Boosted Executive Excess, INDEP. (London), June 29,
1996, at 17.
244. International Executive Compensation, WHARTON MAG., Winter 1978, at 58; Hugh
Parker, The Effective Executive: What Is He Worth?, McKINSEY Q., Winter 1976, at 27-28.
245. See generally CHRISTEL LANE, MANAGEMENT AND LABOUR IN EUROPE: THE INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISE IN GERMANY, BRITAIN AND FRANCE 131-32 (1989); Andreas Budde et al., Corporate
Goals, Managerial Objectives, and Organizational Structures in British and West German
Companies, 3 ORG. STUDIES 1 (1982).
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administration imbued with a free-market ideology. Executive pay
practices changed profoundly. In 1988, Fortune magazine declared
that: "A pay revolution is shaking Britain. Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher's bracing brand of capitalism brought not just tax cuts and
high profits but also a profound change in public attitudes. Big pay
packages are no longer frowned upon."246 Managerial compensation
took off between the time when the Conservatives took office in 1979
and 1994 so that the gross pay of chief executives in larger U.K. public
companies rose nearly 600 percent.247 By virtue of this surge, by the
mid-1990s British CEOs were among the better paid in the
industrialized world.
248
Over the past year, public concerns about big pay gaps seem to
have grown. In many European countries, there have been cries of
outrage over American-style pay packages awarded to local
executives. 249 Even in the United States, the popular press has
decried big pay packages and the gap between the top managers and
lower level employees. 250 It is too soon to tell if this shift in attitudes
will have a lasting impact on the international CEO pay gap.
VI. OPPORTUNITY COST THEORY
The Opportunity Cost Theory claims that the returns to skilled
labor, such as top corporate management, have increased in the U.S.
in recent years.251 This has occurred as increased access to financial
markets has driven down the barriers to entry in many industries,
which, accompanied by increased international competition, has forced
large vertically integrated firms to break up and allowed the
development of many smaller niche firms. The human capital required
by these smaller firms is much less firm specific than before, allowing
246. Tully, supra note 224, at 132; see Van der Weyer, supra 229 (discussing how matters
progressed in the following decade).
247. David Goodhart, In Search of Wages that Work, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 1994, at 16.
248. Abowd & Kaplan, supra note 193, at 146. It is possibile that the 1970s were exceptional
and the pay surge in the 1980s and 1990s brought matters back into line with longer-term
trends. Derek Matthews, Fat Is a Relative Issue, MGMT. TODAY, June 1996, at 53.
249. Jennifer Hill & Charles M. Yablon, Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration:
Rediscovering Managerial Position Conflict, 25 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1, 11 (2002).
250. See, e.g., Simon London, A Risky Option, FIN. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at 19. See generally
CONFERENCE BD., COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE (Working Paper,
2002) (citing excessive use of stock options, lax boards of directors, and other factors as causes of
excessive executive compensation).
251. RAGHURAM RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, FINANCE AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM 39 (Working
Paper, 2001) (on file with author). In general, the rate of return to skilled labor is higher in the
U.S. than in Europe. See generally Paul Krugman, Past and Prospective Causes of High
Unemployment, 79 ECON. REV. 21 (1994).
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skilled managers to change jobs more easily, or to create their own
firms. Both of these options have led to a shift in the balance of power
within firms, shifting it toward skilled labor and away from capital,
thereby increasing the returns to skilled labor.252 The implications of
this shift in power for executive compensation are obvious: established
firms will need to offer their most skilled employees, the ones that
have the most alternative options for employment, a larger piece of
the firm's surplus in order to retain them.
The financial revolution that has enabled American managers
to gain more power as compared to capital has not, until very recently,
spread to other countries. As is discussed below, Continental Europe
and the market-oriented economies of Asia have not witnessed the
expansion of financial markets with nearly the speed, nor to the
degree, that the United States has. Furthermore, many foreign
countries have smaller internal labor markets for managers, more
capital intensive industries, and more restrictive legal regulations on
executive pay arrangements, all of which will tend to depress
executive compensation. The Opportunity Cost Theory therefore
predicts that executive pay in those nations will not reach the levels
seen in the United States as indeed it has not.
A. American CEOs' Opportunity Costs Are Higher than those of
Foreign CEOs and Therefore American CEOs Are Paid More
By the 1930s, larger, vertically integrated firms controlled
most of the U.S. economy. 253 These firms employed professional
salaried managers 254 and "dominated most sectors of the U.S.
economy."255 They were heavily capital intensive, with oligopolistic
positions in their industry and protected by high barriers to entry.
256
252. This has been accompanied by increasing income inequality in the United States. See
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ D....,.. L'V---- D-.9 rA U'TJ TXT ,~7 9l
253. BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND ANTITRUST LAW As DETERMINANTS OF
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE: THE GREAT MERGER WAVE OF 1897 TO 1903, at 10 (Berkeley
Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper, 2002).
254. The modern multiunit business enterprise replaced the small traditional enterprise
when administrative coordination permitted greater productivity, lower costs, and higher profits
than coordination by market mechanisms. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 6 (1977).
255. Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Governance of the New Enterprise, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 207 (X. Vives ed., 2000); CHEFFINS, supra note 253, at 5, 10 (noting
that by 1932 matters had progressed to the point where "Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means could
proclaim in The Modern Corporation & Private Property that 'a separation of ownership and
control' had emerged in America's larger public companies.").
256. Large-scale production in a single firm became possible, but the new importance of
physical capital made it extremely difficult to set up a competing firm. Raghuram Rajan & Luigi
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Managers of these firms were unable to break away and start
their own businesses because large amounts of capital were needed to
start a competing firm and existing financial markets were
underdeveloped. 257 Furthermore, managers' skills were highly firm
specific, with limited transferability to other industries.258  Steep
managerial hierarchies were created with increasing power and pay to
reward those that stayed with the company. 259 Unskilled labor was
minimally paid, but was able to move relatively freely to other firms to
get employment. Skilled, nonmanagerial workers, however, who
developed specialized human capital, were poorly paid, and unable to
leave the firm without sacrificing most of their human capital. 260
Some scholars have claimed that the result was "tremendous
compression of the wages of educated, white collar workers relative to
blue-collar workers. 26'
Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms, 116
Q.J. ECON. 805 (2001).
257. Most importantly, "given the limited alternative opportunities for specialized human
capital and the difficulty of reproducing the mass of inanimate assets these corporations had
created, the critical resource was inanimate assets to which the human capital was tied." Rajan
& Zingales, supra note 255, at 208.
258. Employees could be authoritatively controlled because their skills were often specialized
to the firm and were not readily marketable to other employers. Id. at 208. In other words,
"employees were tied to the firm largely because they were technically specialized ... there was
a very limited market for their skills." Id. at 215. Furthermore, within the same industry,
"gentleman's agreements" between competitors stopped them from poaching each other's
managers. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 251, at 16.
259. "Through its control of the firm's assets, the headquarters effectively controlled the
main source of employment open to their specialized employees." Rajan & Zingales, supra note
255, at 208. Thus, power was concentrated at the top of the firm. "Once the command-and-
control system of the MBE was in place, the main problem became one of how to guarantee
enough power to employees who specialized, so as to motivate their specific investments." Id. at
208. The solution was steep organizational hierarchies with intermediate levels of management.
"The steep hierarchy was a way for top management to cede some power to intermediate
management by giving them control over some resources (the lower level employees). Higher
positions in the hierarchy were associated with higher rents and were a reward for employees."
Id.
260. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 251, at 16-17.
261. Id. at 18. Wage structure narrowed considerably from 1903 to 1956, according to one
study. CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RETURNS TO SKILL ACROSS THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY UNITED STATES 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7126, 1999)
(citing Paul G. Keat, Long-Run Changes in Occupational Wage Structure, 1900-1956, 68 J. POL.
ECON. 584 (1960)), http://www.economics.harvard.edu/-goldin/papers/inequality.pdf. This
narrowing was attributed to "decreased costs of training and education, in part due to the
increase in publicly funded formal education." Id. (citing Harry Ober, Occupational Wage
Differentials, 1907-47, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 274 (1948)). Another study found the wage structure
narrowing from 1907 to 1947, principally during the late 1910s and the late 1930s to 1947; this
study attributed the narrowing to "inflation, changes in 'fairness' norms in setting wages at the
lower end, and automation in rendering many unskilled jobs superfluous." Id. at 6 (citing Ober,
supra).
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These vertically integrated firms continued to grow until the
1970s. 262 Beginning around that time, several forces combined to force
their break up. Although the relative importance of these forces in
bringing about the breakup cannot be unraveled completely, three
things in particular should be focused on: increased openness in trade
and markets, financial innovations, and new technologies.
263
Increasing international trade expanded product markets so that
domestic oligopolies had to do battle with their international
brethren. 264 This pressured domestic firms to deconstruct themselves
to purchase intermediate goods from more efficient providers, and
created new openings for smaller, intermediate good manufacturers to
supply both domestic and international competitors.
265
A second important force leading to the breakup of the
integrated firms was the development of new, more flexible
technologies. 266 These improvements led to smaller firms, as they
reduced the scale required for efficient production, the costs of
exchanging information with other firms, and the costs of transacting
with outsiders.267 As intermediate good producers flourished, even the
larger, vertically integrated firms needed to restructure themselves to
use outside products where they made economic sense. 268 Beginning
in the mid-1970s, more and more smaller firms have emerged, and the
average firm size in the U.S. economy has shrunk.269 These new
intermediate-sized competitors are potential employers and skilled
workers thus have a choice to quit the big companies if they become
dissatisfied.
262. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 251, at 21.
263. Id. at 22-27.
264. Cross-border trade has expanded market size tremendously, "doing away with
previously oligopolistic national markets and dissipating the first mover advantage." Rajan &
Zingales, supra note 255, at 212.
would outsource at the intermediate level. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 255, at 213. Increased
international trade therefore placed subunits of vertically integrated American firms in
competition with independent intermediate suppliers from Japan. Id. The latter were typically
more efficient, because they did not have the luxury of being subsidized by a larger vertically
integrated firm. Therefore, once international markets opened, these American subunits that
were not competitive and had to be divested, breaking up vertical integration. Id.
266. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Influence of the Financial Revolution on the
Nature of Firms, AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. ECON. ASS'N, May 2001, at
206, 209.
267. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 251, at 24.
268. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 255, at 213.
269. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 251, at 29. Mega-mergers in the 1990s may have
increased firm size during that time period, but this did not fully offset the decline from the mid-
1970s. Id. at 30.
[Vol. 57:4:11711226
2004] EXPLAINING THE INTERNATIONAL CEO PAY GAP 1227
Third, there were substantial financial innovations, and
ultimately a financial "revolution" that facilitated the change.
Financial innovations contributing to the breakup of vertically
integrated firms included the MBO. In the 1980s, a wave of manager-
driven leveraged buyouts emerged as the "[m]anagers of profitable
units sought complete independence... pay[ing] their parent firm to
be set free."270 MBOs liberated frustrated managers that wanted to
start up their own firms. Suddenly large pools of capital were
available to finance new private firms either by buying divisions of
existing larger companies or by purchasing an entire firm. Executive
compensation at these firms was heavily skewed toward equity
ownership with the new managers receiving large amounts of stock
options and/or restricted stock.
271
Venture capital became "a major source of funding for new
technology-based firms and play[ed] a crucial role in promoting the
radical innovations often carried out by these firms. ' 272 Venture
capital in the United States exploded during the 1990s, from $2.65
billion in venture capital investments in 1991 to $9.42 billion in 1996;
in 1995 there was $37.2 billion under venture capital management. 2
73
Venture capital in North America is oriented toward high-technology
sectors ("communications, information technology and health and
biotechnology") with "more than 80 percent of total VC investment in
the U.S. and around 67 percent in Canada. This is far above the
figures for Japan and the EU."274  It became the leading source of
start-up capital for many innovative sectors of the American economy
during this time.
At the same time, there was a veritable revolution in American
financial markets. As Rajan and Zingales state:
The ability of financial institutions to price a variety of exotic instruments, and to assess
and spread risks, has increased. More data on potential borrowers is now available, and
it is also more timely. Improvements in accounting disclosure have resulted in greater
borrower transparency. Deregulation has resulted in greater competition and better
270. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 251, at 23. "Leveraged buyouts provide management
with the opportunity, through the use of debt, to acquire ownership of the corporation and to
make large profits." James R. Repetti, Management Buyouts, Efficient Markets, Fair Value, and
Soft Information, 67 N.C. L. REV. 121, 122 (1988). The profit potential for managers was even
greater when they could use inside information to pay shareholders less than fair value. Id.
271. The volume of LBOs in the United States peaked at more than $160 billion in 1988. See
Arthur Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 328 n.464.
272. OECD SCOREBOARD, supra note 140, at 44.
273. Gerald Hane, Comparing University-Industry Linkages in the United States and Japan,
in INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY LINKAGES IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED
STATES 20, 42 (Lewis M. Branscomb et al. eds., 1999).
274. Id.
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prices in financial markets. Finally, regulatory barriers protecting the turf of different
kinds of financial institutions have come down, resulting in the emergence of new
institutional forms.
2 7 5
The increased availability of capital has made "alienable assets such
as plant and equipment easy to come by," making the primary means
by which a traditional firm controlled managers, control of expensive
physical assets, 276 no longer powerful as a means of control; "[i]f need
be, [managers] can break away, raise finance directly in the market,
and replicate the assets.
''277
The opportunities for American executives expanded
tremendously. For example, the internet boom of the late 1990s
created great opportunities for U.S. managers to start up new
businesses. Sparked by the high level of potential returns, massive
amounts of financial capital moved into high tech and other internet-
oriented industries. Almost anyone with a good idea and a modest
amount of managerial experience could start up a new firm. Although
this boom lasted less than a decade, it had a dramatic effect on
executive pay levels.
These changes increased the employment options for
managers, at least for a period of time.278 More flexible production
technologies, and more similar production processes, have increased
skilled workers' mobility. New access to financial markets has allowed
unhappy managers, or skilled workers, to leave established firms and
275. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 266, at 206.
276. Id. at 207.
277. Id. Under the traditional regime, when physical assets were paramount, owners
permitted managers to reinvest because "this secured them property rights on growth
opportunities," while it enhanced the "career and earnings potential" for managers. Id. After
the "revolution," during the 1 nus, managers 'had Lu -ake a caso to chanrohc!!ers th.t 0h-
investment would be profitable, and a variety of mechanisms were put in place to compel
insiders [managers] to repay cash if the case was found wanting. These changes ... helped sever
the link between assets in place and growth opportunities." Id. Managers could just as easily
convince outside investors of the value of their projects as current shareholders, so taking their
new ventures outside the firm was now much more feasible. Id. at 207-08.
In other words, the financial revolution has subjected internal decisions to greater
scrutiny, while making outside decisions easier. Unless there is a strong
complementarity between assets in place and growth opportunities from a
technological point of view, there is no reason why new opportunities should be
undertaken within the legal shell represented by the existing company.
Id. at 208.
278. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 251, at 26.
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start-up their own companies.27 9  Capital investment needs have
become much less of a barrier to entry in most industries.
280
Individual executives' greater potential to move from current
jobs raises their opportunity cost of working at an established firm.
28'
Increased bargaining power for skilled managers permits them to hold
firms hostage, extracting rents from these firms even if there are
perfectly competitive capital markets. This is particularly true for
skills, such as managerial talent, that are in high demand.28 2
Human capital has become increasingly important in today's
marketplace. 28 3 This trend is evidenced by the sharp increase in the
percentage of firms' value that is not attributable to physical assets,
illustrating that human capital's value to the firm has increased.28 4 In
other words: "The view of the corporation of old was one where capital
hired labor. The modern corporation could equally well be thought of
as labor renting capital."28 5
Talented managers' value has increased with the value of
human capital. 28 6 The power to control human capital, the key to the
279. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Systems, Industrial Structure, and
Growth, 17 OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY 467, 470 (2001).
280. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 251, at 29. "Improvements in financial markets have
made it easier to finance large investments, so capital intensity is no longer a source of
protection against competition." Rajan & Zingales, supra note 255, at 212.
281. These changes may also increase income inequalities within the U.S. Studies have
documented the increased inequality in wage levels between highly skilled workers and the
lowest level wage earners. From 1963 to 1989, for instance, one study found that real wages for
the most skilled workers rose by about 40 percent, whereas those of the least skilled labor group
declined by about 5 percent. Chinhui Juhn et al., Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns to
Skill, 101 J. POL. ECON. 410, 411 (1993). Years of schooling and labor market experience did not
account for much of this increased wage differential.
Other studies have found evidence of an increased demand for skilled labor in the American
economy. See Lawrence Katz & Kevin Murphy, Changes in Relative Wages 1963-1987: Supply
and Demand Factors, 107 Q.J. ECON. 35, 76-77 (1992).
282. Juhn et al., supra note 281, at 441.
283. Stephen Machin & John Van Reenan, Technology and Changes in Skill Structure:
Evidence from Seven OECD Countries, 113 Q. J. ECON 1215, 1217 (1998). Rajan and Zingales
offer the financial sector as an example. Previously, when financial capital was less available,
loan officers at banks were simply dispensers of funds; they had little value without their access
to the bank's funds. See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 255, at 210-11. "Competition from markets
and other institutions" made the ability to channel funding less unique. Id. Now, the loan
officer's value is derived from "new ideas for structured financing for firms ... [and] innovative
and customized deals." Id. at 211. The loan officer's value to the bank is now rooted in "human
capital, both in terms of her product and industry knowledge, and her client relationships." Id.
284. See, e.g., BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES (2001) (arguing that "[w]ealth and growth in
today's economy are driven primarily by intangible (intellectual) assets").
285. RAiAN & ZINGALES, supra note 251, at 33.
286. Rajan and Zingales point to the bond trading group at Salomon Brothers in the late
1980s and early 1990s as an example. The head of the group, John Meriweather, was fired after
a "misguided attempt to corner the Treasury bill auction" hurt the firm badly. See Rajan &
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smooth functioning of teams of skilled labor at many modern
corporations, rests in the hands of those executives with the
managerial skills to resolve interpersonal conflicts, and the
investment skills to deploy financial capital wisely. 287 The returns to
these workers have increased commensurately.
What are the implications of these trends for executive pay?
As Rajan and Zingales state:
Firms pay their managers more, not so much to provide incentives, though couching it
in those terms keeps shareholders more docile, but because the labor market for top
managers gives them no alternative. Furthermore, as assets are no longer sufficient for
investors to exercise control over the firm, it is supremely important to have the right
top management team, building links to the rest of the firm .... All of this is not to say
that there is not the occasional "pet" board that rewards its CEO for spectacular
underperformance, but rather that the trend is too important to be dismissed as simply
greed or the sudden discovery that incentives matter.
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High executive pay is thus a reflection of skilled managers' value to
firms in a world where human capital has become crucial.
The Opportunity Cost Theory also provides an explanation for
the increased disparity in recent years in the pay ratios between
executives and other workers. Wages were tightly compressed in the
era when capital was king and laborers of all types were paid poorly.
As skilled labor's share of the firm's surplus soared, and unskilled
labor's grew more slowly, the pay ratio between skilled and unskilled
labor escalated. While this shift raises important social questions
about the need to protect unskilled workers, the underlying cause of
the shift rests on a reallocation of the firm's surplus toward the more
productive factor of production, skilled labor.
B. Do Limited Financial Market Access and Smaller Managerial Labor
Markets Constrain Foreign Executive Pay?
If we accept the Opportunity Cost Theory as the appropriate
explanation for increased executive pay in the United States, what
does it tell us about the origins of the pay gap betweei Ateyican and
foreign executives? If executive pay levels accurately reflect the
returns to skilled labor, then the Opportunity Cost Theory's prediction
should be that the returns to managerial inputs are lower at foreign
Zingales, supra note 255, at 211. Meriweather formed a new company that eventually attracted a
group of Salomon's traders responsible for 87 percent of its 1990-93 profits. With financial capital
widely available, the traders were free to rent that resource wherever they pleased; their ties to
Meriweather, a form of human capital, were stronger than their loyalty to Salomon, whose name
and funds they were only renting. Id. at 212.
287. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 251, at 35.
288. Id. at 39.
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companies than at American firms. There are two factors that may
explain why, in the past, foreign CEOs have had lower opportunity
costs, and therefore received lower pay, than American CEOs: first,
foreign executives' more limited access to financial capital; second, the
more limited job options of foreign executives. Lastly, I consider, and
tentatively reject, claims that America's top managers receive higher
pay because they experience greater job turnover than their foreign
counterparts.
These forces, however, may be changing. International labor
markets are growing, and financial capital is becoming more available
to foreign executives. If these trends continue, then the Opportunity
Cost Theory leads us to predict that executive pay levels will converge.
1. Foreign Executives Have Had More Limited Access to Financial
Markets for Start-Up Capital
Recent research suggests that financial development facilitates
the creation of new firms.28 9 As Rajan and Zingales have noted,
[n]ew firms depend more on external finance than established firms ... financial
development has almost twice the economic effect on the growth of the number of
establishments in an industry as it has on the growth of their average size. This
suggests that an additional indirect channel through which financial development could
influence growth is by disproportionately improving the prospects of younger firms.
2 90
Focusing first on European executives, the fractionalized nature of
continental European capital markets and securities regulation has
made it more difficult and expensive for executives to raise capital to
start new firms. "EU market capitalization is only about half that of
the U.S., even though the EU economy is about three-quarters the size
289. LUIGI GuisO ET AL., THE REAL EFFECTS OF LOCAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 4 (Working
Paper, 2001). They use the "conditional probability of being rejected [for credit] as a measure of
financial underdevelopment." Id. at 8, 12 (indicating that the source for this information is the
Italian Survey of Households Income and Wealth). The results were divided by region, of which
Italy has 20 (one was dropped because it had too few reports). Id. Because demand for financial
development could "generate its own supply," the authors "instrument [their] indicator of
financial development with exogenous determinants of the degree of financial development such
as the level of judicial inefficiency and the level of social capital." Id.
For other studies finding a link between financial market development and growth, see
Robert King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right, 108 Q. J. ECON.
717 (1993); Marco Pagano, Financial Markets and Growth: An Overview, 37 EUR. ECON. REV. 613
(1993). Financial market development can have two desirable effects on macroeconomic growth:
first, it can lead to greater capital accumulation by reducing the fraction of savings that is lost in
the intermediation process; and second, it can lead to a more efficient allocation of savings
through improved risk sharing and more efficient sharing of information about investment
alternatives. FREIDRICH HEINEMANN & MATHIAS JoPP, THE BENEFITS OF A WORKING EUROPEAN
RETAIL MARKET FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES 40 (2002).
290. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 279, at 470.
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of American economic output."291 The EU has struggled to transform
its "chronic underperformer" financial markets into pan-European
powerhouses by enacting a package of new legislation, the Financial
Services Action Plan, to create common rules for all financial
transactions throughout the EU by 2005.292 Still, entrenched interests
have fought these changes, arguing that their own national systems
should be adopted as the EU standard. While some of the disputes
have been settled, 293 others may never be resolved, leaving the
financial system fractured and the cost of capital counterproductively
high.294
Venture capital funding, a prime source of financing for start-
ups in the United States, is much less available in Europe. "According
to a study conducted last year by the European Commission,
European venture capitalists invest roughly one-third the amount
their U.S. counterparts do."295 Similar figures compiled by the OECD
suggest that German and French venture capital funding are at
approximately one-quarter the levels found in the U.S.296 This
suggests that funding start-ups will be more difficult in Europe, and
therefore there will be fewer potential opportunities for executives to
create their own firms.297
291. Paul Hofheinz, A Capital Idea, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2002, at R4.
292. Id.
293. The EU has adopted several measures that will facilitate a pan-European financial
system including, a single accounting standard for all listed companies, rules permitting mutual
funds to sell their products throughout the EU, common standards for collateral in bankruptcies,
and a common ban on insider trading and market manipulation. Id.
294. Id. Some of the unresolved issues are the proposed EU Takeovers Directive, common
disclosure requirements for IPO prospectuses, procedures for cross border pension fund
investing, and patent regulations that will validate filings across all of the EU. Id.
295. Id. Moreover, funding levels may be only the tip of the iceberg. What may be more
important is the organizational features of venture capital financing. As one author said: "The
key feature of VC in New Economy Innovation Systems ... is not so much financial investment,
important as that is, but quaiity, informed business maagtmiiLu f omn~aizati~ n of
science." Philip Cooke, New Economy Innovation Systems: Biotechnology in Europe and the USA,
8 INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 267, 267 (2001).
296. Sebastian Moffett, Japan's Entrepreneurs Say Hawaii Offers a Better Business Climate,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2002, at A16.
297. The importance of venture capital financing is stressed by several studies. For example,
Philip Cooke argues:
[I]nnovation is the fundamental source of value, seeking it out is an investment
imperative, and systemic search and selection (i.e. active "scouring" of research labs)
procedures by VCs [venture capital firms] is the main means of exploiting gains from
public investment in basic research. In traditional innovation systems analysis, there
is an emphasis on the role of public agencies and even strategies, some promoted at
regional level, particularly in the EU. Whether by accident or not, EU innovation
rates are low compared to the USA, and VC is more pronounced in the USA. The logic
of the last two statements suggests the vigorous investment strategies of private
investors and innovators, revealed most clearly in new economy sectors like
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Management buyouts are much more common in the United
States than in Europe.298 With the exception of the United Kingdom,
which has a fairly active market, there are very few buy-out
transactions. 299 Furthermore, "the principal role of buy-outs in much
of continental Europe has been confined to the financing of ownership
transfers in the large private and family-run sector,"300 which are
rarely designed to facilitate professional executives' new firms. MBO
transactions "are unknown to Europe outside of the U.K."301
Similar problems exist in Asia. Venture capital financing is
very limited there.30 2 For example, OECD statistics show that venture
capital investments in the United States amount to 0.29 percent of
GDP.30 3 By comparison, in Japan, venture capital funding amounts to
a mere 0.02 percent of GDP, and financing is unavailable in any form
for many entrepreneurs. 304 Japanese venture funds also concentrate
their investments in mature industries in intermediate stage
(mezzanine) financings, not in start-up companies.
30 5
biotechnology and IT, help explain the difference in innovation performance to a
considerable extent.
Cooke, supra note 295, at 268 (citations omitted).
This is echoed by Brian F. Lavoie and Ian M. Sheldon, who argue that
since biotechnology R&D is lengthy, the rate at which a firm can invest will have
important implications for average time to build, or equivalently, the rate of
innovation .... This disparity between the US and Europe may be attributable to the
fact that European firms face more difficulties in obtaining investment capital.
[Europe] seemingly has no shortage of venture capital ... [b]ut most of it has been
going into relatively unadventurous investments ... only a fraction has been invested
in start-ups.
Brian F. Lavoie & Ian M. Sheldon, The Source of Comparative Advantage in the Biotechnology
Industry: A Real Options Approach, 16 AGRIBUSINESS 56, 58-59 (2000).
298. Mike Wright et al., Corporate Restructuring, Buy-outs, and Managerial Equity: The
European Dimension, 3 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 47, 47 (1991).
299. As of 1989, the U.K. had "experienced more restructuring activity (both in terms of
numbers and value of transactions) than all other European countries combined." Id. at 48.
300. Id. at 50.
301. Id. at 51.
302. Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture
Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 865, 874 (1997)
("To summarize the differences ... U.S. venture capital funds are larger and more independent,
hold larger equity stakes and take a more active role in the management of portfolio companies,
make more early-stage investments, and invest more heavily in new technologies than their
Japanese counterparts.").
303. Moffett, supra note 296.
304. Id.
305. Milhaupt, supra note 302, at 878-79. In recent years, there is some evidence that this is
changing, and more venture capital is flowing into start-up companies. Lisa Bushrod, Western
VC's Breed Asia's Entrepreneurial Culture, EUR. VENTURE CAP. J., Mar. 1, 2001 (stating that
"investment activity in the Asian market centres on high-growth sectors in which young
companies need equity finance to sustain rapid expansion since bank debt is either too expensive
or not available ... although buyout activity seems to be more prominent."), 2001 WL 13626710.
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In addition, Japanese regulations impose many burdensome
requirements on start-ups in that country, so that many new firms
have shifted their situs to Hawaii. 306 In recent years, these high
hurdles for start-ups have contributed to the trend of more firm
closures than start-ups in Japan.30 7
Management buyouts have also not been nearly as widespread
in Japan as in the United States. To date, MBOs in Japan appear to
be most popular for aging entrepreneurial founders of companies to
turn over management to the next generation.308 Obstacles such as
the lack of managers with the requisite entrepreneurial and
management skills hinder MBO activity in Japan. 309 MBOs have
recently been on the rise in Japan.3 10 In 2001, the number of MBOs
tripled because large parent companies, spurred by new group
accounting rules, began selling units that were not a core part of the
business. However, overall activity is still a tiny fraction of that found
in the United States.
2. Do Foreign Executives Have Fewer Job Options?
One implication of the Opportunity Cost Theory is that the size
of the relevant labor market for executives will have an important
impact on their opportunity costs and therefore compensation. In a
small labor market, firms should have more power over their
executives since those managers will have fewer alternative job
options, other things being equal, if they leave an established firm.
For example, in the past the continental European countries offered
relatively small job markets compared to the United States because of
the comparatively small size of their national economies. As we will
see below, however, international migration and the growth of
multinational businesses may be expanding the number of potential
jobs available to top executives. The Opportunity Cost Theory
suggests that this increased job availability could create pressure on
the international pay gap.
306. Moffett, supra note 296 (citing requirements for minimum capital requirements,
registration fees, and appointment of corporate officers).
307. Id. (citing data for 1996-1999 showing higher percentage of closures than start-ups).
308. Kaoru Morishita, Buyouts Allow Large Firms to Get Back to Basic Business, NIKKEI
WKLY., Mar. 5, 2001.
309. Id. But see Patrick McCurry, Asia-Europeans Look for Eastern Promise, EUR. VENTURE
CAP. J., May 1, 2000 (noting that many current managers have had exposure to Western
business practices through working or studying abroad, which may result in these managers
being more amiable to MBOs), 2000 WL 13713138.
310. Morishita, supra note 308; see also Management Buyouts Gain in Popularity in Japan,
ASIA PULSE, Aug. 18, 2000 (citing a 400 percent increase in MBOs in 1999 from 1998).
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a. Cross-Border Hiring
The market for skilled labor is becoming increasingly
international. Businesses, such as the high tech industries, can look to
hire foreign talent if the domestic market cannot meet their needs.
U.S. technology companies have made extensive use of foreign
workers, 311 so much so that the U.S. Congress responded to the
demand in 2000 by increasing the number of visas available for
professionally trained foreign workers, commonly known as H-1B
visas.312 The United States is not alone in relaxing its rules in this
regard; Germany, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom have
also followed suit.
313
As the U.S. economy cooled, the use of new H-1Bs plummeted
from 164,000 in 2001, to 79,000 in 2002 and 2003.314 In the fall of
2003, labor unions, concerned about the influx of highly skilled foreign
workers, persuaded Congress not to renew the 2000 expansions to the
H-1B program. 315 This reduced the number of available visas to a
mere 65,000. 316 However, the success of union efforts should not be
interpreted as a sign of declining interest in skilled foreign labor. Over
the last three years, more than 200,000 service jobs, primarily in
information technology, have been transferred from domestic
corporations to their U.S. foreign affiliates. 317 This trend suggests
employers are accomplishing through outsourcing what once could
only be done through immigration.
Cross-border hiring is also becoming a potentially important
phenomenon with senior executives. Some optimists have even
claimed that "(t)he dawn of the millennium is ushering in a true global
marketplace for CEO's, with a record number of foreign CEO's
311. Lawrence A. West. & Walter A. Bogumil, Foreign Knowledge Workers as a Strategic
Staffing Option, AcAD. OF MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Nov. 2000, at 71, 71-72.
312. Cindy Rodriguez, Foreign Workers Bill Approved: High Tech Firms, Colleges See Gains,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 2000, at D2. Demand may, however, be drying up. Rachel Silverman, For
Foreign Workers Here on Special Visas, Tech Bust Hits Hard, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2001, at Al.
313. G. Pascal Zachary & Cecile Rohwedder, Germany Widens Door for Immigrants, WALL
ST. J., July 2, 2001, at A8.
314. Michael Schroeder, U.S. May Ease Entry for High Tech Workers, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, at
2, available at http://www.ibmemployee.com/PDFs/WSJ.com percent20- percent20 percent20U.S.
percent20May percent20Ease percent20Entry percent20For percent20High-Tech
percent20Workers.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2004).





running major companies in the U.S., the U.K., and several other
countries around the world.
318
There are plenty of examples where companies have hired
globally. The pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly & Co., which has its
worldwide headquarters in Indianapolis, is an interesting illustration
of this phenomenon. The company's CEO, himself a foreign national
from Morocco, has begun a program to "globalize the company and tap
all talent wherever it comes from."31 9  The CEOs of the American
corporations Goodyear, Alcoa, and Pharmacia & Upjohn are originally
from Egypt, Morocco, and Pakistan, respectively. 320 In a similar vein,
40 of Europe's largest 200 companies are currently run by foreign
nationals. 32'
While cross-border executive hiring may be surging, the
market for executives is a long way from being truly global. For
foreign executives trying to move to the United States, several
potential barriers exist. For example, immigration regulations
constitute a potentially significant obstacle. 322 Even if immigration
issues can be addressed, many foreign executives lack the experience
working in the industries where American firms need them most. For
instance, skeptics claim that there are only a handful of English
managers who could move to the United States in search of a highly
lucrative pay deal.323 Similarly, in Canada the prevailing view is that
while executives at companies that compete successfully for business
in a North American or global marketplace might be able to move, 324
most Canadian CEOs are "landlocked" because they work for small
companies that only service the domestic market.325 Nevertheless, in
318. Denis B.K. Lyons & Spencer Stuart, International CEOs on the Rise, CHIEF EXECUTIVE,
Feb. 2000, at 51, 2000 WL 12374732.
319. L.J. Sellers, Executive Profile: Lilly's International Family, PHARMACEUTICAL
EXECUTIVE, Mar. 2001, at 40, 41-42.
320. See id. at 51.
321. See Carol Matlack & Kerry Capell, Managers Without Borders: Europes Companies,
Executives, and Workers Are Becoming More Mobile, Flexible, and Transnational, BUS. WK., Nov.
20, 2000, at 58.
322. One commentator suggests that U.S. managers are effectively shielded from "foreign
made competition." Jan Hack Katz, Competition Breeds Efficiency? Then Open the Executive
Suite to the Free Market, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1997, at B9.
323. See Look Out, There's a Monster Coming to Your Annual Meeting, TELEGRAPH, Jul. 25,
2000, at 27; Sally Patten & Jon Ashworth, U.K Fat Cats Look On in Envy at Their American
Cousins, TIMES, July 15, 2000, at 29; Random Numbers, ECONOMIST, June 3, 1995, at 62; Simon
Targett, Heat May be Turned Up, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2000, at 7.
324. David Berman, A Bad Place To Be Boss, CANADIAN BUS., July 1997, at 17; Katherine
Gay, Canadian CEOs Pay Makes It Hard To Attract Top Talent, FIN. POST, Apr. 20, 1996, at 32;
Janet McFarland, Managing Compensation, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 5, 1996, at B17.
325. Bruce Gates, Well-Paid Canadian Executives Facing a "Taxing" Problem, FIN. POST,
May 6, 1991, at 24; Gay, supra note 324.
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both countries the argument that senior management might depart to
the United States has been invoked to defend significant increases in
executive pay. 3
26
If existing barriers against international movements of labor
persist, this will contribute to maintaining separate labor markets for
executives. On the other hand, if international movement of
executives continues to increase, two important implications exist for
the international pay gap. First, a global market for executive talent
could cause foreign firms to fear that their most talented executives
will out-migrate to the United States to grab the more generous
American remuneration packages. In order to keep their best
managers in place, these companies would need to restructure
managerial compensation along American lines to compete.
3 27
Conversely, companies headquartered outside the United
States may choose to hire an American as their chief executive, at
least in those industries where the American talent pool has more
impressive candidates than its local counterpart. 328 Moreover, if a
foreign company is seeking to hire a CEO who is well-versed in the
concept of maximizing shareholder value, looking for an American
manager makes sense because they have embraced the notion most
strongly.329
If a foreign-owned company seeks to hire an American CEO, it
will need to offer that person a compensation package comparable to
those American companies provide. 3 0 Thus, recruiting an American
326. On the U.K., see, for example, Peter Martin, More than Their Job's Worth, FIN. TIMES,
May 15/16, 1993, at 8; Thin Excuses for Fat Cats, INDEP. SUNDAY, Mar. 6, 1994, at 20; John
Waples, Boardroom Bonanza, SUNDAY TIMES, July 16, 2000, §§ 3, 9. On Canada, see CEO
Shortage Sends Executive Salaries Soaring, VANCOUVER SUN, May 15, 1996, at D3; Gay,
Canadian Pay, supra note 324; Ann Gibbon, CIBC Opposes Executive Pay Limit, GLOBE & MAIL,
Jan. 17, 1997, at B4.
327. See, e.g., Tully, supra note 224, at 121; see CEO Shortage Sends Executive Salaries
Soaring, VANCOUVER SUN, May 15, 1996, at D3; Martin Dickson, Package Envy: Or the Curse of
Keeping Up with the Yanks, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 28/29, 2001, at 13; John Gapper, Executives "Lose
out Against U.S.," FIN. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at 10; Gibbon, supra note 326, at B4; see also
Stephen Gates, Aligning Performance Measures and Incentives in European Companies, ACA J.,
3D Q., 2000, at 19 (discussing a survey of large European companies that indicated 78 percent of
those responding cited attracting and retaining executives as among the forces driving change in
European executive compensation).
328. Luiza Chwialkowska, How to Land an American Boss, NAT'L POST, Sept. 6, 1999, at A3;
John Plender, Cult of the U.S. Manager, FIN. TIMES, April 14, 1999, at 19.
329. Plender, supra note 328.
330. Delroy Alexander, U.S. Bosses in the U.K- Over-Hyped, Overpaid and Over Here,
INVESTORS CHRON., Nov. 24, 1995, at 20; Chwialkowska, supra note 328, at A3; Derek Matthews,
Fat Is a Relative Issue, MGMT. TODAY, June 1996, at 50, 53.
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executive will often trigger a change in approach to executive pay. 331
In theory, therefore, the emergence of a global market for executive
talent could foster key changes to managerial compensation.
b. The Growth of Multinational Enterprise
Another source of greater job opportunities for domestic
executives, and therefore of potentially higher opportunity costs, is the
ever expanding number of multinational companies. In recent years,
there has been a dramatic increase in the size and scope of
multinational companies. 332 United Nations data show that between
1988 and 1997 the number of companies operating as multinationals
tripled to 60,000, and that these firms had over 500,000 affiliates. 333
Cross-border corporate growth raises important issues about internal
pay structures.
Corporations with managers in several different countries have
split over whether to coordinate pay arrangements around a universal
standard.3 34 Some multinationals make "executive pay decisions on a
worldwide level, and more uniform executive pay structures are the
result."335  Companies using this approach can promote people
internally on fairly straightforward terms and organize incentive pay
on an international basis.336 As we will see, though, local laws and
cultural differences can frustrate attempts to implement a fully
uniform compensation policy for executives. 337
When U.S. -headquartered multinationals establish uniform
executive pay practices internationally, host-country nationals will see
their pay Americanized, usually increased to the levels prevailing in
the United States.338 This impacts the market for managerial talent
331. Alexander, supra note 330, at 20; Parker-Pope, supra note 193; S. Karene Witcher,
Australia Looks Abroad in CEO Searches, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 28, 1998, at 6; cf. Michael
Cave, I'm Worth It, Baby, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Dec. 2, 2000, at 21 (arguing that the effect for a
Ouipan f ; ii.~~ c ~ uls + h,~to an hnek to thp,
international marketplace to find a replacement).
332. Douglas M. Branson, Teaching Comparative Corporate Governance: The Significance of
"Soft Law" and International Institutions, 34 GA. L. REV. 669, 669 (2000).
333. Gary M. Quinlivan, The Multilaterals, WORLD & I, Nov. 2000, at 267.
334. Robertson, supra note 216, at 604-05.
335. J.E. Richard, Global Executive Compensation: A Look at the Future, COMPENSATION &
BENEFITS REV., May/Jun. 2000, at 35.
336. Fung, supra note 223, at 40; Mazur, supra note 43.
337. Fung, supra note 223, at 40; Gross & Wingerup, supra note 216, at 25.
338. DERESKY, supra note 217, at 366-67; Mazur, supra note 43 (making the same point by
referring to a U.K. parent company). Still, it is fairly common for multinationals to use parent-
company nationals for top management positions in foreign subsidiaries. DERESKY, supra note
217, at 348-50. In such instances, the top executives can often be segregated in terms of their
pay. Fung, supra note 223, at 41.
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in the countries where the U.S.-based multinationals carry on
business. If American firms hire locals to top posts, their domestic
competitors will need to offer their top managers larger compensation
packages to avoid losing them and to attract new talent.339 This is
most apparent with stock options: American multinationals have been
awarding growing numbers of stock options to managers working
outside the United States, placing pressure on domestic firms to do
likewise.
340
Other multinationals prefer to tailor their pay systems to local
conditions.341 These firms look to the domestic market to determine
compensation structures, taking into account cultural factors, tax
considerations, and other local conditions. The net result is that,
regardless of where this sort of multinational is headquartered,
executives will paid differently depending on where they work.
Consequently, even with a multinational based in the United States,
American compensation levels should not have a strong impact
elsewhere.
Companies that use divergent executive pay structures have
experienced some recurrent problems. For instance, "[m]any top
people at Germany's best multinational corporations line up for
assignments in the United States, partly because they are entitled to
American-style pay packages, which means a substantial pay raise for
many."342  These same expatriate executives then often insist on
continuing to receive American levels of pay when they return home to
Germany. 343 Foreign multinationals with substantial U.S. operations
face a dilemma: they need to offer their American executives a
competitive pay package to recruit or retain talented American
managers, 344 yet, if they do so, their home country top executives may
wonder why their subordinates in the United States have
compensation packages that are more lucrative than their own.
345
339. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 2497 (noting that when U.S. companies export their pay
practices it pressures local competitors).
340. TOWERS PERRIN, STOCK OPTIONS AROUND THE WORLD 3 (2001).
341. Fung, supra note 223, at 40; cf. Brown, supra note 235, at 15 (saying that country-based
variations in remuneration remain prevalent in Europe but there are signs of companies
evolving towards hybrid pay systems).
342. Zachary & Rohwedder, supra note 313.
343. Id.
344. Vikas Bajaj, Foreign Firms Attracting Talent with Stock Options, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Sept. 19, 1999, at D23.
345. David Berman, A Bad Place To Be Boss, CANADIAN BUS., July 1997, at 17; Johnston,
supra note 226; Lublin, supra note 233 (focusing on the jealousies that high U.S. pay can
generate).
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3. CEO Turnover Does Not Explain International Pay Differentials
One final factor to briefly discuss is whether American CEOs
have greater opportunity costs because turnover is higher for U.S.
CEOs than for foreign CEOs. The argument could be that if American
CEOs are more likely than the CEOs of foreign firms to be terminated
by their companies, they must be paid more to compensate them for
these risks. This might be true if top management at foreign firms is
less subject to discipline because of those firms' stakeholders' allegedly
long term perspective on firm performance, while American managers
are held accountable for every quarterly change in earnings.
While the concept that the likelihood of job loss should impact
pay levels makes much sense, the real question is an empirical one: do
foreign CEOs experience less turnover than American CEOs? The
empirical work done to date suggests otherwise. The most
comprehensive work has been done by Kaplan on Japan 346 and
Germany. 347 His study of Japanese data revealed that the "level of
[top executive] turnover is substantially higher at 14.9 percent (per
year) in Japan than the 10.4 percent in the United States."348  He
found that top executive turnover at Japanese firms is negatively
correlated to earnings, stock price, and sales performance, just as it is
in the United States, and that "boards in both countries focus on
similar performance objectives."3 49 Kaplan further concluded that,
while executive compensation levels are lower in Japan, they respond
to the same factors that seem important in the United States:
earnings, earnings changes, stock price, and sales performance.
3 50
Finally, he determined that executive turnover in Japan is more
sensitive to negative earnings, which he attributed to Japanese banks
taking an active role in firms where their loans are at risk. In sum,
higher turnover does not seem to be an explanation for the difference
between American and Japanese executive pay levels.
Kaplan's German study focuses on turnover on the
management351 and supervisory boards 52 at a sample of the iargest
346. Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of
Japan and the United States, 102 J. POL. ECON. 510 (1994).
347. Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany, 10
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 142 (1994).
348. Kaplan, supra note 346, at 522.
349. Id. at 512, 528-29.
350. Id. at 542.
351. The management board is "the equivalent of the top seven or so operating executives of
the firm." Kaplan, supra note 347, at 143.
352. "The supervisory board represents shareholders and employees in appointing and
overseeing the management board." Id.
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German firms. Management board turnover increases with earnings
losses and poor stock price performance, but is not correlated with
sales growth or earnings growth.3 53 For the chairman of the
management board, Kaplan's results show that turnover increases by
a statistically significantly amount if the firm suffers losses of net
income, but not if the firm suffers poor stock price performance. 35
4
These relationships are very similar both in direction and magnitude
to those that he finds exist in Japan and the United States. Again,
these results suggest that higher executive turnover is not a
satisfactory explanation for the international pay gap.
VII. BARGAINING POWER THEORY
The fourth theory offered to explain the pay gap between
American and foreign CEOs is the Bargaining Power Theory. It begins
with the proposition that American CEO pay has grown rapidly since
the mid-1980s because of both the increase in the relative bargaining
strength of American CEOs in hostile takeovers of their corporations
and the simultaneous acceptance of the idea of pay-for-performance by
domestic institutional investors. American CEOs gained power to stop
hostile takeovers of their firms during this time period when there
was a shift in the legal entitlement to approve hostile takeovers from a
target company's shareholders to the target firm's board of directors
and management. Around the same time as the legal rule was
shifting, institutional shareholders, who have come to dominate
American equity markets, pushed for executive pay-for-performance
systems. This led to a surge in the use of stock options and restricted
stock, which combined with a bull stock market, created enormous pay
packages. 35
5
The pay gap between American and foreign managers grew
because the latter did not enjoy the same increase in bargaining
power. Internationally, control shareholder ownership structures are
more prevalent, and professional managers do not have the power to
determine whether or not to sell the company. Nor have pay-for-
performance schemes caught on rapidly, as they do not perform some
of the same functions as in the U.S. dispersed ownership situations.
353. Id. at 143-44; see JULIE ELSTON & LAWRENCE GOLDBERG, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
AND AGENCY COSTS IN GERMANY (Working Paper, 2001) (finding that for German executives,
sales and return on equity are positively correlated with compensation and that greater
dispersion of share ownership leads to higher executive pay).
354. Kaplan, supra note 347, at 149; see also JULIAN R. FRANKS & COLIN MAYER, OWNERSHIP
AND CONTROL OF GERMAN CORPORATIONS (Ctr. For Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No.
2898, 2001), http:/www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP2898.asp.
355. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 871.
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Pay convergence will therefore occur, according to this theory,
only if dispersed ownership structures develop that create more
negotiating power in the hands of foreign executives, and make pay-
for-performance systems more necessary. The remainder of this
section develops these points more fully.
A. U.S. CEO Pay Has Increased with Their Greater Power To Stop
Takeovers and As Institutional Investors Have Accepted Pay-for-
Performance
Large public American corporations began experiencing hostile
takeovers beginning in the 1960s, with a huge wave of them striking
in the 1980s. 35 6 For the first time, unsolicited tender offers were being
successfully directed to target firm's shareholders. In the 1960s and
1970s, corporate management had lobbied strenuously to change the
system with limited results. 357  For instance, in 1968, the U.S.
Congress had passed the Williams Act, compromise legislation
creating greater disclosure obligations for acquirers and delaying the
closing of tender offers. 358 But this bill did not fundamentally alter
the allocation of power between bidders and targets. Similarly, state
legislatures passed a barrage of first generation anti-takeover
statutes, designed to provide target company management with the
power to stop unfriendly deals. However, judicial hostility to them
rendered them ineffective.3
5 9
The resulting vacuum left matters to the state courts. Years
before, the Delaware Supreme Court had adopted a toothless judicial
standard of review for management defensive tactics in takeover
situations. 360 Hostile acquisitions continued to occur, though, despite
356. BENGT R. HOLMSTROM & STEVEN N. KAPLAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MERGER
ACTIVITY IN THE U.S.: MAKING SENSE OF THE 1980S AND 1990S 1 (MIT Dep't of Econ., Working
- apex No. 0-1J r±, 201" , , . .
commonly defined as those "bids pursued without the acquiescence of target management." Id. at
6. About 30 percent of the Fortune 500 received bids during the 1980s. "This is an extraordinary
number, indicating that shareholder power via takeover bids had to be on the minds of all large
firm managers ... Hostile takeovers were, and despite the rise of the poison pill still are, an
engine of shareholder wealth maximization." Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2074 (2001).
357. Prior to 1980, corporate "management was loyal to the corporation, not to the
shareholder." HOLSTROM & KAPLAN, supra note 356, at 3. Existing corporate governance
structures gave executives little reason to worry about shareholder value. Id.
358. 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-1 et seq., 14d-1 et seq., 14e-1 et seq.
359. The unconstitutionality of these statutes was established when the U.S. Supreme Court
struck them down in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
360. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964) (noting that such tactics are considered
within business judgment).
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such innovative tactics as the defensive self-tender offer and dual
class voting structures. 361 Pressure built on this court to do something
to stop the onslaught.
Finally, in the mid-1980s, the Delaware courts found an
answer to target company's continued demands for action. In Moran v.
Household International, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the Shareholder Rights Plan, or poison pill, as a method of
blocking hostile tender offers.362 This single defense, especially when
used in combination with a classified board, gave the management of
target companies the ability to stop its shareholders from accepting a
bidder's tender offer, and could even impede dissidents' success in a
proxy contest to remove the incumbent directors.
363
The early case law, however, only permitted the target
company to use the Rights Plan to temporarily bar the closing of
tender offers. After target company management had sufficient time
to attempt to find a third party bidder, or to propose an alternative
transaction, shareholders needed to be permitted the chance to tender
their shares to the bidder. 364 Although praised by legal academics as
sound judicial decisions, these cases had a very brief life: by the end of
the decade, the Delaware Supreme Court had overruled them and
gone on to permit boards of directors to "Just Say No" to most hostile
takeovers. 365 The U.S. Supreme Court added to target management's
powers, too, by reversing earlier prohibitions on stringent state anti-
takeover laws. 3
66
These new legal rules did not stop acquisitions, though. As the
Coase theorem predicts, when two parties face a legal rule, they
bargain around it to reach the efficient outcome, subject to overcoming
361. "In fact, it is said that almost 10 percent of American corporations included in the
Fortune 500 in 1980 have since been acquired in a transaction that was hostile or started off as
hostile." Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things, and Corporations: The Corporate Personality
Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 609 (1999).
362. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
363. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Impact of Rights Plans on Proxy Contests:
Reevaluating Moran v. Household International, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 327 (1994).
364. See, e.g., City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
365. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). There, "the
court permitted the board of Time, faced with a hostile, conditional tender offer by Paramount, to
proceed with its own tender offer for Warner Brothers and to retain its poison pill. . . . Most
commentators have read Time- Warner to fortify the power of a board to 'just say no.' " Kahan &
Rock, supra note 10, at 877-78. According to the court, '"[d]irectors are not obligated to abandon a
deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly
no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.' " Id. at 877 (quoting Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154).
When Time-Warner was handed down, "[m]erger and acquisition activity declined sharply," with
the decline in hostile acquisitions "particularly pronounced." Id. at 878.
366. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding
constitutionality of second generation of state antitakeover statutes).
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any transaction costs that stand in the way.367 Whether or not the
Delaware courts' approval of strong defensive tactics was an efficient
decision is a hotly contested question, 368 and not one this Article needs
to resolve. For my purposes, what is important is that, while hostile
transactions were greatly diminished by these new rules, 369 deals
continued.
370
Most of these acquisitions were friendly transactions3 71 where,
as part of the negotiations, the target company's management was
rewarded with long term employment agreements, or equivalent
compensation, as part of the acquisition agreement. Even with
transactions that began on a hostile note, target company executives'
holdings of stock options gave them strong incentives to consider
eventually proposing a friendly sale of the company. 372 In almost all of
these cases, members of target company management were also
awarded severance packages as part of selling the company to any
bidder.373 Now, when the company was sold to a bidder that did not
intend to retain target management, these executives could exit the
firm with large cash payments apparently part of the price for
agreeing to the deal.
This illustrates another aspect of the Coase theorem that is
frequently neglected. While the theorem speaks eloquently about the
,367. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
368. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 874-75 n.7 (providing summary of the law review
debate over this question); see also BENGT BERGSTROM AND STEVEN N. KAPLAN, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND MERGER ACTIVITY IN THE U.S.: MAKING SENSE OF THE 1980S AND 1990S 44 n.3
(Working Paper, 2001) (listing empirical studies investigating the question).
369. Bergstrom & Kaplan, supra note 368, at 15.
370. Id. at 6, 36. Kahan and Rock argue that
market participants reacted to the challenges presented by hostile takeovers in
general and the judicial validation of the poison pill in particular ... by adopting
informal adaptive devices [such as] ... boards became more independent and the
executive compensation regime changed to provide managers with substantial
Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 915.
371. "[Tlhe number of successful hostile acquisitions of U.S. targets [fell] dramatically...
[from] 163 between 1981 and 1989... to fifty-six between 1990 and 1998." Michael Bradley et al.,
Challenges to Corporate Governance: The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in
Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1999, at 9, 72. M&A deals plummeted from $247 billion in 1988 to $71 billion in 1991; hostile
deals fell 90 percent. Id. The total value of deals began rising again in 1992 and had surpassed
1988 levels by 1995. Id. at 12, 60. Although hostile bids "continued to be made," "the vast
majority of takeover bids in the second part of the 1990s were nominally friendly." Kahan &
Rock, supra note 10, at 880.
372. BERGSTROM & KAPLAN, supra note 368, at 15-16.
373. See, e.g., JAY HARTZELL ET AL., WHAT'S IN IT FOR ME? PERSONAL BENEFITS OBTAINED BY
CEO'S WHOSE FIRMS ARE ACQUIRED (Working Paper, 2000) (noting that target company CEOs
receive $8-11 million average wealth increases in completed mergers and acquisitions).
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parties' ability to reach the efficient result, assuming that transaction
costs are not too high, it also tells us that which party holds the legal
entitlement, in this case the entitlement to decide whether to sell the
company, will have distributional consequences.37 4 In this instance,
the entitlement shifted to target company management and with it
came the ability to extract more rents from the firm's shareholders.
Executive pay in the United States, in other words, increased so
rapidly from the mid-1980s until the present at least in part because
managers used their new powers to get a better deal for themselves
when they agreed to sell their firm.
375
While this bargaining may have affected only a small
percentage of firm value, say 1 percent, a wealth transfer on this order
of magnitude to target company management would have an
enormous impact on executive compensation. A serious issue arose
over how such large payments to managers could be made without
creating an uproar among investors.
37 6
One important form of transfer payment already mentioned is
the golden parachute agreement. Such contracts, while initially
controversial, were quickly accepted by the investor community and
target boards of directors as a necessary mechanism to balance target
company management's incentive structure: selling the company
meant giving up their jobs and power, so the management needed to
be put back in the same position after a sale as they would have been
in without the sale.37 7 The problem with golden parachutes from
executives' perspectives is that they only pay off if the company is
sold.
378
What target company executives needed was a way to raise
their pay without giving up their positions. Although they had
leverage in any pay negotiations with their boards of directors and
Compensation Committees in structuring executives' pay packages, 379
they needed a way to get shareholders to bless their greater pay
374. See Coase, supra note 367.
375. Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 896-97.
376. Brian Hall & Jeffrey Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 112 Q.J. ECON.
653, 684 (1998) (offering two complementary explanations for the rapid increase in the use of
stock options in recent years: first, that boards wanted to increase CEO pay and option grants
were a less visible vehicle for paying them than salary and bonus; and second, that boards
wanted to increase the relationship between pay and performance to improve corporate
performance). Both of these claims are consistent with the argument made here.
377. John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1, 74-76 (1986).
378. One problem with them from the target company shareholders' point of view is that
they may overincentivize managers to sell the company, thereby leading to sales at too low a
price.
379. CRYSTAL, supra note 74.
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packets. The idea of pay for performance, tying manager compensation
to stock price performance, served this function.
Stock option compensation had become popular with the
leveraged buyout wave of the 1980s. LBOs were a very successful way
of taking companies private during this time period. One of their great
attractions was that they directed managerial incentives toward the
maximization of shareholder value by giving them large equity stakes
in the companies they managed. One study found that CEOs of these
companies raised their ownership stakes from an average of 1.4
percent prior to the buyout to 6.4 percent of the company after the
LBO. 38 0 This novel approach quickly won acceptance among academic
commentators as an important change in corporate governance
structures because it aligned management and shareholder objectives
more closely. 38
1
At roughly the same time, institutional investors grew
increasingly powerful and activist.38 2 From 1980 to 1996, the biggest
institutions roughly doubled their percentage ownership of U.S.
corporations from less than 30 percent to over 50 percent of all
outstanding equity securities in the U.S.383 These investors were more
supportive of takeovers, viewing them as a mechanism for maximizing
their returns on their investments. The SEC's proxy rule reforms in
1992 further bolstered their strength by reducing some of the
collective action barriers that had previously existed in voting
contests. 3
8 4
These institutional investors had realized large profits from
their stakes in many LBO funds. They were enthusiastic about the
benefits of incentive-based pay because it had been accompanied by
operating performance improvements at these newly privatized
firms, 38 5 lending credence to the notion that these incentives produced
tangible benefits for shareholders. Furthermore, the SEC's new
executive pay disclosure requirements in 1992 made equity-based
compensation packages "defensible, if not desirable.
''38 6
380. Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operations and Value, 24 J. FIN.
ECON. 217 (1989).
381. See, e.g., Michael Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 1989, at 61.
382. Bergstrom & Kaplan, supra note 368, at 18.
383. Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 116 Q. J.
ECON. 229 (2001).
384. RANDALL THOMAS & CATHERINE DIXON, ARANOW AND EINHORN'S PROXY CONTESTS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 1-17 (3d ed. 1999).
385. BERGSTROM & KAPLAN, supra note 368, at 8-9.
386. STEVEN KAPLAN, THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WE ARE ALL
HENRY KRAVIS Now 14 (Working Paper, 1997).
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Institutions were successful in pushing for greater use of pay-
for-performance. Studies have shown that increases in institutional
investor stock ownership are a strong predictor of the share of
compensation paid as stock options.387 One empirical analysis
estimated that institutional ownership alone can explain 6 percentage
points of the 23 percentage point increase in the median share of
compensation paid in options that occurred in the 1980 to 1994 time
period. 38
8
While the cause and effect relationship between the increased
acceptance of huge incentive based pay awards and the success of the
LBOs, especially in the early 1980s, may never be completely
established, "[it] is arguably the case that the large payoffs earned by
LBO sponsors and, more importantly, by the top executives of LBO
companies made it more acceptable for top executives of public
companies to become wealthy through equity-based compensation."
38 9
In any event, it is clear that the widespread use of LBOs and their
emphasis on equity compensation for the managers of the newly
private firms had accustomed investors and managers to the idea of
executive pay packages containing substantial components of stock
and stock options. Thus, the market was well-conditioned to the
concept of equity-based compensation.
What happened next is clear. The usage of options soared: in
1980, CEOs received less than 20 percent of their compensation in
forms tied to stock price performance, whereas by 1994, this
percentage had gone up to almost 50 percent. 390 Throughout the rest of
the 1990s, these trends continued. Institutional investors continued to
press for equity-based compensation schemes. Activist shareholders
would sporadically complain about perceived abuses of executive pay,
but no concerted pressure existed for changes. 391 In the end, boards
made increasingly large stock options awards to executives and CEOs
in particular. 3
92
The bull stock market had a dramatic effect on the value of
executives' stock option awards. From 1980 to 1994, the average value
387. Hall & Liebman, supra note 376, at 653; see also JAY C. HARTZELL & LAURA T. STARKS,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Working Paper, 2002) (finding that
increased concentration of institutional investor shareholding is positively correlated with
increased use of pay-for-performance).
388. Hall & Liebman, supra note 376, at 662-63.
389. HOLMSTROM & KAPLAN, supra note 356, at 16.
390. Hall & Liebman, supra note 376, at 661.
391. Randall Thomas & Kenneth Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock
Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 31-32 (2000).
392. Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or
Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 131 (2000).
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of stock option grants went up 682.5 percent!393 In real dollar terms,
CEO average total pay went from $809,973 in 1980 to $2,505,469 in
1994, an increase of 209.3 percent, in large part because of the value
of CEOs' stock options. For the rest of the 1990s, stock options raised
CEO pay rapidly as the stock market rose spectacularly.
These option awards help shareholders persuade managers to
drop their resistance to selling the company to a hostile bidder (or
someone that would have otherwise been viewed as hostile).394 Now
managers have much to gain from selling the company at a premium
price, especially since their options immediately vest upon completion
of the transaction. Thus, while management enthusiastically endorsed
the idea of maximization of shareholder value, they were "[h]elped
along by generous stock option programs."395
In the wake of the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, stock-
based pay has been subject to widespread criticism. Some of these
criticisms have focused on the "structural deficiencies" of many option-
laden compensation packages, such as the ease of meeting any
performance requirements, the lack of linkage between pay and
performance, and the absence of any downside risk for stock
options. 396 Other critiques have pointed to the unclear connection
between options and improved performance, 397 and a host of other
technical and strategic problems with stock options as they are
currently used in the United States. 398
I Furthermore, it is unclear whether option-based pay will
continue to dominate American executives' pay packages after the
disappearance of the bull stock market in 2000. If the stock market
decline continues, then options may have little value to executives. 399
For example, one study finds that fifty Fortune 1000 companies cut
393. Hall & Liebman, supra note 376, at 661.
394. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love The Pill:
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 CHI. L. REV. 871, 884, 896-97 (2003). But see JOHN C.
COATES IV & REINIER KRAAKMAN, CEO INCENTIVES AND MERGER ACTIVITY IN THE 1990S: STOCK
OPTIONS AND REAL OPTIONS (Working Paper, 2003) (rejecting hypothesis that increased level of
option compensation explains level of overall merger activity).
395. BERGSTROM & KAPLAN, supra note 368, at 15.
396. Hill & Yablon, supra note 249, at 11-12.
397. See, e.g., SIMI KEDIA & ABON MAZUMDAR, PERFORMANCE IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK
OPTIONS (Working Paper, 2002) (finding little evidence that option grants at high growth firms
result in better performance); see also Hill & Yablon, supra note 249, at 12 (summarizing other
studies).
398. Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 437, 437-
40 (2003).
399. BERGSTROM & KAPLAN, supra note 368, at 28.
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option awards to CEOs by an average of 76 percent in 2001.400 This
suggests that option usage may be highly sensitive to stock market
trends.
However, other reports indicate an increase in the size of
option awards, perhaps to make up for the lower probability of
sustained stock price increases. A recent study of option compensation
at 287 of the 500 corporations in the S&P 500 index found that option
compensation expense grew 36 percent in 2001.401 By comparison to
1999, option compensation expense for this group of companies had
doubled. Thus, any conclusion that there will there a decline, or
levelling off, in the levels of option-based compensation in the United
States seems premature.
B. Control Shareholder Systems Already Have Strong Anti-takeover
Protections and Less Need for Option Pay
What does the bargaining theory have to tell us about the
likelihood of other countries adopting American pay systems,
especially stock-option-based compensation schemes? First, hostile
takeovers in most foreign countries are rare. This does not mean,
however, that foreign CEOs have the same kind of leverage that their
American counterparts do to extract higher pay in return for agreeing
to a friendly deal. Large foreign companies are much more likely than
American firms to have control shareholder ownership structures,
where all major decisions about the future of the company are in the
hands of these owners, and even the company's CEO may have little
say.
Ownership structures in most foreign countries differ
significantly from those in the United States. With the exception of
the United Kingdom, Canada, and perhaps Australia, 4 2 control
shareholder ownership remains the general rule abroad.40 3 In
corporations with this type of ownership, major decisions, such as the
decision to sell the firm, are made by the owners, not their managerial
employees.
It is not surprising that hostile takeovers abroad are rare,
because without the consent of the control shareholder, a sale cannot
400. Kemba J. Dunham, The Jungle, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at A13 (summarizing results
of study by Executive Compensation Advisory Services, a research firm).
401. Gretchen Morgenson, Options' Costs Revealed, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 20, 2002, at 9
(reporting results of study by Patricia McConnell, an accounting analyst at Bear Stearns & Co.).
402. These countries have also been the most receptive to the idea of performance-based
compensation. Towers Perrin, supra note 22, at 20, 26.
403. See supra Part II.B.
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take place. 40 4 For example, until the successful hostile takeover of
Mannesmann AG 405 by Britain's Vodafone Airtouch in 2000, there had
been just three completed hostile takeovers in Germany since World
War 11.406 There are essentially no hostile takeovers in Japan.40 7
404. In Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, hostile takeovers
are de facto impossible because of the existence of intensely concentrated patterns of
ownership. For example, in Italy, around five percent of the companies listed on the
Milan Stock Exchange have more than fifty percent of their common stock in public
hands. Of this five percent, five companies are controlled by a holding company
owned by a single family. For this reason, as Professor Ronald Gilson has observed,
"only two companies in the entire Italian economy are even theoretically subject to
hostile take-over."
Clas Bergstrom et al., The Regulation of Corporate Acquisitions: A Law and Economics Analysis
of European Proposals for Reform, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 495, 505-06.
405. AG stands for Aktiengesellschaften, meaning "stock corporation." Susan-Jacqueline
Butler, Models of Modern Corporations: A Comparative Analysis of German and U.S. Corporate
Structures, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 555, 555 & n.1 (2000).
406. Michael Bradley et al., Challenges to Corporate Governance: The Purposes and
Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a
Crossroads, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, at 9, 56 n.277. The exact number of hostile
takeovers between the Second World War and Vodafone-Mannesmann is somewhat in dispute.
The Bradley article cites JULIAN FRANKS & COLIN MAYER, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND THE
PERFORMANCE OF GERMAN CORPORATIONS 1 (London Bus. Sch., Working Paper, 1997). Franks
and Mayer point to "the bid for Feldmiihle Nobel AG by the Flick Brothers in 1988 and then by
Veba AG in 1989; the bid for Continental AG by Pirelli AG in 1990 and 1991; and the bid for
Hoesch AG by Krupp AG in 1991 and 1992." Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Bank Control,
Takeovers and Corporate Governance in Germany, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 1385, 1387 (1998).
Another source claiming three takeovers is Scott Mitnick, Note, Cross-Border Mergers and
Acquisitions in Europe: Reforming Barriers to Takeovers, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 683, 704.
One source claims there have been none, but restricts the claim to tender offers. Andre J.
Thomas, Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies
in Germany, 73 TUL. L. REV. 69, 119 (1998) (citing Bankers'Indecent Proposal, EUROMONEY, Apr.
30, 1997, at 10). Tim Jenkinson and Alexander Ljungqvist acknowledge that "Krupp's recent
(ultimately unsuccessful) bid for rival steel producer Thyssen was possibly Germany's first ever
truly Anglo-US tender offer." Tim Jenkinson & Alexander Ljungqvist, The Role of Hostile Stakes
in German Corporate Governance, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 397, 398 n.2 (2001). They find 17 cases of
"hostile stakebuilding," however. Id. at 398. Franks and Mayer acknowledge the possibility of
stakebuilding, but claim that what "distinguishes the three cases of hostile bids is that they
involve companies whose shares are widely held and where a change in control could not be
secured by agreement between a small number of large blockholders." Franks & Mayer, supra,
at 1387. In any event, the point here is that very few hostile deals occur in comparison with the
United States.
407. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., In Defense of Management Takeovers, 65 TUL. L. REV. 57, 83
(1990) ("Hostile takeovers as a means of acquiring control [in Japan] essentially do not exist");
Dan F. Henderson, Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers in Japan, 39 ST. LOUIS L.J. 897, 903
(1995) ("for practical purposes, hostile takeovers do not exist [in Japan]"); Curtis J. Milhaupt, A
Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37
HARV. INT'L L.J. 3, 20 (1996) ("[Hlostile takeover attempts are rare, and the market for corporate
control does not function as a mechanism to discipline and monitor management."); Mark G.
Robilotti, Recent Development: Co-Determination, Stakeholder Rights, and Hostile Takeovers: A
Reevaluation of the Evidence from Abroad, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 536, 554 (1997) ("Hostile
takeovers are virtually nonexistent in Japan.").
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Furthermore, although takeover defenses in the Anglo-
American tradition are largely absent, "[t]he market for corporate
control as a credible disciplining device is largely absent in both Japan
and Germany, as is the need for takeover defenses. The governance
system itself may be considered a de facto poison pill."408
Professional managers do not have the power to sell the
company, and therefore, despite the fact that hostile takeovers are
difficult to accomplish, have not gained any bargaining power with
which to demand greater pay. Foreign executive pay levels should
therefore not be expected to rise toward American levels unless
something changes.
The most obvious place for such a change to occur is if
companies shift from the control shareholder system to the dispersed
shareholder system. 40 9 In this event, their CEOs will gain more power
as there is less monitoring by the control group. Foreign CEOs will
assume more duties and responsibilities that were formerly handled
by the control shareholder. Hostile takeovers would become more
feasible, 410 and if managers can credibly threaten to successfully
oppose them, then this would give them greater leverage in pay
negotiations. If such changes happen, we would expect that the CEOs'
value to their firms will increase, that their bargaining strength will
increase, and that they will receive higher pay.
The U.K. situation can also be well-explained with this theory.
Its takeover market is the most active in Europe, in large part because
of its permissive takeover rules and concentrated institutional
investor shareholding patterns. Under the City Code on Takeovers
and Mergers, a target company is precluded from engaging in
defensive tactics once a bid has been launched.41' Rule 21 of the City
Code on Takeovers and Mergers makes it very difficult for target
408. Bradley et al., supra note 406, at 61.
409. As discussed supra notes 196-206, there is some evidence that several European
countries are developing less concentrated share ownership structures in recent years.
410. There is some evidence that hostile takeovers have become more common in Europe in
recent years. RICK ESCHERICH & PAUL GIBBS, J.P. MORGAN, GLOBAL MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
REVIEW (2000) (reporting that in 1999, 34 hostile bids with a total value of $406 million were
announced versus a total of 52 bids valued at $69 billion over the entire period from 1990 to
1998). For instance, in Japan and Germany, "companies are increasingly turning to the stock
market to raise funds, the hostile takeover bid is gaining a foothold, formerly omnipresent banks
are in retreat and implicit guarantees of continued employment are being redefined (albeit
slowly)." Cheffins, supra note 170, at 503.
411. Peter Lee, Takeover Regulation in the United Kingdom, in EUROPEAN TAKEOVERS: LAW
AND PRACTICE 133, 135 (Klaus J. Hopt & Edy Wymeersch eds., 1992). The Code imposes two
additional requirements to protect target company shareholders: equal treatment for all
shareholders holding the same class of shares and strong disclosure rules. Mitnick, supra note
406, at 702.
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company boards to implement defensive tactics to defeat a proposed
acquisition, although they are permitted to search for alternative
bidders in order to give shareholders more options. 412 Effectively, this
gives the target company's shareholders the power to decide the fate of
the bid. The result is that British chief executives have less
bargaining power than their U.S. counterparts and, consistent with
the Bargaining Power Theory, they are paid less as well.
In sum, in most foreign countries, control shareholders will
make the decision whether or not to sell the company, while in the
United Kingdom, shareholders will ultimately get to decide this issue
in a takeover setting. In either situation, institutional investors will
have little incentive to lobby for increased option compensation for
foreign CEOs as a method of encouraging them to sell the firm. This is
in contrast to the American setting, where incentivizing the CEO to
sell the firm may be necessary to getting a deal done.
VIII. RISK ADJUSTMENT THEORY
Risk Adjustment Theory rests on the unverified, but intuitively
plausible, assertion that American CEOs hold more of their wealth in
the form of their company's stock and stock options than foreign
CEOs, and therefore bear significantly more firm-specific risk than
their foreign counterparts. If it is true that American CEOs have a
greater proportion of their wealth tied up in their firms, then we
would anticipate that they would need to receive a greater risk
premium to compensate them for bearing this risk. 413 Foreign CEOs
with smaller holding of their firm's stock and equity based
instruments would expect to receive less compensation for their lower
levels of firm-specific risk. Thus, higher American CEO pay could
simply reflect the greater risk that U.S. CEOs bear from holding more
of their wealth in company stock.
There is some evidence that American CEOs have more of their
wealth invested in their firms. To begin with, as a theoretical
proposition American CEOs should receive more of their pay in the
form of equity-based instruments. First, firms with greater growth
opportunities use more option-based compensation. External
monitoring is difficult for firms with greater growth options, especially
those associated with intangible assets. 414 These firms have "broader
informational asymmetries that create a larger potential for
412. Mitnick, supra note 406, at 703.
413. John E. Core et al., supra note 186, at 30.
414. John Bizjak et al., Stock-Based Incentive Compensation and Investment Behavior, 16 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 349 (1993).
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opportunistic behavior by managers."415 To reduce the agency costs of
equity, these firms therefore issue more option-based compensation.
Second, American firms are on average larger than foreign
firms. Larger firm size increases the agency costs of equity because
broader firm operations permit greater opportunism by managers and
make external monitoring of managers less effective. 416 Thus we
would expect, and empirical studies do find, that larger firms pay
their executives with significantly greater relative amounts of equity-
based pay.
417
Third, firms from market/equity based financial systems (the
United States/United Kingdom) have different capital structures than
companies that are based in debt-based financial systems
(Japan/Germany). The orientation of national capital markets impacts
on the relative importance of stock based compensation for executives:
market/equity-based systems will have a preference for maximization
of shareholder wealth that leads to the use of more equity-based
compensation, whereas debt-based systems will tend to use more fixed
compensation in their managerial compensation packages. 418
Moreover, larger and more liquid equity markets will be more
informationally efficient, so that stock prices will "provide more
accurate retrospective of managerial performance," making equity-
based compensation more effective. 419
Theory aside, the available data, discussed in Part II.A,
confirm that American CEOs receive more stock options than their
foreign counterparts in their annual pay packets. This does not,
however, inevitably lead to the conclusion that American CEOs
experience more firm-specific risk. For one thing, these data are based
on annual flows of stock options. They do not include information
about executives' total holdings of stock options, or reflect the number
of shares of the company's stock that are owned by executives, or the
executives' net worth.
We have much of this data for American CEOs. Researchers
have estimated that in 1998 the median dollar amounts of equity and
stock options held by CEOs of S&P industrial and financial sector
415. STEPHEN BRYAN ET AL., THE EQUITY MIX IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: AN
INVESTIGATION OF CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES 9 (Working Paper, 2002).
416. Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
417. David Yermack, Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively?, 39 J. FIN.
ECON. 237 (1995).
418. BRYAN ET AL., supra note 415, at 11.
419. Id. at 12.
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companies were $30 million and $55 million, respectively. 420 Other
estimates show that these amounts swamp the amount of annual
compensation that these same executives receive by a ratio of over 30
to 1 for the years 1993-1998.421 Unfortunately, we lack this
information for most foreign CEOs because their countries' disclosure
laws concerning executive pay are much weaker in most cases.
Moreover, what is missing for both types of CEOs is the amount of the
CEOs' total wealth that is tied up in the company in order to decide
how much company-specific risk that they are exposed to.
To test whether American CEOs are subject to more risk than
their foreign counterparts, we would need data on each type of CEO's
holdings of stock options, their ownership of stock in their firms, and
their total wealth. Unfortunately, given the current lack of public
information about CEO wealth, this question cannot be fully resolved
at this point.
Suppose, though, as seems probable, that American CEOs do
bear more firm-specific risk than foreign CEOs. Is there any reason to
think that this gap will diminish by having foreign CEOs demanding
grants of stock options approaching the levels seen in America? Will
companies grant such requests if they are made?
For several reasons, it is highly unlikely that foreign CEOs will
receive the same level of option awards as those received by U.S.
CEOs. First, options do not perform the same function in debt-based
financial systems as they do in equity-based systems, nor do foreign
firms or executives want them as much. In debt-based systems,
creditors care about minimizing the agency costs of debt. They do not
want to align the incentives of managers with those of shareholders
because this alignment of interests will increase the agency costs of
debt. 422 Furthermore, most of these countries' firms have control
shareholders already monitoring managers to insure that they do
what is in (the controlling) shareholders' best interests, so additional
alignment is unnecessary.
However, stock options are becoming more important in foreign
executive pay. For example, the Towers Perrin 2001 study of stock
420. BRIAN HALL & KEVIN MURPHY, THE TROUBLE WITH STOCK OPTIONS (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9784, 2003).
421. JOHN CORE ET AL., ARE PERFORMANCE MEASURES OTHER THAN PRICE IMPORTANT TO
CEO INCENTIVES? 38 tbl. 1 (Working Paper, 2000).
422. BRYAN ET AL., supra note 415, at 12 ("In a debt-dominated financial system, the
institutional environment is designed to ensure that management does not reduce firm value too
much (as opposed to equity-based systems structured to encourage shareholder value
maximization). Accordingly, in a debt-based economy, the value of equity is of little importance
when monitoring and motivating managers. It follows that firms operating in a debt-based
economy should compensate managers with less equity and with more cash.").
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option compensation shows that the percentage of companies
worldwide offering their executives stock options has grown
substantially from 1997 to 2001.423 Will this trend continue?
This Article argues that the scope for increased use of stock
options by most foreign companies is very limited. This is best
illustrated by looking at the different types of companies and the
rationale for using options at each of them. First, it is unlikely that
wholly private firms will lead the pack in offering options. If the firm
is privately held with all of the equity in the hands of the control
shareholders, there are no minority shareholders. The owners can get
cash out of the business in a wide variety of ways, and tax laws will
play a large role in determining if it is done through compensation or
other methods. Furthermore, there are problems with using stock
options in a privately held company. For example, determining the
strike price and the exercise price will be potentially complex and
divisive exercises. This may make options unattractive and require
control shareholders to award managers direct grants of restricted
stock to the extent that managers are paid with equity-based
compensation.
The more interesting problems arise when the control group
holds less than complete ownership, and minority shareholder
interests come into play. Here we must consider four situations: the
public corporation with professional managers; the public corporation
with control shareholders acting as managers; private firms with
professional managers; and private firms with family managers. Each
of these cases raises different sets of questions about the appropriate
role for stock options.
A. Case 1: Private Firms with Family Managers but Some Minority
Shareholders
In these firms, we expect to see the same minority oppression
problems as in close corporations in the U.S. The presence of a control
shareholder can easily lead to rent-seeking activities at the expense of
the minority investors. Excessive managerial compensation is one
manifestation of this problem. In abusive cases, executive pay levels
will be set to minimize distributions to minority shareholders.
From a corporate governance point of view, the key questions
raised here concern what mechanisms minority shareholders have to
bring about changes. In the United States, minority shareholders in
public companies have relatively strong protections against majority
423. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 340, at 333.
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shareholder abuses. 424 The combination of strong disclosure rules and
legal protections for shareholders should prevent excessive
compensation practices.
425
In most foreign countries, minority shareholders in a private
company are in a weaker position generally. We therefore expect
relatively high executive pay levels, although if tax rates on personal
income are higher than on capital distributions, this may lead to the
allocation of firm income into payments to equity. Corporate law
prohibitions on non-pro rata distributions may have the opposite
effect, as controlling shareholders may funnel income into executive
pay or engage in advantageous self-interested transaction in lieu of
sharing any monetary benefits with minority shareholders.
Stock options are unlikely to play a major role in compensation
for foreign companies' control shareholder managers. Such parties
already have a control position in the firm, so that options are not
necessary for consolidating the control shareholders' power, although
they may have future value if the firm is taken public and they could
be used to further dilute the interest of the minority shareholder.
There is no alignment purpose to be served by option grants, and the
control shareholder manager does not need to worry about retention or
attraction of herself because she is the owner. Options could be used
as incentive payments, but so could bonus payments based on
accounting performance. In sum, while I cannot conclude that stock
options will pay no role in executive compensation for control
shareholder managers, it seems likely that their role will be limited.
B. Case 2: Private Firm Dominated by Control Shareholder Employing
Professional Managers
In this case, the control shareholder has a financial interest in
keeping executive pay levels as low as possible, as these payments are
funds that will come at least in part out of its pocket. However,
professional managers must be hired in the executive labor market,
and in order to attract and retain them the control shareholder will
need to pay a market level of pay. Pay levels therefore should reflect
the prevailing market conditions in that particular country.
424. See generally F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 2000).
425. Empirical research has found that American family controlled firms pay their non-
family executives significantly less than other firms, and have much smaller proportions of these
executive's compensation in stock options. BATES ET AL., supra note 191, at 11, 17. Furthermore,
with the family child having excellent chances of being promoted to the top job, the internal
tournaments for jobs at these firms have much lower prizes to offer outsiders.
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The pay package is likely to be comprised mainly of fixed salary
and accounting performance-based bonuses. Stock options and other
long term incentive pay could be used, but have limited value. For
example, stock options could be issued to professional managers as a
means of aligning their interests with those of the control shareholder,
but the control shareholder can engage in direct monitoring relatively
easily, which lessens the need for options to act as an alignment
device. Options can still serve incentive purposes, as can accounting
performance-based bonuses, and attraction/retention functions if
outside managers value them highly.
Furthermore, professional executives at privately held firms
are unlikely to press hard for stock-based compensation. There is no
public market for these shares and they are likely to have restrictions
on them rendering them completely illiquid. Given these limitations,
managers will attach a low value to these options, unless the control
shareholder can create a valuation method for the shares that will
allow the executives to realize an equivalent gain to what they would
receive in a market. Finally, as with all option schemes, undiversified
executives will discount their value to take into account the risk
associated with them, thereby creating a gap between their cost to the
firm and their value as compensation to the executive. 426
Options might have particular value in a couple of cases. First,
in certain circumstances, the control shareholder may be planning to
take the company public through an IPO, or intend to sell the
company to a third party buyer. In either situation, professional
managers could sell their options, either to the public or the third
party buyer, and recognize substantial gains. Of course, in these
circumstances, we have moved out of the private firm scenarios and
into the public firm case, which I discuss more fully below in cases 3
and 4.
A second scenario is a reverse LBO. Here a public company has
been taken private, but there is an expectation that it will go public
again. The control shareholder, usually an LBO investment fund, will
provide professional managers with substantial equity interests in the
firm that vest only over a long time period with the accomplishment of
certain performance goals. As I discussed earlier, empirical evidence
shows substantial productivity gains at these firms, as managers seek
to get rich when the firm goes public or is sold to a third party. 427
426. HALL & MURPHY, supra note 187.
427. Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 356; Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, The
Effects of Leveraged Buyouts on Productivity and Related Aspects of Firm Behavior, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 165 (1990); Abbie Smith, The Effects of Leveraged Buyouts, BUS. ECON., April 1990, at 19.
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LBOs and reverse LBOs, however, while common in the U.S. during
the 1980s, remain a rare occurrence in most foreign countries. 428
To summarize, stock options may have a greater role to play in
this case than in the first one, but this Article argues that they can
still be expected to be a fairly modest part of executive compensation
except in the last two circumstances discussed immediately above.
C. Case 3: Public Firm with Control Shareholder Managers
The control shareholder managers will, just as in case 1, have
an incentive to pay themselves excessive compensation at the expense
of the public minority. As outside investor monitoring is weak, we
would also anticipate other forms of "rent extraction," such as
violations of the duty of loyalty through self-dealing transactions and
diversion of business opportunities. In addition to corporate law
limitations on these practices, firms may also face corporate
governance rules from the exchanges where they are listed, and
securities law disclosure obligations once they sell stock to the public.
Executive pay levels will adjust to a level that balances the control
shareholders' interest in getting cash for themselves out of the firm,
against the various corporate law, securities law, listing requirements,
and tax preferences of the foreign firms' countries of origin. For
example, if there are disclosure obligations for executive pay, outside
investors may complain openly about high pay, and this may create
pressure on control shareholders to use other methods of getting cash
out of the company.
Stock option compensation is not necessary to align manager
and shareholder incentives because control shareholders already have
large stakes in the firm. Incentive pay could be in the form of
accounting-based performance bonuses. Attraction and retention are
not as serious a problem for firms where the control shareholders are
acting as top managers themselves, although they may be a concern
for lower level professional managers. 429 Finally, given the likelihood
that these control shareholder executives are overly invested in the
company's stock, they may prefer to be compensated in the form of
cash in order to diversify their portfolio.
Option pay can still have some role, however, in compensation
packages at these firms. Options may be attractive to the control
shareholder managers if there is a sufficiently liquid market for the
428. See supra notes 298-301, 308-310 and accompanying text.
429. Lower level professional managers may work harder if given stock-based incentive
compensation, although the alignment effect is weak in this case as the control shareholder is
actively managing the firm and monitoring these managers.
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stock that they can sell newly acquired shares without a problem.
Large option awards will allow them to accumulate more shares and
thereby solidify their control of the company. Furthermore, the
dilutive effects of options will only be partially borne by the control
shareholders, as some fraction of these costs will be shifted to the
public shareholders.
I should raise at least two cautionary notes about these
conclusions. First, if the float in the company's stock is small, then the
market for its stock may be dominated by noise and the connection
between managerial performance and stock prices may be quite
attenuated.430 This effect will weaken the link between pay and
performance, and render the incentive effects of options much weaker.
Second, control shareholders may not be as concerned about using
options to increase their control, either because the firms' takeover
defenses are so strong that a hostile offer cannot succeed or because
the control shareholders' decision to take the company public indicates
that they prefer liquidity to maintaining control.
431
To summarize, there is a more significant role for stock-based
incentive pay systems in this situation than in previously discussed
cases, largely because of the presence of a public market for the firm's
shares.
D. Case 4: Public Firms Dominated by Control Shareholder Employing
Professional Managers
Control shareholders will continue to try to maintain executive
pay levels as low as possible because they bear at least part of the
compensation costs. The executive labor market will set a floor,
however, on managerial pay for professional managers. In order to
attract and retain high quality executives, the control shareholder will
need to offer market pay levels.
Fixed salary and accounting performance-based bonuses will
continue to dominate the pay packet. Stock options and other long
term incentive pay will be used if they are demanded by the market,
but they have limited value as an alignment device. Options can still
serve incentive purposes and attraction/retention functions and the
public market for the stock makes professional managers attach a
higher value to them.
430. This may create further opportunities for the control shareholders to enrich themselves
though, as they may be able to manipulate the market price by virtue of their large stock
position.
431. It may be the case that the control shareholder wants both liquidity and control,
thereby reinforcing their interest in using options to accumulate a larger stake in their company.
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Stock-based compensation can potentially weaken the control
shareholders' grip on the company if the option plans are highly
dilutive, although this effect may be dampened by the presence of
strong anti-takeover defenses and a weak market for corporate control
(frequently the case in these countries). The control shareholder,
however, will bear a significant part of the economic costs of dilution.
As mentioned above, the executives will have a market for
their shares, but if the float in the company's stock is small, this
market may be dominated by noise trading. The more noise in the
market, the weaker the connection between the managers' efforts and
the stock price. Thus, one would expect that managers will discount
the value of their stock options because of this effect.
Outside investors will have some voice on governance
questions. If there are significant U.S. or U.K. pension fund investors
in the company, they may seek to put into place incentive pay based
systems as part of their corporate governance platform.
432
This fourth case describes the most likely type of company to
offer more stock options. Even in this case, however, the role for stock-
based incentive pay systems is limited. The public market for the
stock, and the need to make competitive offers to attract executives,
may combine to make options most important in this situation.
E. Summary
At control shareholder dominated firms, options are less useful
as alignment-enhancing devices, less valuable to the executives
receiving them, and less desirable from the control shareholders'
perspective. This Article argues that one should not expect to see stock
options used as much in those economic systems where concentrated
ownership is the norm. Neither will the legal rules, cultural norms,
and soft laws be as favorable to their introduction as in the United
States.433 If ownership structures become more dispersed, and the
market for corporate control becomes more important abroad, then the
Bargaining Power Theory would predict that CEOs and other
executives would have more leverage in their pay negotiations. Option
pay may also become more important as an alignment device and
more valuable to executives as the size of the markets for their
securities expand. In this scenario, we should anticipate seeing
shifting patterns of legal rules, soft law constraints, and cultural
norms, to make the use of incentive pay more acceptable.
432. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
433. Roe, supra note 169, at 41-43.
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IX. SHOULD WE TRY To ELIMINATE THE INTERNATIONAL PAY GAP?
Is the pay gap between U.S. CEOs and foreign CEOs a sign of
American executive compensation run amok, or just an indicator of
different underlying corporate management systems and economic
forces? Board Capture advocates argue that American CEOs are
vastly overpaid. 434 They have suggested government intervention is
needed to bring the "excessive" American executive pay levels down.
Most recently, Bebchuk, Fried and Walker have proposed greater
disclosure about executive pay as a solution to the international pay
gap. In Part A below, I argue that Board Capture Theory should be
rejected as a primary explanation of the pay gap, and that even if it is
not rejected, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker's proposal for increased
disclosure about executive pay will not reduce the pay gap.
In Part B, I argue that if the underlying economic forces, or
different management structures, that are the foundations of the
other theories discussed in this paper are primarily responsible for the
pay gap, though, then the policy prescription is quite different. For
any of the five alternative theories I have developed in this paper-the
Marginal Revenue Product Theory, the Tournament Theory, the
Opportunity Cost Theory, the Bargaining Theory, and the Risk
Adjustment Theory-there is no need for government intervention. If
foreign executive pay levels move in the direction of American pay
levels, that change would reflect economic or strategic forces, with
economically desirable, or at least neutral, characteristics. In short,
market forces will dictate whether convergence will occur or not.
A. Board Capture Theory Should Be Rejected and Its Recent
Proponents'Policy Proposals Will Not Work
Board Capture theorists claim that policy makers should
intervene in the market for corporate executives. They argue that
434. See, e.g., Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 60-61 (1992)
(noting that in the 1980s, executive compensation grew by 212 percent while factory workers'
wages only grew by 53 percent); Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based
Solution, 5 B.C. L. REV. 937, 937-38 (1993) (arguing that American executives are grossly
overpaid in comparison to their foreign counterparts); Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care,
Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 650-51 (1995) (noting that the
problem of executive compensation is directly related to a passive board and effects the entire
system of corporate governance); Joshua A. Kreinberg, Reaching Beyond Performance
Compensation in Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138, 142 (1995) (noting
the general American view that executive compensation is much too high); Mark J. Loewenstein,
Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L.
REV. 201, 201-02 (1996) (discussing the current debate over why U.S. executives are
overcompensated).
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American executive pay levels are too high, and that government
intervention could serve to bring them down. However, as I showed
supra Part III.C, Board Capture Theory does not offer a persuasive
explanation of the international pay gap for many reasons. Moreover,
it is hardly clear that the pay gap causes any economic inefficiencies.
For example, what is the negative externality caused by American
CEO pay levels that justifies government intervention into this
market? In other words, why does the government have to help
directors and shareholders set executive pay levels? The proponents
of government intervention have not identified any product market
inefficiencies, or shown that stock prices are too low because investors
discount stock prices to take account of excessive management pay, or
that managers could not commit to take less money so that everyone
would be better off. Furthermore, if governments need to intervene to
change international pay differentials between corporate executives,
shouldn't they also need to take action on other workers' international
pay differentials?
Even if we accept that Board Capture may explain some part of
American executive pay levels, the policy conclusions that these
theorists have proposed are unlikely to remedy the problem that is
claimed to exist. While early proponents of Board Capture Theory
argued for direct government intervention, more recently Board
Capture theorists have focused on increasing disclosure on executive
pay. 435 To evaluate whether this is a sensible policy, we must address
the question: what has been the impact of increased disclosure on
international pay levels? Prior research shows that introducing
executive pay disclosure regimes in foreign countries has had two
effects: first, fostering an increased emphasis on incentive-oriented
compensation, 436 and second, facilitating a shift towards the U.S. pay
paradigm by accelerating increases in executive remuneration. 43 7 As
to the first point, Anglo-American institutional investors are keen on
remuneration schemes that give management incentives to maximize
shareholder value and might want to promote this agenda on a global
basis.4 38 Disclosure regulation could affect their ability to do so since
435. See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 20, at 74-76 (proposing increased disclosure,
summarizing suggestions by others to directly regulate pay levels through caps or tax code
changes). Bebchuk and his coauthors further claim that strong institutional shareholders are
the most effective check on managerial remuneration.
436. Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 U.
TORONTO L.J. 489, 497-501 (1998).
437. For somewhat different versions of the thesis presented here, see Iacobucci, supra note
436, at 504-17; Mark J. Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2000).
438. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 164, at 308, 311-12.
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the extent to which corporations are required to provide data that
sheds light on the relationship between pay and performance will
dictate to some degree the costs of shareholder monitoring. 439 The
comments offered by a former securities regulator when the Canadian
province of Ontario bolstered disclosure regulation in 1993 makes the
point well: "Good corporate governance relies on an informed and
active investor community. In some respects, this legislation
recognizes their legitimate need for information that enables them to
relate management's performance to the performance of the
company."440  The available Canadian empirical and anecdotal
evidence suggests enhanced disclosure regulation had the effect
predicted and helped to cause a shift towards incentivized managerial
pay in publicly quoted companies. 441 Foreign CEO pay packages would
therefore become more like those used in the United States if
disclosure levels are raised overseas.
The second effect of increased disclosure may be to increase
overall foreign pay levels. The catalyst here will be that those who
manage a company and those who set executive pay on its behalf will
be able to find out readily the "market rate" offered by competitors in
the same industrial sector and by firms of a similar size. Assume that
a company pays its top managers less than the norm. Due to
disclosure, its executives will be fully aware of their inferior position
in the compensation hierarchy and a perceived loss of social status
could fuel their future pay demands. 442 Those who set executive
remuneration will be sympathetic to such claims since the frugal
compensation packages could be perceived as a tacit admission that
the management team is "below average."443 Also, there will be fears
that valued executives will defect to rivals offering more generous
terms .444
Once those who set executive pay on behalf of a company
discover that senior management is "underpaid," the obvious response
439. Iacobucci, supra note 436, at 497-501.
440. Id. at 497.
441. Id. at 502-03; Yun M. Park et al., Executive Pay and the Disclosure Environment, 24 J.
FIN. RES. 347 (2001). Note, though, that research conducted in New Zealand, which bolstered
executive pay disclosure somewhat in the early 1990s, does not reveal the same pattern. See
ALEKSANDAR ANDJELKOVIC ET AL., PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: Do
SHAREHOLDERS NEED TO KNOW? (Working Paper, 2000); FAYEZ A. ELAYAN, EXECUTIVE
INCENTIVE COMPENSATION SCHEMES AND THEIR IMPACT ON CORPORATE PERFORMANCE:
EVIDENCE FROM NEW ZEALAND SINCE LEGAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS BECAME EFFECTIVE
(Working Paper, 2001).
442. Thomas & Martin, supra note 104, at 1041-42.
443. Room at the Top, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, at 19.
444. Peter Rodgers, The Greenbury Effect: Is It Pushing Pay Higher?, INDEP., Apr. 26, 1996,
at 21.
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will be to offer more lucrative deals. If all companies ultimately follow
this pattern and seek to match or exceed the "market rate," the
inevitable result will be an upward "ratchet" in pay. 445 Consistent
with this line of reasoning, there has been much speculation in the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia that the introduction of more
rigorous executive pay disclosure requirements in the 1990s
accelerated increases in managerial remuneration. 446 Empirical work
done on Canada indicates that such suspicions are well-founded.
447
It is ironic that increased disclosure might contribute to an
American-style executive pay spiral. Board Capture theorists and
others who are concerned that top managers are paid "too much" are
keen supporters of enacting these changes. 448 For instance, when
Ontario bolstered executive pay disclosure in 1993, a left-wing
administration was in power that was concerned about the excesses of
free-market economics. This led a columnist in a leading Canadian
newspaper to suggest that the "real motivation" for reform "was to
plunge the population into an egalitarian snit over the money paid to
the capitalist scoundrels who run private-sector corporations. '" 449
Matters did not quite work out as planned. As the same columnist
observed in 2001, "[s]o far, the only impact of the disclosure has been
to drive compensation higher as companies now compete more
aggressively for talent."450
Nevertheless, the Board Capture Theory does highlight some
aspects of the American executive pay process that are alarming. For
example, it points out several important flaws in the current
American practices in setting executive pay, particularly the
pernicious effects of pay surveys and captive pay consultants. 451 There
445. Room at the Top, supra note 443; How Greenbury Has Boosted Executive Excess, INDEP.,
June 29, 1996, at 17.
446. On the UK, see COMM. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE 4.5 (1998) (Sir Ronald Hampel, Committee chairman); Rodgers, supra note 444.
On Canada, see lacobucci, supra note 436, at 512; Barbara Shecter, Canadian CEOs Enjoy
Average 8 percent Hike in Compensation, FIN. POST, Sept. 25, 1996, at 5. On Australia, see
Margot Saville, Up, Up and... Execs Double Pay in 5 Years, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 16,
2000, at 29.
447. PARK ET AL., supra note 191.
448. See, e.g., CHEFFINS, supra note 119, at 699; Rodgers, supra note 444; Power Politics,
American Style, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 1995, at 67.
449. Terence Corcoran, Executive Pay Is Not About Social Justice, GLOBE & MAIL, May 14,
1994, at B2; see also Terence Corcoran, Raestone Kops Storm Executive Suite, GLOBE & MAIL,
Oct. 16, 1993, at B2.
450. Terence Corcoran, Executive Hunting Season, NAT. POST, Apr. 3, 2001, at C19.
451. It should be noted that the empirical evidence on the influence of CEOs over
Compensation Committees is mixed. Murphy, supra note 1, at 25 (summarizing studies).
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is also empirical evidence that some boards of directors are subject to
management capture.
452
These facts fall short, however, of demonstrating that the
present system suffers from a breakdown. As one commentator noted:
The work of those who criticize CEO pay, although appealing, simply does not "prove"
that any particular CEO is overpaid, much less that an entire class of CEOs is overpaid.
What is lacking in such work is some indication of what the CEOs would earn if the
market for their services were more efficient. In the absence of evidence that the
"overpaid" individuals would have been willing to accept less for their services, or that
CEOs occupy some sort of monopoly position regarding executive services, it is difficult
to accept the proposition as proven.
4 5 3
In my view, economic forces are the most important factors in the
determination of the market pay rate for CEOs and other top
executives. The CEO's contribution to her firm's value, or the top
executive's best alternative job opportunities, are powerful
explanations of her relative pay scale. It seems unlikely that these
values are fixed through some massive secret conspiracy to keep
managerial pay levels high.
B. The Theories Developed in This Paper Support the Claim that
Government Intervention in Executive Pay Markets Is Unnecessary
With each of the five theories advanced in this paper,
government intervention to close the international pay gap is not
desirable. If the Marginal Revenue Product Theory is an accurate
description of how executive pay is set in the market place, then
executive pay levels are set at (or close to) the amount that CEOs
contribute to firm value. In this scenario, international convergence to
U.S. pay levels would occur if, and only if, the economic value of
foreign executives to their firms increased enough to entitle them to
receive higher compensation. This type of change would arise only if
foreign CEOs' decision-making powers increased, foreign firms grew
larger, or foreign firms' growth opportunities expanded. No form of
government intervention would therefore be desirable.
The Tournament Theory would lead to convergence if the
position of CEO in a foreign company becomes as powerful as in the
American firm, so that the prize to the victor is equally large. As with
the first theory, higher foreign CEO pay seems justifiable only if these
managers became more powerful. Cultural forces may constrain pay
levels for a period of time, but ultimately underlying economic
452. John C. Coates, IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable
Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 844-45 (1999).
453. Loewenstein, supra note 437, at 205.
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pressures will lead managerial pay toward levels that reflect the value
of winning the tournament. Higher pay reflects the greater economic
payoff of victory in the internal labor market sweepstakes. Again,
government intervention seems unnecessary.
Opportunity Cost Theory leads to the conclusion that foreign
firms will pay their executives on an American pay scale only if these
executives can get alternative positions at that price. If foreign
financial markets are making it easier for top managers from these
countries to obtain financing to start up their own firms or to engage
in leveraged buyouts of existing firms, or if the market for foreign
executives is expanding outside of purely domestic frontiers, then
foreign managers' opportunity costs of remaining at their current
employers are rising. This change in their economic opportunities
should lead to an increase in their pay levels. Again, convergence to
higher (or lower) pay levels will depend on movements in economic
forces, not government intervention.
Increased foreign CEO pay under the Bargaining Power Theory
would be the result of a shift in CEOs' power to oppose takeovers and
a rise in the use of stock options. More hostile takeovers abroad,
accompanied by declines in concentrated ownership patterns, could
move executive pay toward U.S. levels. 454 If these changes make the
foreign market for corporate control more efficient, then the resulting
benefits may offset any increase in executive pay, so that the resulting
outcome is at least wealth-neutral for shareholders in foreign
companies. Although there are distributional consequences to
increased executive power, policy makers would need to change their
views on the desirability of hostile takeovers in order to change the
underlying motivations for higher American executive pay.
If we look at convergence through the lens of the Risk
Adjustment Theory, then international pay convergence will only
occur if U.S. and foreign CEOs' firm-specific risk levels converge.
Empirically, this is a difficult claim to test because of the paucity of
data available on CEOs' individual wealth levels and stockholdings.
The one component we can most easily observe, stock option usage, is
presently quite different, with U.S. levels far exceeding those abroad.
For the near future, this trend seems likely to continue, making it
difficult to forecast convergence any time soon.
454. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 458 (2000).
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X. CONCLUSIONS
The international executive pay gap is one of the great puzzles
of executive compensation. In this paper, I have argued that the
divergence between American and foreign CEO pay can be explained
by a variety of market-based theories. I claim that such theories cast
more light on the persistence of these wage gaps than sole reliance on
board capture claims. Does the international pay gap constitute a
crisis in corporate governance that requires government intervention?
No. For one thing, international pay levels are largely determined by
underlying economic forces, such as the marginal revenue product of
executives, the difference in alternative job prospects, and the
relatively larger size of American firms. These factors are dictated by
markets and will adjust as markets adjust. The pay gap will disappear
if these conditions move toward convergence.
Even if the pay gap is partially explained by differences in the
relative bargaining power of American executives, it is unclear
whether such differences arise from Board Capture or the Bargaining
Power Theory. Which one is right leads to very different policy
implications.
Finally, even if you believe that executive pay levels are just
too high, so that they are in some sense of the word "unfair," there is
evidence that they have stopped growing. The current economic
slowdown has adversely affected executive pay levels both in the U.S.
and abroad.455 Corporate boards are looking harder at all aspects of
executive compensation, especially large stock option awards and
severance packages, as their firm's stock prices drop. Much more work
needs to be done in this area before scholars can confidently predict
what policies, if any, governments, self-regulatory organizations, and
firms ought to be adopting.
455. See, e.g., Joseph E. Bachelder, Executive Compensation: Impact of Current Turmoil on
Executive Pay, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 30, 2002, at 3 (noting that long term incentives given to executives
are hit the hardest by a slowing economy); Kathy M. Kristof, Executive Pay Report: Working to
Retire Overcompensation: Some Firms in Southland are Tying CEO Pay to Performance, L.A.
TIMES, Jun. 2, 2002, at 1 (noting that some firms' performance-based compensation plans are
designed to cut executive compensation during economic downturns); Hope Yen, CEOs Try to
Restore Credibility: Gathering Reveals Misery, Frustration, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 21, 2002, at 1
(nothing that reducing executive pay is seen as a viable option for increasing performances of
companies).

